When an executive defects

The news that one of the company's senior managers is leaving comes as a complete surprise to Paul Simmonds, CEO of Kinsington Textiles, Inc. Ned Carpenter, KTI's vice president of operations for three years, writes in his resignation letter than he is leaving for a better opportunity. Simmonds soon learns that Carpenter's new job is at Daltex, one of KTI's main rivals in the intensely competitive carpet industry. Hiring Carpenter had helped Simmonds establish his reputation as a topnotch manager. Carpenter came to KTI with lots of ideas and put his enthusiasm to good use. Three years into a five-year change program, Carpenter had turned KTI's operations from one of the worst in the industry to one of the best. He also had helped develop and plan the upcoming launch of a new fiber coating--KTI's first breakthrough in years. In this fictitious case study, Simmonds, along with the company's counsel and vice president of human resources, must figure out how much and what sort of damage control they need. What are they going to tell the company's employees and the media? Should they immediately replace Carpenter with John Brady, the second-in-command of operations? What if Carpenter is taking KTI employees--and strategic information--with him to Daltex? Should Simmonds ask all his managers to sign noncompete agreements-something Carpenter was never asked to do? Should KTI sue Carpenter? Five experts offer advice about communicating with KTI's employees, the media, and Carpenter himself, and about protecting the company's confidential information.     

McCloskey, economics as conversation, and Sprachethik

In writing about the 'rhetoric of economics' - particularlyabout the standards which prevent situations where 'anythinggoes' in argument - McCloskey takes an eclectic approach totwo philosophical positions, based on Rorty and Habermas respectively.But these positions, despite sharing some common aspects, alsodifferentiate themselves from each other sharply in importantways. In this paper, it is argued that this eclecticism of McCloskeyis not coherent, as a result of her not completely graspingthe fundamental differences between these two positions, andthat this incoherence has damaging implications for her projectof the rhetoric of economics.     

TOP MANAGEMENT TURNOVER AND CEO SUCCESSION: AN INVESTIGATION OF THE EFFECTS OF TURNOVER ON PERFORMANCE

One strategic action which is often taken by firms in need of a turnaround is to bring in a new chief executive officer (CEO). Many observers argue, however, that having done this the new CEO must replace large numbers of top managers in order to effect a change in the firm's interactions and subsequent performance. Critics of this perspective insist that just the opposite is true. Substantial levels of turnover may only serve to further disrupt the organization decreasing performance still more. This controversy is addressed in the following study using a sample of 84 firms all of which experienced CEO succession during the year 1980. Analyses rely on a three-year-period pre-succession and three-year period post-succession. Three hypotheses are proposed. First, poor performance prior to CEO succession leads to greater turnover afterward. Second, that turnover is curvilinearly related to performance after the succession. And, finally, that successor type (i.e. whether the CEO was an inside or outside candidate) is related to the level of turnover in upper level management positions in the post-succession period. the results from tests of these hypotheses are presented, and the implications of these findings are discussed.     

Leadership development: perk or priority?

Karen Barton, Zendal Pharmaceuticals' senior vice president of human resources, was livid when COO Dave Palmer slashed her executive education budget by 75%. It must have been a mistake. Without funding there could be no in-house leadership development program, which was to be the first step toward a full-blown Zendal University. But it wasn't a mistake. Not that Palmer was against bold initiatives, but, as he patiently told Barton, sales were down 26%, and there was that $300 million debt Zendal took on when it acquired Premier Pharmaceuticals. As a result, Barton's budget wasn't the only one being cut. Palmer added that it wasn't clear what the return on investment of her proposed program--or any of her current ones for that matter--would be. Barton's analysis had been woefully short on quantitative benefits. Figuring ROI for people isn't the same as calculating the payback from a machine, Barton complained to friend and ally Carlos Freitas, head of the medical devices division. But Freitas disagreed: "If you want dollars, you have to show how you fit in with [management's] plans. You must be willing to fight for resources with the rest of us." Barton bristled: "Don't you see that my department is connected to all the others? Every division benefits from the HR budget." But she knew Freitas was right. She needed to make the case that doubling her budget was a smart move even in tough times. The question was, How? Four commentators--Susan Burnett, an HR executive at Hewlett-Packard; Mike Morrison, dean of the University of Toyota; Noel M. Tichy, professor at the University of Michigan Business School; and David Owens, vice president of Bausch & Lomb's corporate university--offer advice in this fictional case study.     

Price formation on stock exchanges: the evolution of trading within the day

Prior analyses of prices of the NYSE and other exchanges findthat transitory price volatility is greater at the open of tradingthan at the close. We extend this line of research by using40 years of hourly Dow Jones 65 composite price index data toestimate transitory volatility throughout the trading day. Ourresults indicate that transitory volatility steadily declinesduring the trading day. We find a similar intraday decline intransitory volatility for a 2-year sample of the individualfirms in the Dow Jones 30 Industrials Index. The results areconsistent with the hypothesis that trading aids price formationand do not support the argument that particular trading mechanismsare the source of greater volatility at the open of trading.     

When consultants and clients clash

This fictitious case study explores the issues that surround the relationships between consultants and their clients, as well as the dynamics of a newly merged organization. Susan Barlow, a senior consultant with the Statler Group, dreaded her upcoming status meeting. She had thought it a lucky break when she got assigned to the Kellogg-Champion project. Royce Kellogg, the CEO of the newly merged firm, had engaged the Statler Group for what seemed a simple project: to reconcile the policies and practices of the two former firms now that they had become one. But once on the job, Barlow realized that the issues were much more complex than they had seemed. The new firm needed help badly-but not the kind of help that the client had led Barlow to believe it needed. What would she and Jim Roussos, her partner on the assignment, tell Kellogg at the meeting? Kellogg, for his part, was not looking forward to the status meeting, either. From his point of view, the consultants had caused more problems than they had solved. What's more, he wasn't even dealing with the consultants he had hired. Where was George Gray, the senior partner he had met with originally? Maybe Barlow and Roussos were just too young and inexperienced. Kellogg felt he was getting a raw deal. How would he approach them in the morning? Should he fire them or make an attempt at damage control? Two experts advise the consultants and two advise the client on how to handle the status meeting.     

Tax planning, regulatory capital planning, and financial reporting strategy for commercial banks

We test whether banks' investment and financing policies canbe explained by tax status. We document changes in bank holdingsof municipal bonds in response to changes in tax rules relatingto deductibility of interest expense. We also document an associationbetween banks' marginal tax rates and their investment and financingdecisions, which is consistent with the existence of tax clienteles.However, banks do not sort themselves perfectly into investmentand financing clienteles because of adjustment costs. We positspecific types of transaction-cost impediments to tax planning,and document that banks apparently trade off these costs againsttax-planning benefits.