Is non-audit services a suitable proxy for auditor independence in the post-SOX period?

Before implementation of the Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) in 2002, researchers frequently used fees from non-audit services (NAS) as a surrogate for auditor independence. NAS is still used in this way, even though SOX has restricted the types of NAS that auditors may provide to their clients. Therefore, we pose the following question: What does the literature say about the continuing adequacy of NAS as a surrogate for auditor independence in the post-SOX era? This question is relevant to research in accounting regulation because, if NAS is no longer an adequate surrogate, then research on auditor independence may provide biased results. Overall, we find that many post-SOX studies using NAS have insignificant or counterintuitive results, whereas pre-SOX studies using NAS predominantly have significant results suggesting that NAS impairs auditor independence. Is this shift in findings because NAS is no longer an adequate proxy for independence? We discuss this issue and provide our conclusions, citing relevant research where applicable.     

Use of loan loss provisions for capital, earnings management and signalling by Australian banks

This study examines whether and to what extent Australian banks use loan loss provisions (LLPs) for capital, earnings management and signalling. We examine if there were changes in the use of LLPs as a result of the implementation of banking regulations consistent with the Basel Accord of 1988, which made loan loss reserves no longer part of Tier I capital in the numerator of the capital adequacy ratio. We find some evidence to indicate that Australian banks use LLPs for capital management, but we find no evidence of a change in this behaviour after the implementation of the Basel Accord. Our results indicate that banks in Australia use LLPs to manage earnings. Furthermore, listed commercial banks engage more aggressively in earnings management using LLPs than unlisted commercial banks. We also find that earnings management behaviour is more pronounced in the post‐Basel period. Overall, we find a significant understating of LLPs in the post‐Basel period relative to the pre‐Basel period. This indicates that reported earnings might not reflect the true economic reality underlying those numbers. Finally, Australian banks do not appear to use LLPs for signalling future intentions of higher earnings to investors.     

The Accounting Court: Some Speculations on Why Not?

The accounting court proposed by Spacek (Account Rev 33(3):368, 1958) was a potent and controversial idea. The court would provide a venue to which auditing firms and clients could bring disputes over the application of accounting principles and over time would build a database of casework illustrating the court’s decisions on proper application and interpretation of accounting principles. In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the accounting court and on standard setting by analyzing group value orientations and motivations that should promote the likelihood of an accounting court appearing in these times. We base our analysis in value group theory (Shakun 1988 Evolutionary systems design: policymaking under complexity and group group decision support systems. Holden-Day, Oakland, CA.), an analysis rooted in an examination of operational and terminal values of key participants. The analysis brings to light a contradiction between the terminal values of the key players and the actions of those players. We argue that common conditions of existence came between the operational goals and terminal values in the accounting domain and key actors willingness to seek the specified values. This analysis provides a flexible but powerful tool for analyzing motivations that may influence behavior of key organizations in the accounting domain.     

Patent Citation, R&D Spillover, and Tobin's Q: Evidence from Taiwan Semiconductor Industry

Although prior research has examined the effect of patent citations on Tobin's Q in a variety of environments, in this study we examine whether the parameters are affected by stage of a company in the value chain. Unlike other national semiconductor firms, Taiwanese semiconductor firms typically specialize in one of the value-added activities, namely, either design or manufacturing or packaging and testing. Our finding is that the effect of patent citation on Tobin's Q is accentuated when the firm is at the front end of the value chain and diminishes as we proceed to the back end. This finding is novel in the literature. We also find that frequency of patent citations and R&D spillover are positive and significant in relation to Tobin's Q. In addition, the effect of R&D spillover on Tobin's Q is more pronounced for firms in the design sector relative to other sectors. JEL Classification: M41, O3 Authors are grateful for insightful comments and suggestions from an anonymous reviewer. Picheng Lee also gratefully acknowledges a research grant from Lubin School of Business at Pace University     

The association between corporate governance and earnings quality: Further evidence using the GOV-Score

This paper reexamines the relation between corporate governance and quality of earnings using a summary governance measure. Prior research has used many surrogates for corporate governance including size and composition of board of directors, existence and composition of audit committee, and extent of institutional ownership. However, the criticism of the extant research has been that corporate governance comprises many facets and is not uni-dimensional. In this study we fill this void by using the Gov-Score developed by Brown and Caylor [Brown, D., and Caylor, M.L., (2006). Corporate governance and firm valuation. Journal of Accounting and Public Policy 25, 409-434.] to measure corporate governance. In the post-Sarbanes-Oxley period, we find evidence of a significant inverse relationship, namely higher levels of corporate governance are associated with lower absolute discretionary accruals and higher quality of earnings. Furthermore, our results suggest that only firms in the highest category of corporate governance experience significantly improved quality of earnings. Finally, as a test of robustness, we document that corporate governance is negatively associated with small earnings surprises. This implies that firms with weak corporate governance are more likely to manage earnings in order to meet or beat analyst forecasts.