Bureaucratic Advice and Political Governance

This paper studies the conflict of interest between politicians and better-informed bureaucrats when they have differing preferences over a public project. We start with a baseline model where a bureaucrat advises a single decision maker (politician) whether to adopt a project. The bureaucrat can be punished if his misrepresentation of the project is detected. We extend this to multiple projects and multiple bureaucrats, and compare the level of Type I and Type II errors generated with centralized and decentralized decision making. This typically depends on the form of the distribution function that determines the bureaucrats' expectation of being disciplined.     

TRADE IMPACTS ON SKILL ACQUISITION VIA VARIETY EXPANSION*

We show that trade enhances skill formation through gains from trade via variety expansion à la Krugman. Although workers are identical as unskilled labour, they differ in productivity as skilled labour. Workers become skilled by incurring training costs. By introducing these settings into a trade model with monopolistic competition, we show that, although trade makes all agents better off, its effect is stronger for skilled than unskilled workers, which stimulates skill acquisition. As a result of less productive workers becoming skilled, the wage dispersion among skilled workers increases.     

QUANTITY OR QUALITY: THE IMPACT OF LABOUR SAVING INNOVATION ON US AND JAPANESE GROWTH RATES, 1960–2004*

This article deals with both theoretical and empirical analyses of the post‐war (1960–2004) growth for the USA and Japan. We investigated three factors contributing to growth: the growth rates of capital, labour and labour saving innovation. In Japan, the growth rate of the labour force has been much less important than its quality improvement—i.e. labour saving technical change—while in the USA, the growth rates of labour and population have contributed more than their quality improvement. The policy implication is that Japan's declining population can be compensated for by additional quality improvement of the existing labour force.     

IDEAL AND REAL JAPANESE MONETARY POLICY: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL AND OPTIMAL POLICY MEASURES*

This paper discusses the successes and failures of Japanese monetary policy by evaluating policies from January 1980 to May 2003 in the light of optimal policy rules. First, we quantitatively conceptualize the Bank of Japan (BOJ)'s policy decisions by employing Bernanke and Mihov's (1998 ) econometric methodology for developing monetary policy measures and term the resulting policy measure the ‘actual policy measure’. Next, assuming that the BOJ is committed to optimal policy rules, we simulate optimal policy paths, which we term ‘optimal policy measures’. We evaluate Japanese monetary policy historically by comparing actual and optimal policy measures.     

Optimal Income Taxation with Risky Earnings: A Synthesis

We study optimal nonlinear income taxation when earnings can differ because of both ability and luck, so the income tax has both a redistributive role and an insurance role. A substantial literature on optimal redistribution in the absence of risk has evolved since Mirrlees's original contribution. The literature on the income tax as a social insurance device is more limited. It has largely assumed that households are ex ante identical so unequal earnings are due to risk alone. We provide a general treatment of the optimal income tax under risk when households differ in ability. We characterize optimal marginal tax rates and interpret them in terms of redistribution, insurance, and incentive effects. The case of ex ante identical households and the no‐risk case with heterogeneous abilities come out as special cases.     

Altruism,Liquidity Constraint,and Investment in Education

In Japan and other East Asian societies, household educational expenditures per child (especially private tutoring expenditures) have increased sharply, perhaps to an excessive degree. This paper suggests a rationale for many families to invest extensively in education, whereas other relevant literature rarely addresses the possibility of excessive educational investment. Introducing altruism and liquidity constraints into a model in which parent and child interact for determining investment in the child's education, we show that educational investment may be excessive unless the family is profoundly liquidity‐constrained. Our result extends previous findings incorporating the Samaritan's Dilemma. We also discuss public policy designed to remedy the inefficiency in educational investment.     

合资企业“独资化”的博弈分析

外商在华投资出现的独资化趋势,是基于中国加入WTO后国内投资环境和投资前景的变化、中外合资双方核心优势的得失变化等多种因素促成的结果,并不以东道国单方面的意志为转移。分析决定外商投资者在投资过程中采取何种投资形式的决定因素,并结合博弈论分析这些因素的变化是如何影响投资者对其投资形式的选择,从四个角度解释了合资企业的不稳定性原因,针对这一情况提出了积极的应对措施。     

INCOME REDISTRIBUTION IN URBAN CHINA BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM—AN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS BASED ON ANNUAL AND LIFETIME INCOME

This study investigates the redistributive effect of social security reform in urban China using the nationally representative urban household surveys of 1995 and 2002. The main findings are as follows. First, public pension is the main income for the elderly in urban China. The majority of people aged 60 and over (72% in 1995 and 82% in 2002) receive a pension. Second, the social security system in urban China has increased the income of low‐income and older age groups and reduced the relative poverty rate. However, the redistributive effect did not offset the expanding income inequality, which resulted in the Gini coefficient of redistributed income in 2002 being higher than that in 1995. Third, during 1995 and 2002, both low‐income and high‐income groups received a positive net benefit from the social security system, but the net benefit increased with income. The Chinese social security system lacks progressivity in contribution, and does not favor the poor in terms of benefits. Fourth, assuming that the reformed policy was applied to public sector employees, the long‐term redistributive effect of the pension system for the working population, calculated using their lifetime income, is larger. (JEL D31, H55, I38)