Das Human-Kapital: A Theory of the Demise of the Class Structure

The history of society is the history of struggles between social classes.
Karl Marx
This paper suggests that the demise of the capitalists–workers class structure was a socio-economic transformation orchestrated by the capitalists in reaction to the increasing importance of human capital in sustaining their profit rates. Physical capital accumulation in the process of industrialization enhanced the importance of human capital in production and generated incentives for capitalists to support the provision of public education for the masses, triggering the demise of the existing class structure. The implications of the theory are consistent with the voting patterns on England's education reform of 1902.     

THE PECULIAR ECONOMICS OF HOUSING BUBBLES

Home values increase rapidly during housing bubbles generating large capital gains. High loan‐to‐value (LTV) mortgages secured by expected future home values are one way to take advantage of these capital gains. In this article, we use a simple partial equilibrium consumer theory model to explore the implications of high LTV borrowing. We find that sufficiently large expected house price growth leads to an upward‐sloping budget line when households can obtain high LTV mortgages. In this environment, the demand for housing fits neither the conventional theories of consumer goods nor that of investment goods. In fact, increases in the expected future price of housing may reduce current housing demand, whereas decreases in the effective (current) price may lead to households buying smaller homes. Moreover, high LTV loans reduce the effectiveness of monetary policy, but raise the volatility of aggregate demand. Tighter borrowing standards may help lower demand volatility at the expense of shrinking the economy. (JEL E21, R21, E52)     

THE QUALITY OF INFORMATION AND INCENTIVES FOR EFFORT*

We study the relationship between the precision of information about the performance of an agent in a market, and the incentives this agent has for exerting effort to produce high quality. We show that this relationship can be nonmonotonic. There exists an efficient plausible equilibrium that induces a threshold beyond which any further improvement in the precision of information weakens the agent's incentive to produce high quality. Accordingly, both very accurate and very inaccurate signals about the agent's performance may destroy its incentive to exert effort. A few applications of this result are discussed.     

Access to Capital, Capital Structure, and the Funding of the Firm

Based upon a large data set of public and private firms in the United Kingdom, I find that compared to their public counterparts, private firms rely almost exclusively on debt financing, have higher leverage ratios, and tend to avoid external capital markets, leading to a greater sensitivity of their capital structures to fluctuations in performance. I argue that these differences are due to private equity being more costly than public equity. I further examine the private firms subsample to show that private equity is more costly than its public counterpart due to information asymmetry and the desire to maintain control.     

Hedge Fund Activism, Corporate Governance, and Firm Performance

Using a large hand-collected data set from 2001 to 2006, we find that activist hedge funds in the United States propose strategic, operational, and financial remedies and attain success or partial success in two-thirds of the cases. Hedge funds seldom seek control and in most cases are nonconfrontational. The abnormal return around the announcement of activism is approximately 7%, with no reversal during the subsequent year. Target firms experience increases in payout, operating performance, and higher CEO turnover after activism. Our analysis provides important new evidence on the mechanisms and effects of informed shareholder monitoring.     

Myth or Reality? The Long-Run Underperformance of Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Venture and Nonventure Capital-Backed Companies

We investigate the long-run underperformance of recent initial public offering (IPO) firms in a sample of 934 venture-backed IPOs from 1972–1992 and 3,407 nonventure-backed IPOs from 1975–1992. We find that venture-backed IPOs outperform non-venture-backed IPOs using equal weighted returns. Value weighting significantly reduces performance differences and substantially reduces underperformance for nonventure-backed IPOs. In tests using several comparable benchmarks and the Fama-French (1993) three factor asset pricing model, venture-backed companies do not significantly underperform, while the smallest nonventure-backed firms do. Underperformance, however, is not an IPO effect. Similar size and book-to-market firms that have not issued equity perform as poorly as IPOs.     

Inequality in Landownership, the Emergence of Human-Capital Promoting Institutions, and the Great Divergence

This paper suggests that inequality in the distribution of landownership adversely affected the emergence of human-capital promoting institutions ( e.g . public schooling), and thus the pace and the nature of the transition from an agricultural to an industrial economy, contributing to the emergence of the great divergence in income per capita across countries. The prediction of the theory regarding the adverse effect of the concentration of landownership on education expenditure is established empirically based on evidence from the beginning of the 20th century in the U.S.     

Lag length selection in vector autoregressive models: symmetric and asymmetric lags

This study used Monte Carlo simulations to study the performance of alternative lag selection criterion for symmetric lag and asymmetric lag vector autoregressive models. Lag models with short lags and with long lags were considered. The alternative criteria considered were the AIC, SIC, Phillips' Posterior Information Criterion, and Keating's modification of the AIC and SIC. The alternative criteria were evaluated by computing the frequency distribution of lags selected, by computing the out-of-sample forecasting performance of models with lags selected using each criterion, and by comparing the ability of models with lags selected using each criterion to mimic the ‘true’ impulse response functions for the lag model.