Risk Premium Shocks and the Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates

Quantitative dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models often admit that the zero bound on nominal interest rates does not constrain (optimal) monetary policy. Recent economic events, however, have reinforced the relevance of the zero bound. This paper sheds some light on this disconnect by studying a broad range of shocks within a standard DSGE model. In contrast to earlier studies, we find that risk premium shocks are key to building quantitative models where the zero bound is relevant for monetary policy design. Other commonly included shocks, such as productivity, government spending, and money demand shocks, are unable to push nominal rates close to zero.     

Recognition of Reserve Values in the Extractive Industries

An issue that focuses clearly on the difference between market and book values is accounting for reserves in the extractive industries. The primary determinant of the value of a minerals or oil-and-producer is the value of the reserves it controls. Hence, one might expect that managers acting to maximise the value of the firm would try to account for the value of reserves in a credible way. However, we show that financial-statement recognition of reserve values is rare. We review the reasons for the general reluctance to recognise reserve values in financial statements and comment on the few exceptions.     

Financial Reporting Quality and Wage Differentials: Evidence from Worker-Level Data

We examine whether financial reporting quality affects worker wages using employer-employee matched data in the United States. We find that low financial reporting quality is associated with a compensating wage differential—that is, a risk premium—using three distinct approaches while controlling for worker characteristics by (1) regressing wages on firm-year–level and firm-level reporting quality, (2) documenting wage changes when workers switch firms, and (3) estimating a structural approach that separates reporting quality from performance-related volatility. We find evidence consistent with two channels: performance pay and turnover risk, where workers bear risks from noise in performance measurement and unemployment, respectively. To mitigate endogeneity concerns, we show that—after the accounting scandals in 2002 and after the announcements of an internal control weakness (ICW)—former Arthur Andersen clients and ICW firms pay wage premiums to employees, with magnitudes between 0.9% and 2.8% of annual wages.