Transmission of information within transnational social networks: a field experiment

Several studies have shown a relationship between the stocks of migrants and country-level investment in the home country; however the mechanism through which this relationship operates is still unexplored. We use a field experiment in which participants who are recent immigrants send information about risky decisions to others in their social network in their home country. The results demonstrate how this information influences decisions in the home country. We find that the advice given by family members and decisions made by friends significantly affects an individual’s risky decision-making.     

Introduction: What Role Can Experiments Play in Research on Regulation?

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

The Discriminating Beta: Prices and Capacity with Correlated Demands

Uniform customer‐class pricing can do much of the work of congestion‐based or time‐of‐day pricing in communication or wireless networks. A monopolist exploits differences in the stochastic characteristics of demands. If demands are correlated and the firm faces a capacity constraint, then it can set prices to reduce the variability of aggregate demand, thereby reducing the probability of excess demand and the associated service quality deterioration. Demands that covary negatively with aggregate demand are valuable to the firm in much the same way that securities that covary negatively with the market are valuable in a stock portfolio. Customer classes that exhibit low covariance with aggregate demand realize lower optimal prices. Optimal capacity is also affected by these covariances. As long as demands are not perfectly positively correlated, expected costs of joint production are less than expected costs of serving demands separately.     

Information and communications technology use,e‐government,pain and stress amongst public servants

This paper examines information and communications technologies use, work intensity, technology preference, respondent characteristics, pain and stress in 240 New Zealand public servants across six agencies. In particular, we find that four variables are the most consistent predictors of pain—hours using a cell phone, stress, female gender and one's salary.     

People Playing Games: The Human Face of Experimental Economics

Experiments can be used not only to test theory but also to measure preferences and assess heterogeneity of behavior. I discuss the design of experimental measures of altruism and trust, as well as their uses in assessing how behavior varies across individuals, and across partners that a given individual might encounter. Experiments show that women are more altruistic than men. The appearance of a partner substantially impacts trust and trustworthiness, in part through the association of attractiveness and skin tone with expectations about a partner's behavior.     

Is More Information Always Better? An Experimental Study of Charitable Giving and Hurricane Katrina

We report results of an experiment designed to assess the impact of Hurricane Katrina on the pattern and level of charitable contributions of donors. The study includes an experimental measure of charitable giving and targets three charities: the American Red Cross, the Salvation Army, and Oxfam International. In the experiment subjects make allocation decisions from three endowments ($10, $20, and $50) and with four different matching subsidies (0%, 25%, 50%, and 100%), with the matching amount provided by the experimenter. Two locations (Texas and Minnesota) and two information conditions are used. Survey measures of sympathy, risk perceptions, and perceptions of Katrina victims are also collected. The probability and amount of giving are responsive to the experimental design parameters—the endowment and match. We find evidence of “Katrina overload” as those closest to the disaster respond negatively to Katrina-related priming information. Perceptions of the psychological attitudes of the victims of the disaster have a significant effect on the amount given.     

Motives for Giving: A Reanalysis of Two Classic Public Goods Experiments

Experimental work in economics prompted the development of theories of other‐regarding behavior. In this article we reanalyze two classic public goods experiments and focus on the nature of individuals' responses to others' behavior in order to help distinguish alternative motives for giving, including altruism, warm glow, reciprocity, and inequality aversion. Analysis that allows for asymmetric feedback responses generates support for inequality aversion motives but little for reciprocity (matching), altruism, and warm glow. We conclude that individual‐level analysis of existing public goods data can provide more insightful, informative estimates of treatment effects.