Case for Evaluating Protection in an Economy-wide Perspective

‘Whether protectionism spreads, imposing major harm on the world economy, depends on three factors: the costs and benefits of trade for domestic political actors; these actors’ access to and control over the process of government; and the extent to which international commitments and obligations to trade policy are viewed as binding by national governments’ —Costs and Benefits of Protection (Paris: OECD Secretariat, 1985)     

The invisible backhand or the “New marketing concept” must be turning Adam Smith in his grave

The drive to enlarge the marketing concept to embrance non-profit organizations has drawn attention to the tools and techniques of marketing at the expense of an appreciation for marketing’s function in the business world. This paper calls for a renewed awareness of the central role of profits, particularly with respect to social responsibility concerns. Many actions by business labelled as socially responsible are merely the result of enlightened profit motivation. Those actions which sacrifice long run profit for social action are seen as being beyond the purview of the business enterprise.     

Economic Implications of WTO Negotiations on Non‐agricultural Market Access

The economic implications of current WTO negotiations are likely to be far reaching. The World Bank and UNCTAD estimate annual global gains in agriculture and non‐agricultural products (including fish) of about $70−150 billion each under various scenarios and technical assumptions. Liberalising trade in services could be even more important, especially if agreement were reached to facilitate the temporary movement of labour (Mode 4 under the General Agreement on Trade in Services, GATS). Some qualifications, however, are in order. First, gains are likely to be spread unevenly across countries and across sectors; and, second, short‐term adjustment costs might precede long‐term gains. Much depends on how ambitious liberalisation is and on policies to facilitate adjustment. This paper examines the Doha mandate in non‐agricultural market access (NAMA) and the current state of the WTO negotiations, in particular some key proposals being considered at the December 2005 Ministerial Meeting in Hong Kong. We analyse various scenarios and their implications for trade, welfare, output, employment, revenues and preferences, as well as the distributional effects across countries and sectors. We note possible adjustment problems related to balance of payments and structural adjustment, as well as revenue and preference losses. These suggest the need for ‘aid for trade’ to help developing countries realise gains possible from WTO negotiations.     

Option and non-use values and rail project appraisal

Option values and non-use values are well-known concepts in environmental economics, but so far there been few attempts to apply the concepts to the transportation field. This paper therefore firstly reviews empirical studies on transport option and non-use values, and secondly examines the inclusion of option and non-use values in five rail scheme appraisals in the UK. We find that whilst the evidence base is small, the importance of option and non-use values is large where user benefits are low and for projects involving the provision (or loss) of commuting opportunities (including station openings/closures).     

A NOTE ON THE AGGREGATION BIAS IN CURRENT PROCEDURES FOR THE MEASUREMENT OF TRADE BARRIERS

For purposes ranging from practical commercial policy matters to the testing of theoretical trade models, economists have utilized aggregate data relating to tariffs and non-tariff barriers (NTBs) across countries. However, the statistics employed in these analyses are generally derived using aggregation procedures which are based on weights relating to trade that occurs under restrictions. While it is recognized that this approach incorporates a bias in the resulting averages, due to the fact that the products facing the highest tariffs or NTBs enter the calculation with relatively low (actual) trade weights, little information is available for quantifying the magnitude of this bias. This study provides such empirical evidence and also proposes indices that overcome some shortcomings of the traditional measures.     

Trick or Treat? Development Opportunities and Challenges in the WTO Negotiations on Industrial Tariffs

Negotiations on industrial tariffs in the current WTO work programme have turned out to be surprisingly difficult. On the one hand, developing countries, particularly in Africa, are concerned about the potential negative effect on their industrial development of developed country efforts to push them into deep cuts in applied tariffs: after the disillusion of the Uruguay Round, promises of welfare gains seem unconvincing. On the other hand, a number of the more complex formula proposals for tariff‐cutting make it difficult for participants to evaluate what they have to do compared with what they hope to receive. The developing countries may achieve greater exports and welfare gains from the more ambitious proposals, but computations show that these also imply greater imports, lower tariff revenues, some labour market adjustments and reduced output in some politically sensitive sectors. Some way of assisting the developing countries in coping with these adjustments is required to take advantage of the opportunities presented by the negotiations.