Piece rates, time rates, and teams: Explaining patterns in the employment relation

This paper illustrates how the economics of internal organization can be used to explain patterns in agricultural labor contracts. Piece rates tend to be chosen over time rates for tasks when shirking is easy monitor by ex post inspection. The incidence of piece rates is also higher where the work force is more heterogeneous, where high opportunity wages prevail and where some agricultural operations are done by specialized teams. These relationships are implied by the proposition that contracts minimize excess burden in the face of enforcement and information costs.     

FINANCIAL MARKETS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE

Many factors contributed to the rapid growth of the economiesof East Asia in the past quarter century. This article examinesone important aspect of that growth—commonly referredto as the "East Asian miracle"—public policies affectingthe financial markets. East Asian governments intervened extensivelyin financial markets at all stages of their development. Whatsets their actions apart from those of other developing countriesthat have not fared as well? We do not have the informationto answer conclusively what effect particular actions had (thatrequires a counterfactual test of what growth would have beenwithout the particular intervention). But we can identify themarket failures the East Asian governments addressed, assesssome of the theoretical reasons why each policy might be growthenhancing, and provide some data attesting to the impacts ofthe policy. Several characteristics of financial sector interventionsin East Asia stand out: they incorporated design features thatimproved the chances of success and reduced opportunities forabuse; interventions that did not work out were dropped unhesitatingly;and policies were adapted to reflect changing economic conditions.