UNIT MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS, STOCKHOLDER WEALTH, AND SELLING FIRMS' CHARACTERISTICS

Previous research on unit management buyouts, UMBs, has shown that selling firms benefit from the selloff transaction. The current research demonstrates that when the selling firm has either poor liquidity or poor earnings, selling firm shareholders do not benefit as much. We hypothesize that the unit managers have knowledge about the selling firm's difficulties so they do not pay as large a premium for the assets. Since the unit managers technically are employed by the selling firm shareholders, their bargaining to achieve a better price is an agency cost. Finally, selloff frequency does not affect seller abnormal returns.     

VARIANCE BOUND TESTS OF BOND MARKET EFFICIENCY

In this paper we examine variance bound tests of the joint hypothesis that (1) bond markets are efficient and (2) the term structure is determined by the expectations hypothesis. Both the Singleton and Shiller tests are shown to be seriously biased toward rejecting the joint hypothesis in finite samples. Flavin's test is unbiased but has a very high variance leading to many false rejections of the joint hypothesis. When corrected as suggested by Flavin, Shiller's test is unbiased and has a relatively low variance. Unfortunately, it is also sensitive to measurement error.     

Market efficiency and cointegration: Some evidence in Pacific-Basin black exchange markets

This paper investigates the efficiency of the black exchange markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan, and Thailand. The study applies unit root and cointegration tests to examine black exchange market efficiency of Pacific-Basin countries. The generating process of black exchange rates appears to be a random walk. This is consistent with Gupta (1981) and other foreign exchange rate unit root test studies. Johansen cointegration tests are performed for these black exchange markets together with Japan and Singapore. The results suggest that there is at least one unit root among the black market exchange rates. Hence, black exchange markets are not collectively efficient.     

Trust,terrorism, and technology

The development of civilization implies an evolution of complex trust mechanisms which integrate the social system and form bonds which allow individuals to interact, even if they are strangers. Key elements of trust are predictability of consequences and an evaluation of consequences in terms of self-interest or values. Values, ethics, and norms enhance predictability. The terrorist introduces an unpredictable event which has negative consequences, thus destroying trust. However, terrorist-like situations occur in day-to-day activities. Technology itself makes the world more interdependent and less predictable. Furthermore, technological accidents and disasters, which are also unpredictable and negative, may prompt individuals to perceive technology as if it were a terrorist. Louis H. Bluhm is Associate Professor of Sociology at the Mississippi State University. He has written several articles which have been published in Rural Sociology, and with P. M. Shingi he has written a chapter in a book.     

Expected inflation and the optimal number of nominal wage rate revisions

A neglected aspect of wage contracts, namely the number of times that the nominal wage rate will be revised during the course of a non-indexed contract, is considered. Theory and evidence suggest that the optimal number of revisions depends on the cost of each revision, expected inflation and contract length.