Voluntary Disclosures and Analyst Feedback

We study the resource allocation role of voluntary disclosures when feedback from financial markets is potentially useful to managers in undertaking value maximizing actions. Managers weigh the short‐term price implications of disclosure against the long‐term efficiency gains due to feedback while financial analysts strategically produce information. The model can explain why managers disclose bad information (e.g., grim outlook), that reduces the stock price, and why prices respond more strongly to bad news relative to good news. We find that not all firms enjoy the same quality of feedback, and that feedback, by itself, does not induce more disclosure but less.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Voluntary Disclosure with Informed Trading in the IPO Market

We examine voluntary disclosure and capital investment by an informed manager in an initial public offering (IPO) in the presence of informed and uninformed investors. We find that in equilibrium, disclosure is more forthcoming—and investment efficiency is lower—when a greater fraction of the investment community is already informed. Moreover, managers disclose more information when the likelihood of an information event is higher, more equity is issued, or the cost of information acquisition is lower. Investment efficiency and the expected level of underpricing are non‐monotonic in the likelihood that the manager is privately informed.     

Screening Talent for Task Assignment: Absolute or Percentile Thresholds?

Matching talents to tasks is an important part of job design. Organizations routinely use performance thresholds to group agents by talent. We see thresholds defined both in terms of an individual's own performance (absolute value) and in terms of peer performance (percentile). Intuition suggests a preference for percentile thresholds because the resulting rank-order statistic is sufficient to assess relative talent. Yet, in the context of a task assignment problem in which the objective is to match talent with task type (using two agents and two task types), we show that absolute thresholds can dominate percentile thresholds under either of two conditions. First, flexibility in task assignment tilts the balance toward absolute thresholds. Second, performance manipulation can adversely affect the inherent advantage of percentile thresholds because they motivate agents to invest relatively more in personally costly influence activities to cast their performance in a favorable light. We examine how these results hold up when there are countably large number of agents and discuss empirical implications.