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1.
R. Scott Marshall Michèle E.M. Akoorie Ralph Hamann Paresha Sinha 《Journal of World Business》2010,45(4):405-414
Industry transformation related to environmental stewardship has received significant scholarly attention over the past decade. However, limited theoretical and empirical work examines the motivations for improving environmental performance in an industry in different countries. In this paper, we develop a set of hypotheses, based in the theory of reasoned action and stakeholder theory, regarding drivers of the adoption of environmental practices in the wine industries of New Zealand and the United States. We test our hypotheses using data from survey questionnaires collected in each country. Our findings suggest that subjective norms and internal stakeholder pressures are common drivers of the adoption of environmental practices in these two countries. However, managerial attitudes and external stakeholder pressures are not significant drivers. We also find that managerial attitudes and export dependence are stronger determinants of environmental practice adoption in New Zealand compared to the U.S. 相似文献
2.
We explore the implications of the farsightedness assumption on the conjectures of players in a coalitional Great Fish War
model with symmetric players, derived from the seminal model of Levhari and Mirman (Bell J Econ 11:649–661, 1980). The farsightedness assumption for players in a coalitional game acknowledges the fact that a deviation from a single player
will lead to the formation of a new coalition structure as the result of possibly successive moves of her rivals in order
to improve their payoffs. It departs from mainstream game theory in that it relies on the so-called rational conjectures, as opposed to the traditional Nash conjectures formed by players on the behavior of their rivals. For values of the biological parameter and the discount factor more plausible
than the ones used in the current literature, the farsightedness assumption predicts a wide scope for cooperation in non-trivial
coalitions, sustained by credible threats of successive deviations that defeat the shortsighted payoff of any prospective
deviator. Compliance or deterrence of deviations may also be addressed by acknowledging that information on the fish stock
or on the catch policies actually implemented may be available only with a delay (dynamic farsightedness). In that case, the
requirements are stronger and the sizes and number of possible farsighted stable coalitions are different. In the sequential
move version, which could mimic some characteristics of fishery models, the results are not less appealing, even if the dominant
player or dominant coalition with first move advantage assumption provides a case for cooperation with the traditional Nash
conjectures. 相似文献
3.
How far can we go in weakening the assumptions of the general equilibrium model? Existence of equilibrium, structural stability and finiteness of equilibria of regular economies, genericity of regular economies and an index formula for the equilibria of regular economies have been known not to require transitivity and completeness of consumers’ preferences. We show in this paper that if consumers’ non-ordered preferences satisfy a mild version of convexity already considered in the literature, then the following properties are also satisfied: (1) the smooth manifold structure and the diffeomorphism of the equilibrium manifold with a Euclidean space; (2) the diffeomorphism of the set of no-trade equilibria with a Euclidean space; (3) the openness and genericity of the set of regular equilibria as a subset of the equilibrium manifold; (4) for small trade vectors, the uniqueness, regularity and stability of equilibrium for two version of tatonnement; (5) the pathconnectedness of the sets of stable equilibria. 相似文献
4.
In the present paper we study voting-based corporate control in a general equilibrium model with incomplete financial markets. Since voting takes place in a multi-dimensional setting, super-majority rules are needed to ensure existence of equilibrium. In a linear–quadratic setup we show that the endogenization of voting weights (given by portfolio holdings) can give rise to – through self-fulfilling expectations – dramatical political instability, i.e. Condorcet cycles of length two even for very high majority rules. 相似文献
5.
Summary. This paper studies monotone risk aversion, the aversion to monotone, mean-preserving increase in risk (Quiggin [21]), in the Rank Dependent Expected Utility (RDEU) model. This model replaces expected utility by another functional, characterized by two functions, a utility function u in conjunction with a probability-perception function f. Monotone mean-preserving increases in risk are closely related to the notion of comparative
dispersion introduced by Bickel and Lehmann [3,4] in Non-parametric Statistics. We present a characterization of the pairs (u,f) of monotone risk averse decision makers, based on an index of greediness
G
u
of the utility function u and an index of pessimism
P
f
of the probability perception function f: the decision maker is monotone risk averse if and only if
. The index of greediness (non-concavity) of u is the supremum of
taken over
. The index of pessimism of f is the infimum of
taken over 0 < v < 1. Thus,
, with G
u
= 1 iff u is concave. If
then
, i.e., f is majorized by the identity function. Since P
f
= 1 for Expected Utility maximizers,
forces u to be concave in this case; thus, the characterization of risk aversion as
is a direct generalization from EU to RDEU. A novel element is that concavity of u is not necessary. In fact, u must be concave only if P
f
= 1.Received: 10 April 2001, Revised: 18 November 2003, JEL Classification Numbers:
D81.
Correspondence to: Michéle CohenAlain Chateauneuf, Michéle Cohen, Isaac Meilijson: We are most grateful to Mark Machina, Peter Wakker and two anonymous referees for very helpful suggestions and comments. 相似文献
6.
We investigate the geometry of finite datasets defined by equilibrium prices, income distributions, and total resources. We show that the equilibrium condition imposes no restrictions if total resources are collinear, a property that is robust to small perturbations. We also show that the set of equilibrium datasets is pathconnected when the equilibrium condition does impose restrictions on datasets, as for example when total resources are widely noncollinear. 相似文献
7.
THE RACIAL EMPLOYMENT GAP IN SOUTH AFRICA 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
8.
9.
Summary. An economy with two dates is considered, one state at the first date and a finite number of states at the last date. Shareholders determine production plans by voting - one share, one vote - and at
-majority stable stock market equilibria, alternative production plans are supported by at most
percent of the shareholders. It is shown that a
-majority stable stock market equilibrium exists if
where S is the number of states at the last date and J is the number of firms. Moreover, an example shows that
-majority stable stock market equilibria need not exist for smaller
s.Received: 23 December 2002, Revised: 14 June 2004, JEL Classification Numbers:
D21, D52, D71, G39.
Correspondence to: Hervé CrésThe authors are grateful to an anonymous referee for helpful comments and suggestions. Financial support from the Danish Research Councils and hospitality of HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Mich Tvede and support from Fondation HEC is gratefully acknowledged by Hervé Crés. 相似文献
10.