How Preussag Became TUI: A Clinical Study of Institutional Blockholders and Restructuring in Europe

Between 1997 and 2004, Preussag, a diversified German conglomerate of "old economy" businesses, transformed itself into TUI, a company focused almost entirely on tourism and logistics. We analyze how Preussag executed this change, and how the change contributed to Preussag's underperformance in the stock market. We find that only the divestitures created value, that the strategy to invest in tourism destroyed value, and that the acquisition premiums Preussag paid were mostly unjustified. The case shows how divestiture programs increase the liquid resources available to management and casts doubt on the positive governance role of institutional blockholders.     

Stemming the gender gap in STEM entrepreneurship – insights into women’s entrepreneurship in science,technology, engineering and mathematics

Science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) fields are notably important for innovation and technological development, which in turn are seen as drivers of social and economic growth. Hence, researchers and policy-makers have paid substantial attention to analyzing and promoting high-growth ventures in STEM fields. However, STEM fields are highly gender-skewed, regardless of whether the population considered is students, faculty members, graduates, top managers, or entrepreneurs. This is noticeable in the small number of women entrepreneurs with STEM backgrounds. This underrepresentation of women in innovation-driven business startups highlights existing gender biases and systemic disadvantages in social structures, making visible the double masculinity that exists at the intersection of STEM and entrepreneurship. This article addresses this issue by combining insights from research about women’s entrepreneurship and research about the gender aspects of STEM fields. We emphasize institutional, organizational, and individual factors influencing women’s entrepreneurship in STEM fields, laying the foundation for the articles included in this special issue. Finally, we discuss the way forward for research on the gender aspects of STEM entrepreneurship to help us create the knowledge needed to close this gender gap.

     

“Managing” Corporate Community Involvement

In academic research, many attempts have been undertaken to legitimize corporate community involvement by showing a business case for it. However, much less attention has been devoted to building understanding about the actual dynamics and challenges of managing CCI in the business context. As an alternative to existing predominantly static and top-down approaches, this paper introduces a social movement framework for analyzing CCI management. Based on the analysis of qualitative case study data, we argue that the active role of employees pressuring for CCI policies and practices, as well as the organization audience responses to their efforts, are at the core of the challenges involved in managing CCI. These challenges also pose limits to how far CCI can be extended to a “business as usual” activity.     

Restricting CEO pay

We analyze several proposals to restrict CEO compensation and calibrate two models of executive compensation that describe how firms would react to different types of restrictions. We find that many restrictions would have unintended consequences. Restrictions on total realized (ex-post) payouts lead to higher average compensation, higher rewards for mediocre performance, lower risk-taking incentives, and the fact that some CEOs would be better off with a restriction than without it. Restrictions on total ex-ante pay lead to a reduction in the firm's demand for CEO talent and effort. Restrictions on particular pay components, and especially on cash payouts, can be easily circumvented. While restrictions on option pay lead to lower risk-taking incentives, restrictions on incentive pay (stock and options) result in higher risk-taking incentives.     

Timing and Wealth Effects of German Dual Class Stock Unifications

This paper studies the reasons and the costs of separating ownership from control by analysing the decision of German dual class firms to consolidate their share structure from dual to single class equity between 1990 and 2001. We find that the firm value increases significantly by an average 4% on the announcement day. A significant part of the variation in abnormal returns can be explained by the ownership structure and by changes in liquidity. A logit analysis of the unification decision yields that firms are more likely to unify if their controlling shareholder loses only little voting power in a stock unification. Also, firms that are financially constrained are more likely to abolish dual class shares; these firms often issue additional shares after the stock unification.     

Discussion of “Are CEOs compensated for value destroying growth in earnings?”

This discussion provides several explanations for the evidence presented in Balachandran and Mohanram (2010) that are consistent with efficient contracting. I also show that—contrary to the suggestion of the title—CEOs do not benefit from value destroying growth in earnings. Finally, I argue that there is no conclusive evidence that corporate investments destroy value.