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Based on the universe of rate-regulated electric utilities in the U.S., we examine why firms alter their financing decisions when transitioning from a regulated to a competitive market regime. We find that the significant increase in regulatory risk after the passage of the Energy Policy Act, state-level restructuring legislations, and divestiture policies have reduced leverage by 15 percent. Policies that encouraged competition, and hence increased market uncertainty, lowered leverage by another 13 percent on average. The ability to exercise market power allowed some firms to counter this competitive threat. In aggregate, regulatory risk and market uncertainty variables reduce leverage between 24.6 and 26.7 percent. We also confirm findings in the literature that firms with higher profitability and higher asset growth have lower leverage, and those with more tangible assets are more levered. Firms with greater access to internal capital markets and those with a footloose customer segment use less debt, while those actively involved in trading power in the wholesale market use more debt. 相似文献
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This paper examines how loan covenant violations impact firm dividend policy. Using contract-level loan data for nonfinancial firms in the US, this study provides evidence that the occurrence of a covenant violation significantly increases the likelihood of a dividend reduction in the subsequent quarter. Moreover, we show that the degree of creditor–shareholder conflict and firm financial constraints are important determinants of dividend cuts upon technical default. Additionally, this paper finds the tendency of dividend cuts upon technical default weakened after the repeal of the Glass–Steagall Act. These findings suggest that loan covenants serve a critical role in mitigating creditor–shareholder conflicts. 相似文献
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We investigate whether the equity-linked components of top executive pay have an effect on patenting activity within a firm.
We find a positive relationship between firm patenting activity and managerial alignment incentives created by stock and stock
option grants. Prior work has shown that the market value of a firm reflects the value of its patents. Thus, our finding suggests
innovation is one such channel through which equity alignment incentives positively impact firm value. On the other hand,
we find that the risk-taking incentive from stock options does not increase patenting. 相似文献
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