排序方式: 共有2条查询结果,搜索用时 15 毫秒
1
1.
Loan syndication involves a repeated game between lead banks and syndicate members. Lead banks do not use their private information to exploit syndicate participants but rather focus on accurately certifying loan quality. Using borrowers' financial ratios (shifts in Altman's Z scores) after origination to proxy for bank private information, we find that lead banks syndicate larger proportions of loans that subsequently do not experience lower Z scores. Performance pricing covenants under which borrowers commence to pay higher spreads if ratios (or credit ratings) deteriorate constitute a positive signal reducing agency costs and are associated with higher proportions of syndication. 相似文献
2.
Do Tighter Loan Covenants Signal Improved Future Corporate Results? The Case of Performance Pricing Covenants
下载免费PDF全文
![点击此处可从《Financial Management》网站下载免费的PDF全文](/ch/ext_images/free.gif)
Mehdi Beyhaghi Kamphol Panyagometh Aron A. Gottesman Gordon S. Roberts 《Financial Management》2017,46(3):593-625
Covenants in corporate bonds and loan agreements mitigate agency conflicts between borrowers and lenders and may provide a signal of borrower quality to help resolve information asymmetry. Performance pricing covenants in bank loans specify automatic adjustments to loan spreads based on borrowers’ subsequent performance. Our covenant signaling framework views interest‐decreasing performance pricing as a tight covenant associated with borrowers’ private information on improved future performance accompanied by reduced credit risk. This positive signal is associated with larger positive loan announcement returns and greater improvements in future borrower performance. Further, in addition to signaling value, we find that the spread impact of this class of covenant also depends on its option value and reduction in transaction costs. 相似文献
1