Organizational dissidence: The case of whistle-blowing

Research on whistle-blowing has been hampered by a lack of a sound theoretical base. In this paper, we draw upon existing theories of motivation and power relationships to propose a model of the whistle-blowing process. This model focuses on decisions made by organization members who believe they have evidence of organizational wrongdoing, and the reactions of organization authorities. Based on a review of the sparse empirical literature, we suggest variables that may affect both the members' decisions and the organization's responses.     

Reactions to the career plateau

Plateaued managers may be disenchanted and produce less on the job. But survey results indicate that such problems may not be as widespread as “common sense” would dictate. The extent of the problem, plus some solutions, are herein examined.     

A Word to the Wise: How Managers and Policy-Makers can Encourage Employees to Report Wrongdoing

When successful and ethical managers are alerted to possible organizational wrongdoing, they take corrective action before the problems become crises. However, recent research [e.g., Rynes et al. (2007, Academy of Management Journal 50(5), 987–1008)] indicates that many organizations fail to implement evidence-based practices (i.e., practices that are consistent with research findings), in many aspects of human resource management. In this paper, we draw from years of research on whistle-blowing by social scientists and legal scholars and offer concrete suggestions to managers who are interested in encouraging internal reporting of problems requiring attention, and to observers of questionable activity who are considering reporting it. We also identify ways that research suggests policy-makers can have a more positive influence. We hope that these suggestions will help foster evidence-based practice regarding whistle-blowing.     

The incidence of wrongdoing,whistle-blowing,and retaliation: Results of a naturally occurring field experiment

The present study examined two general research questions pertaining to the passage of a law designed to encourage whistle-blowing: (a) Has the incidence of perceived wrongdoing, whistle-blowing, anonymous whistle-blowing, or retaliation changed following the passage of the law? (b) What variables predict the comprehensiveness of retaliation that identified whistle-blowers claim to have experienced? One questionnaire was mailed to members of 15 organizations affected by the law in 1980 (n=8500) and a second was administered in 1983 (n=4700). There was some evidence that the law had beneficial effects; specifically, the incidence of perceived wrongdoing declined and whistle-blowing increased. Unfortunately, identified whistle-blowers were just as likely to experience retaliation in 1983 as they were in 1980. The predictors of the comprehensiveness of the retaliation experienced were generally the same in both years. The results tentatively suggest that more legal and organizational encouragement of whistle-blowing is needed.     

Japan's success: Luck or skill?

Can the success of Japanese automakers be attributed to skill or luck? How has American business answered that question—and how valid is the answer?