Risk aversion, liquidity, and endogenous short horizons

We analyze a competitive model in which different informationsignals get reflected in value at different points in time.If investors are sufficiently risk averse, we obtain an equilibriumin which all investors focus exclusively on the short term.In addition, we show that increasing the variance of informationlesstrading increases market depth but causes a greater proportionof investors to focus on the short-term signal, which decreasesthe informativeness of prices about the long run. Finally, wealso explore parameter spaces under which long-term informedagents wish to voluntarily disclose their information.     

Environmental self-auditing: setting the proper incentives for discovery and correction of environmental harm

Many firms conduct 'environmental audits' to test compliancewith a complex array of environmental regulations. Commentatorssuggest, however, that self-auditing is not as common as itshould be, because firms fear that what they find will be usedagainst them. This article analyzes self-auditing as a two-tieredincentive problem involving incentives both to test for andto effect compliance. After demonstrating the inadequacy ofconventional remedies, we show that incentives can be properlyaligned by conditioning fines on firms' investigative effort.In practice, however, the regulator may not be able to observesuch effort. Accordingly, we propose and evaluate the use ofthree observable proxies for self-investigation: the mannerin which the regulator detected the violation; the firm's owndisclosure of violations; and the firm's observed correctiveactions. Each method has its own efficiency benefits and informationalrequirements, and each is distinct from EPA's current auditpolicy.     

Competition and regulation in the UK gas industry

The decade since privatization has seen gas change from an integratedmonopoly with no competition and without the structure necessaryto encourage it, to an industry moving rapidly towards fullcompetition. British Gas was privatized as an integrated monopoly;it had no regulation in the bulk market, and light regulationin the tariff market. Within 10 years it has lost more thanhalf its bulk market, has voluntarily 'demerged' into a transportationand supply arm, and is leading the way in liberalization ofthe residential market. Some of these changes have been assistedby the particular circumstances of the gas market, especiallythe contracts which the incumbent has inherited. The Regulatoris relying increasingly on prevention of undue discriminationfor control of the dominant supplier, and this principle hasbeen discussed and applied in a number of cases within the industry.Liberalization also raises important distributional issues,especially in the residential market.     

Virtuous capital: what foundations can learn from venture capitalists

U.S. foundations and nonprofits work diligently on behalf of society's most needy and yet report that progress is slow and social problems persist. How can they learn to be more effective with their limited resources? Foundations should consider expanding their mission from investing only in program innovation to investing in the organizational needs of nonprofit organizations as well. Their overemphasis on program design has meant deteriorating organizational capacity at many nonprofits. If foundations are to help nonprofits be assured of making payroll, paying the rent, or buying a much-needed computer, they must develop hands-on partnering skills. Venture capital firms offer a helpful benchmark. In addition to putting up capital, they closely monitor the companies in which they have invested, provide management support and stay involved long enough to see the company become strong. If foundation officers familiarize themselves with such practices, they can begin to build organizational capacity in the nonprofit sector. Foundations can hire organizational experts to assist grantees; they can lengthen grant terms to allow nonprofits to build up organization strengths; and they can create new classes of grants that allow for organizational effectiveness. Nonprofits in turn should articulate their organizational needs when applying for grants; they should apply to foundations known for longer-term grants; and they should create plans that justify long-term support from foundations.