Warranties: Continued Readability Problems After the 1975 Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act

A major thrust of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (MMWA) passed by Congress in 1975 is to make warranties “easy to read and understand.” This study examines readability levels for 121 warranties in ten categories of consumer durables. The warranties analyzed are found to require readability levels beyond what most Americans have attained. Limited warranties require significantly higher readability levels than full warranties. Results suggest the MMWA, since passage in 1975, may have increased the number of limited warranties and the difficulty of reading level.     

Absolute and Relative Restriction and Consumer Behavior: Implications for Understanding Global Consumption

Our premise is that researchers have much to gain from an understanding of the global marketplace experiences of impoverished consumers. We argue that influences of absolute and relative restriction, across peoples and societies, are particularly critical. Therefore, this research makes progress by evaluating consumer data from diverse cultures and nations using hierarchical linear models, revealing ways restriction through poverty and consumption impacts well‐being. We find that understanding both absolute and relative poverty is necessary for a more complete picture. Specifically, interactions show that absolute restriction moderates relationships between relative restriction and consumption and well‐being by muting or exacerbating the effects.     

Agricultural extension system reform and agent time allocation in China

We conducted a nationally representative survey to measure the impact of China's institutional reforms in public agricultural extension on the time allocation of its one million agricultural extension agents. We found that Chinese agents spent much less time than their titles would suggest on providing agricultural extension services, and that agents whose base salaries were funded fully or partially by commercial activities spent substantially less time serving farmers. The institutional incentives associated with the source of funding have a much larger effect on agent time allocation than do the levels of funding. We conclude that the recent government policy to separate commercial activities from extension services is a step in the right direction and should be expanded. The results also suggest that, at least for agricultural extension, the goal of many national governments and international donors to develop locally financing institutions to sustain development projects may be misguided.     

CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments

This article examines incentives for adopting antitakeover charter amendments (ATAs) that are associated with compensation contracts. The evidence is consistent with the hypothesis that antitakeover measures such as ATAs help managers protect above-market levels of compensation. Chief executive officers (CEOs) of firms that adopt ATAs receive higher salaries and more valuable option grants than CEOs at similar firms that do not adopt them. Furthermore, the magnitude of this difference increases following ATA adoption. The evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that ATAs facilitate the writing of efficient compensation contracts.     

How Do Quasi‐Random Option Grants Affect CEO Risk‐Taking?

We examine how an increase in stock option grants affects CEO risk‐taking. The overall net effect of option grants is theoretically ambiguous for risk‐averse CEOs. To overcome the endogeneity of option grants, we exploit institutional features of multiyear compensation plans, which generate two distinct types of variation in the timing of when large increases in new at‐the‐money options are granted. We find that, given average grant levels during our sample period, a 10% increase in new options granted leads to a 2.8% to 4.2% increase in equity volatility. This increase in risk is driven largely by increased leverage.     

Market Expectations in the Cross‐Section of Present Values

Returns and cash flow growth for the aggregate U.S. stock market are highly and robustly predictable. Using a single factor extracted from the cross‐section of book‐to‐market ratios, we find an out‐of‐sample return forecasting R² of 13% at the annual frequency (0.9% monthly). We document similar out‐of‐sample predictability for returns on value, size, momentum, and industry portfolios. We present a model linking aggregate market expectations to disaggregated valuation ratios in a latent factor system. Spreads in value portfolios’ exposures to economic shocks are key to identifying predictability and are consistent with duration‐based theories of the value premium.