ON THE FIRST–ORDER EFFICIENCY AND ASYMPTOTIC NORMALITY OF MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATORS OBTAINED FROM DEPENDENT OBSERVATIONS

Abstract. In this paper we study the first–order efficiency and asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator obtained from dependent observations. Our conditions are weaker than usual, in that we do not require convergences in probability to be uniform or third–order derivatives to exist.
The paper builds on Witting and Nolle's result concerning the asymptotic normality of the maximum likelihood estimator obtained from independent and identically distributed observations, and on a martingale theorem by McLeish.     

Testing for Vertical Fiscal Externalities

The purpose of this paper is to design a test of whether the vertical external effects associated with tax base sharing among local and regional governments have become internalized via the intergovernmental transfer system. Such tests are important in the sense that the income tax rates chosen by different levels of government will generally be correlated, even if the resource allocation is optimal from society's point of view. By using panel data for the Swedish local and regional public sectors, the results imply that an increase in the regional income tax rate induces the municipalities in the region to decrease their income tax rates. In addition, we are able to reject the null hypothesis that the vertical external effects have become internalized.     

Stated Preferences, Real Behaviour and Anchoring: Some Empirical Evidence

We compare different contingent valuation question formats with each other and with observed behaviour for a non-monetary estimation task, the expected number of kilometers travelled by automobile. Open-ended questions, open-ended follow-up questions, dichotomous choice (DC) questions, and double-bound DC questions are included. The single and double-bound DC questions result in an estimated mean about twice as high as the actual value and the open-ended mean. The DC question overestimation seems to be due to an anchoring effect leading to yea-saying behaviour. Our results about the difference between DC questions and open-ended questions is consistent with the pattern observed in contingent valuations studies of the willingness to pay. Our results indicates that DC questions seem to be associated with a general overestimation problem that is present even for simple non-monetary estimation tasks.     

Job Polarization and Task‐Biased Technological Change: Evidence from Sweden, 1975–2005

In this paper, we show that between 1975 and 2005, Sweden exhibited a pattern of job polarization with expansions of the highest‐ and lowest‐paid jobs compared to middle‐wage jobs. The most popular explanation for such a pattern is the hypothesis of task‐biased technological change, where technological progress reduces the demand for routine middle‐wage jobs but increases the demand for non‐routine jobs located at the tails of the job–wage distribution. However, our estimates do not support this explanation for the 1970s and 1980s. Stronger evidence for task‐biased technological change, albeit not conclusive, is found for the 1990s and 2000s. In particular, there is both a statistically and economically significant growth of non‐routine jobs and a decline of routine jobs. However, results for wages are mixed; while task‐biased technological change cannot explain changes in between‐occupation wage differentials, it does have considerable explanatory power for changes in within‐occupation wage differentials.     

Permanent versus transitory wage differentials and the inequality-hours hypothesis

This paper disentangles the effect of inequality in permanent and transitory wages on hours worked by, first, estimating the two components for Swedish industries and, second, using the resulting estimates as explanatory variables in an hours-worked equation. Consistent with Bell and Freeman’s (2001) inequality-hours hypothesis, permanent wage differentials are found to have a positive effect on individuals’ hours of work while transitory wage differentials have no effect. However, the analysis also shows that, in estimated hours-worked equations, inequality in observed wages is potentially a good approximation for inequality in permanent wages.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A REJOINDER

In our 2011 survey of the literature in the Journal of Economic Surveys on the effect of government size on economic growth in wealthy countries we find a relatively consistent pattern: An increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5–1 percentage point lower annual growth rate. This conclusion is questioned by Colombier. In this rejoinder we present a rebuttal of Colombier's argument based on a detailed scrutiny of his own statistical evidence and regression results. Furthermore, we note that several new papers that have appeared since our original paper was published give support to our main conclusion.     

Eliciting Willingness to Pay without Bias using Follow-up Certainty Statements: Comparisons between Probably/Definitely and a 10-point Certainty Scale

Correction for hypothetical bias using follow up certainty questions often takes one of two forms: (1) two options, “definitely sure” and “probably sure”, or (2) a 10-point scale with 10 very certain. While both have been successful in eliminating hypothetical bias from estimates of WTP by calibrating based on the certainty of yes responses, little is known about the relationship between the two. The purpose of this paper is to compare the two using data from three field experiments in a private good, dichotomous choice format. We compare four types of yes responses that differ in the criterion used to determine if there is sufficient certainty for a hypothetical yes response to be considered a true yes response. We make several comparisons, but focus on determining which values on the 10-point scale give the same estimates of WTP as “definitely sure” hypothetical yeses and real yeses (actual purchases). Values that produce equivalence are near 10 on the certainty scale.     

Public interest versus regulatory capture in the Swedish electricity market

This article tests the public interest and regulatory capture hypotheses, in the context of the Swedish electricity market, by studying the factors influencing the Swedish Energy Agency’s decision to replace decision-makers it employs to hear customer complaints against utilities. The study covers the period from the beginning of 1996, when a series of regulatory reforms were introduced to improve consumer protection, until the end of 2008. The study concludes that decision-makers who find in favor of customers have had a statistically lower probability of being removed, consistent with public interest theory. A transitory effect of favoring utilities can be observed for the period from 2 to 6 years following the reforms. In this period, government and public scrutiny of the regulator, which had been high in the immediate aftermath of the reforms, had waned and there were few precedents decided by the courts that the regulator was required to follow. This vacuum created an opportunity for the utilities to increase their influence over the regulator. Once the courts started establishing precedents in relatively large numbers, the supervisory role of the courts ensured that the actions of the regulator were scrutinized. This development has served a similar function to government and public scrutiny in the years immediately following the reforms in promoting the public interest.     

Entrepreneurship and the theory of taxation

A review of the literature on firm taxation reveals that the economics of entrepreneurship has not sufficiently been taken into consideration. We discuss how this affects conclusions derived from standard models of capital taxation when applied to entrepreneurial income. Some defining features of entrepreneurship important for analyzing the effects of taxation of owner-managed firms are identified. These include the lack of a well-functioning external market for entrepreneurial effort, limited access to external capital and complementarities between entrepreneurial innovation, effort and capital. Due to these constraints, the entrepreneurial project is tied to the individual owner–manager. The entrepreneur is unable to decouple saving decisions from investment decisions, and makes joint decisions on the supply of effort and capital. The return from successful entrepreneurial ventures can therefore not be readily divided into labor and capital income, in deep contrast to what is typically assumed in taxation theory. It is argued that when distinct attributes of entrepreneurship are taken into account, certain conclusions of capital taxation models may no longer hold, including the neutrality of capital taxation in owner-managed firms. Cost of capital formulas derived from the behavior of public firms could underestimate distortions when applied to the investment behavior of entrepreneurial firms. For tax purposes and otherwise, it becomes useful to analyze return to entrepreneurial activity as income of a distinct factor of production. In this context, conceptual issues and the difficulties of measuring entrepreneurial income are discussed.