Using Industry-Sponsored Game Nights to Educate About Risk and Insurance

As educators in the field of risk management and insurance, we see know- ledge of risk management and insurance as a core business function. However, some colleagues and students see insurance as cold-call sales or companies with a lot of money that continue to raise their prices. So we have to find ways to make our public aware of the usefulness of risk management and insurance in the business world and in private life and of the opportunities that having such knowledge presents to all business majors and business people. One method that is beginning to show dramatic improvements in at least our students' perceptions of the field and the major involves industry-sponsored game nights. While not an academic endeavor nor strictly risk management education, we believe the idea provides a useful tool for opening students' eyes to the need for knowledge of risk management and insurance and of the opportunities that are available in the insurance industry and its related fields. This article discusses the history of such an event at Appalachian State Univer- sity, the current status of the North Carolina Surplus Lines Association (NCSLA) event, and the benefits of the event.     

NONPROFIT EMPLOYEES' MACHIAVELLIAN PROPENSITIES

Nonprofit organizations are held to high ethical standards due to their charitable missions serving the common good. Incidents of fiscal mismanagement within the nonprofit sector make it relevant to assay the ethical principles of employees. This study examines the level of Machiavellian propensities of US nonprofit employees. Results indicate Machiavellian propensities do exist in certain nonprofit employees and these employees agree with questionable behavior. Policy makers and oversight agencies may find these results useful in developing corporate governance and accountability measures for nonprofit organizations. Furthermore, board of director members may use these results to monitor employee actions and address management training.     

Correction to: Earnings announcement return extrapolation

Review of Accounting Studies - A Correction to this paper has been published: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11142-021-09605-9     

Are serial Condorcet rules strategy-proof?

Abstract. This paper explores the extent to which majority rule is invulnerable to manipulation by individuals and coalitions, even when majority rule is used to select more than one alternative. The resulting rule may or may not be strategy-proof, depending on the size of the coalitions that can form, and on the nature of the individual preferences over sets of alternatives. No individual can manipulate with respect to a wide family of preferences over sets. The only restriction on the domain of true and revealed individual preferences is that the selection rule is always well defined. Received: 1 November 1999 / Accepted: 7 May 2001 We thank two anonymous referees for suggestions that have significantly improved the paper. We are also grateful to l'Université de Caen for sponsoring a Workshop on Social Choice Theory, where a first draft of this paper was presented in May, 1999, and to the workshop participants for helpful observations. Work on the final version of the paper was done while one of the authors was a guest of the Project on Intergenerational Equity supported by the Ministry of Education, Science, and Technology of Japan. We are grateful to the Ministry and to the project leader, Professor Kotaro Suzumura, for their support.     

In support of the new working class thesis: the case of the Irish white collar worker

This study, using data collected from 325 Irish white-collar employees in the private sector, examines the extent to which white-collar trade unionism may be regarded as a response to concern about the lack of achievement of desired levels of self-expression at work.     

Price and quantity regulation in general equilibrium

We consider a general equilibrium model with a production externality (e.g. pollution), where the regulator does not observe firm productivity shocks. We examine quantity (permit) regulation and price (tax) regulation. The quantity of permits issued by the regulator are independent of the productivity shock, since shocks are unobserved. Price regulation implies use of the regulated input is an increasing function of the productivity shock because firms take advantage of a good productivity shock by increasing input use. Thus price regulation generates higher average, but more variable, production. Therefore, we show that in general equilibrium the relative advantage of quantity versus price regulation depends not only on the slopes of marginal benefits and costs, but on general equilibrium effects such as risk aversion. The general equilibrium effects are often more important than the slopes of the marginal benefits and cost curves. In the simplest model, a reasonable risk aversion coefficient implies quantity regulation generates higher welfare regardless of the benefit function.     

Lebesgue measure and social choice trade-offs

Summary An Arrovian social choice rule is a social welfare function satisfying independence of irrelevant alternatives and transitivity of social preference. Assume a measurable outcome spaceX with its (Lebesgue) measure normalized to unity. For any Arrovian rule and any fractiont, either some individual dictates over a subset ofX of measuret or more, or at least a fraction 1–t of the pairs of distinct alternatives have their social ordering fixed independently of individual preferences. Also, for any positive integer (less than the total number of individuals), there is some subsetH of society consisting of all but persons such that the fraction of outcome pairs (x, y) that are social ranked without consulting the preferences of anyone inH, whenever no individual is indifferent betweenx andy, is at least 1–1/4.We are grateful to Roy Mathias and Daniel Waterman for help with some technical matters, and to chairman Jim Follain and the Syracuse University Economics Department for financing the exchange that launched this project. Campbell's research was funded by National Science Foundation grants, SES 9007953 and SES 9209039.     

Intraday Empirical Analysis and Modeling of Diversified World Stock Indices

This paper proposes an approach to the intraday analysis of diversified world stock accumulation indices. The growth optimal portfolio (GOP) is used as reference unit or benchmark in a continuous financial market model. Diversified portfolios, covering the world stock market, are constructed and shown to approximate the GOP, providing the basis for a range of financial applications. The normalized GOP is modeled as a time transformed square root process of dimension four. Its dynamics are empirically verified for several world stock indices. Furthermore, the evolution of the transformed time is modeled as the integral over a rapidly evolving mean-reverting market activity process with deterministic volatility. The empirical findings suggest a rather simple and robust model for a world stock index that reflects the historical evolution, by using only a few readily observable parameters. Mathematics Subject Classification: (1991) primary 90A12, secondary 60G30,62P20 JEL Classification: G10, G13