Regional entrepreneurship capital and firm production

Certain theories suggest that the capacity of a region to generate new firms, called entrepreneurship capital, has positive spillover effects on the production of the firms in that region. Evidence generated with aggregated data at the regional level supports this prediction. This paper argues that, using aggregated data at the regional level, entrepreneurship capital could be correlated with regional production even if entrepreneurship capital has no spillover effects on firm production. This will not be the case when data at the firm level are used. This paper provides evidence from a sample of 11,276 Spanish firms during the 2004–2012 period. Positive spillovers are estimated in between effects models, but such spillovers are only found in technological firms when within effects models have been estimated. Thus, the regional entrepreneurship capital spillovers are unclear when data at the firm level are used. Plausible interpretations and implications are discussed.     

Transfer payments and the Phillips Curve

Policy makers are today confronted with a worsening relationship between inflation and unemployment. Voluminous economic literature on the “Phillips Curve” has long attempted to show why inflation and unemployment are normally inversely correlated. More recent literature has sought to identify factors that could worsen the apparent tradeoff. This paper uses the labor sector of the System Dynamics National Model to analyze the potential impacts of increased transfer payments on inflation and unemployment. The results suggest that in the short run, higher transfer payments can prolong job search, thereby boosting unemployment, while simultaneously driving up wages due to reduced labor availability. But over the longer term, rising wages raise the attrractiveness of working, thereby compensating for higher transfer payments. Therefore, higher transfer payments are not permanently inflationary. Key long-run impacts of transfer payments may be to raise relative costs of labor, thereby lowering employment through factor substitution, and to discourage dropout from the labor force so as to maintain eligibility for payments.     

Monetary and real causes of investment booms and declines

The 1900s have marked two major investment booms in the United States. The boom of the 1920s was followed by the Great Depression of the 1930s, in which investment demand fell sharply. The second boom, of the 1950s and 60s, has been followed by a period of lagging investment. The economics literature reflects two disparate schools of thought on long-term investment behavior: the accelerator theory and the monetarist theory. This paper develops an investment function that interrelates monetary and real variables. Analysis of the investment function identifies several powerful non-monetary forces that can trigger investment booms with subsequent collapse due to overexpansion. Money is shown to be a critical element in sustaining a boom, but monetary contraction during the succeeding decline appears to be a symptom rather than essential cause of investment stagnation. The results thus point toward an integration of the monetarist and accelerator theories.     

Destabilizing impacts of price and quantity adjustments to relative supply and demand

The static theories of the firm and household rest their practical validity on an assumption that disequilibrium conditions will rapidly be eliminated through price and quantity adjustments. This paper develops a model of stock management by producers to explore the time paths of production adjustment to disequilibrium. Model results suggest that typical corporate policies for responding to inventory and order backlog levels lead to continuing fluctuations in production and employment around equilibrium values. Moreover, fluctuations are acceptuated when price impacts on output and consumption decisions are included. Following Samuelson's Correspondence Principle, the results imply that equilibrium analyses for models containing equilibrium assumptions) have little explanatory power, especially over a short-run period of several years. Further, proper dynamic analysis requires comprehensive interrelating of stocks and flows, not merely incorporation of lagged adjustments to theoretical equilibrium conditions.     

Individually rational rules for the division problem when the number of units to be allotted is endogenous

We study individually rational rules to be used to allot, among a group of agents, a perfectly divisible good that is freely available only in whole units. A rule is individually rational if, at each preference profile, each agent finds that her allotment is at least as good as any whole unit of the good. We study and characterize two individually rational and efficient families of rules, whenever agents' preferences are symmetric single-peaked on the set of possible allotments. Rules in the two families are in addition envy-free, but they differ on whether envy-freeness is considered on losses or on awards. Our main result states that (a) the family of constrained equal losses rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy justified envy-freeness on losses and (b) the family of constrained equal awards rules coincides with the class of all individually rational and efficient rules that satisfy envy-freeness on awards.     

ON STRATEGY‐PROOFNESS AND THE SALIENCE OF SINGLE‐PEAKEDNESS

We consider strategy‐proof rules operating on a rich domain of preference profiles. We show that if the rule satisfies in addition tops‐onlyness, anonymity, and unanimity, then the preferences in the domain have to satisfy a variant of single‐peakedness (referred to as semilattice single‐peakedness). We do so by deriving from the rule an endogenous partial order (a semilattice) from which the concept of a semilattice single‐peaked preference can be defined. We also provide a converse of this main finding. Finally, we show how well‐known restricted domains under which nontrivial strategy‐proof rules are admissible are semilattice single‐peaked domains.     

Weighted approval voting

To allow society to treat unequal alternatives distinctly we propose a natural extension of Approval Voting by relaxing the assumption of neutrality. According to this extension, every alternative receives ex-ante a strictly positive and finite weight. These weights may differ across alternatives. Given the voting decisions of every individual (individuals are allowed to vote for, or approve of, as many alternatives as they wish to), society elects the alternative for which the product of total number of votes times exogenous weight is maximal. If the product is maximal for more than one alternative, a pre-specified tie-breaking rule is applied. Our main result is an axiomatic characterization of this family of voting procedures.      

Some things couples always wanted to know about stable matchings (but were afraid to ask)

In this note we study the National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) algorithm in the US market for physicians. We report on two problems that concern the presence of couples, a feature explicitly incorporated in the new NRMP algorithm (cf. Roth and Peranson in Am Econ Rev 89:748–780, 1999). First, we show that the new NRMP algorithm may not find an existing stable matching, even when couples’ preferences are ‘responsive’, i.e., when Gale and Shapley’s (Am Math Monthly 69:9–15, 1962) deferred acceptance algorithm (on which the old NRMP algorithm is based) is applicable. Second, we demonstrate that the new NRMP algorithm may also be anipulated by couples acting as singles.