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Abstract. The decision to disclose information concerning a firm's environmental liabilities is modeled as a sequential game involving the firm, a capital market, and outside stakeholders who can impose proprietary (political) costs on the firm. A partial disclosure equilibrium is derived in which firms reveal information strategically, maximizing the share-value net of expected political costs. Inherent uncertainty regarding the existence and size of the liabilities creates a setting where outsiders are uncertain if management is informed about these liabilities, so firms can plausibly withhold “bad news”, that is, they do not disclose liabilities that exceed a threshold level. Three novel hypotheses are that a firm is more likely to disclose as (1) its pollution propensity increases, (2) outsiders' knowledge of its environmental liabilities increases, and (3) the risk of incurring proprietary costs decreases. Empirical support is found for the hypotheses, based on the accounting disclosures made by sample firms selected from the records of the Ontario Ministry of the Environment and Energy. Improved accounting and auditing standards for environmental disclosure would build on at least three implications of the study:
- 1 To the extent that inherent uncertainty leaves managers with discretion as to what to disclose, the partial disclosure equilibrium result suggests that not all firms will comply with disclosure standards.
- 2 Publishing broad environmental performance indicators for companies in nonaccounting outlets would increase public awareness of a manager's private information endowment, making voluntary accounting disclosures of the liabilities more likely.
- 3 If a significant decline in stakeholder tolerance of pollution occurs, the expected proprietary costs of disclosing increase, and companies become less likely to disclose.
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We explore the impact of supervision on the riskiness, profitability, and growth of U.S. banks. Using data on supervisors' time use, we demonstrate that the top-ranked banks by size within a supervisory district receive more attention from supervisors, even after controlling for size, complexity, risk, and other characteristics. Using a matched sample approach, we find that these top-ranked banks that receive more supervisory attention hold less risky loan portfolios, are less volatile, and are less sensitive to industry downturns, but do not have lower growth or profitability. Our results underscore the distinct role of supervision in mitigating banking sector risk. 相似文献
4.
Although women in the United States now complete more college degrees than men, the distribution of college majors among college graduates remains unequal, with women about two‐thirds as likely as men to major in business or science. We develop and estimate a dynamic, overlapping generations model of human capital investments and labor supply. We allow for specific college major choices, instead of aggregating these choices to the education level. Results show that changes in skill prices, higher schooling costs, and gender‐specific changes in home value were each important to the long‐term trends. 相似文献
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MATTHEW McGINTY 《Journal of Public Economic Theory》2011,13(2):311-325
This paper presents a rule to allocate a coalition’s worth for superadditive games with positive externalities. The allocation rule awards each member their outside payoff, plus an equal share of the surplus. The resulting allocation maximizes coalition stability. Stable coalitions are Strong Nash equilibria since no subset of members has an incentive to leave. Similarly, no subset of non‐members has an incentive to join a stable coalition if the game is concave in this region. The allocation is risk‐dominant. All stable coalitions are robust to the maximum probability of 50% that players’ deviate from their individual best‐responses. The paper compares the allocation to the Shapley value and the Nash bargaining solution, and illustrates why these traditional rules result in small coalitions when applied to issues such as international environmental agreements. 相似文献
6.
The Affordable Care Act (ACA) expands Medicaid coverage and creates subsidized state health insurance exchanges. The implementation of the ACA will impact the states and consequently the state residents differently. We discuss the factors contributing to the variation in uninsured rates and the Medicaid population, and we predict that these underlying economic, demographic factors and state policies will continue to affect health insurance coverage. Using data from the March 2010 Current Population Survey (CPS), we examine health care coverage at the state level prior to the ACA and forecast the percentage of state residents eligible for expanded Medicaid and the exchanges. Our results suggest the percentage of state population eligible for expanded Medicaid and subsidized exchanges will vary considerably, especially for adults. Further, we show that current state Medicaid eligibility rules, the percentage of employers offering health insurance and poverty rates will continue to shape the variation in projected health insurance coverage across the states. Finally, we discuss the potential impact of the Supreme Court decision that allowed states to opt‐out of Medicaid expansion. 相似文献
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SCOTT RICHARDSON SIEW HONG TEOH PETER D. WYSOCKI 《Contemporary Accounting Research》2004,21(4):885-924
It has been alleged that firms and analysts engage in an "earnings‐guidance game" where analysts first issue optimistic earnings forecasts and then "walk down" their estimates to a level that firms can beat at the official earnings announcement. We examine whether the walk‐down to beatable targets is associated with managerial incentives to sell stock after earnings announcements on the firm's behalf (through new equity issuance) or from their personal accounts (through option exercises and stock sales). Consistent with these hypotheses, we find that the walk‐down to beatable targets is most pronounced when firms or insiders are net sellers of stock after an earnings announcement. These findings provide new insights on the impact of capital‐market incentives on communications between managers and analysts. 相似文献
9.
MATTHEW J. SLAUGHTER 《劳资关系》2007,46(2):329-346
For decades, the private‐sector unionization rate in the United States has been falling. At the same time, the integration of the United States into the world economy has been rising. Many anecdotes suggest the latter has played a role in that decline, with unions feeling pressured to reduce employment and/or compensation demands in the face of rising cross‐border activity of employers. To investigate this possibility econometrically, in this paper I assembled a panel of U.S. manufacturing industries that matches union‐coverage rates with measures of global engagement such as exports, imports, tariffs, transportation costs, and foreign direct investment. The main finding is a statistically and economically significant correlation between falling union coverage and greater numbers of inward FDI transactions. Possible interpretations of this finding are then discussed. Because U.S. affiliates of foreign multinationals have higher unionization rates than U.S.‐based firms do, this correlation does not reflect just a compositional shift toward these affiliates. Instead, it may reflect pressure of international capital mobility on U.S.‐based companies, consistent with research on how rising capital mobility raises labor‐demand elasticities and alters bargaining power. 相似文献
10.
Using a sample of rural Chinese villages, which have recently been the subject of democratic reforms, we look for relationships between marginal changes in the democratic process and marginal changes in economic outcomes. We find that even very poorly conducted elections can have large incentive effects. That is, even corruptible elections provide leaders with strong incentives to act in the interests of their constituents. Our findings also allow us to rank the importance of four possible election reforms, which have attracted the attention of international observers and academic researchers. 相似文献