Pro-poor trade policy in Sub-Saharan Africa

This paper examines the presence of a pro-poor bias in the existing structure of protection of six Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Côte d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, Gambia, and Madagascar. We build on a simple agricultural household production model and we propose an extension to include adjustments in labor income. Our approach, which can be implemented without repeated cross-sections of household level data, suits well the data constraints in SSA. It also allows us to capture the heterogeneity in trade protection at the tariff line level. The pro-poor bias indicators suggest that SSA's trade policies tend to be biased in favor of poor households, as these policies redistribute income from rich to poor households. This is because protection increases the agricultural prices of goods that are sold by African households and this effect dominates both the impacts of higher consumption prices and the strong Stolper–Samuelson effects that benefit skilled over unskilled workers.     

Endogenous Tariff Formation: The Case of Mercosur

Mercosur appears as an interesting case study for analyzingthe determinants of exceptions in regional trade agreements.Its member countries—Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, andUruguay—intended to make Mercosur a full customs unionby January 1995. This goal turned out to be too ambitious, andthe Protocol of Ouro Preto and other agreements signed in December1994 led to a hybrid solution. Overall, out of a total of 9,119tariff lines, around 30 percent are subject, in at least onemember country, to either external deviations from the commonexternal tariff or internal deviations from free trade. Thusan important set of holes remains under the existing agreement,leading some authors to consider Mercosur an incomplete customsunion. This article compares the results of the theoretical literatureon endogenous tariff formation with evidence from Mercosur.The results show that Mercosur's common external tariff andmember countries' deviations from it and from internal freetrade can be explained by sector or industry lobbying as predictedby the endogenous tariff literature. If a viable political economyis a key to success, then Mercosur is here to stay.     

Trademark Protection or Protectionism?*

This paper explores the extent to which discrimination against foreign applicants in the trademark registration process can be used as a “behind‐the‐border” barrier to imports. Prima‐facie evidence shows that in some developing countries the ratio of trademark registrations to applications is much higher for national than for foreign applicants, which is consistent with the notion of discrimination against foreign firms. A simple model is developed that suggests that incentives to discriminate are stronger when foreign firms manufacture products that are close in quality to the goods produced by domestic firms. This hypothesis is then tested and empirically confirmed in three of the four countries in our sample, suggesting that discretion and discrimination in the trademark registration process can sometimes be used as a protectionist tool.     

AGOA and Apparel: Who Captures the Tariff Rent in the Presence of Preferential Market Access?

The United States grants preferential (tariff‐ and quota‐free) market access to a list of products from eligible countries in sub‐Saharan Africa through the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA). We analyse the increase in prices received by apparel exporters who benefited from AGOA preferences. In the presence of competitive markets, export prices should increase as much as the tariff which was previously collected by the US government. We refer to this price increase as the ‘tariff preference rent’ since exporters receive this income as the rent for their preferential status. The results show that exporters receive only one‐third of this rent and smaller exporters receive less than larger and established ones. We then provide evidence that suggests this may be due to the degree of market power enjoyed by US importers when facing African exporters.     

Investigating exchange rate shocks on agricultural trade balance: The case of Tunisia

The paper studies the impact of changes in Tunisia's exchange rate on the net external position of the agricultural sector. It shows that substitutability on production and consumption among domestically produced goods leads to an ambiguous impact for reasons that go beyond the Marshall-Lerner condition. Using cointegration techniques to disentangle the long and short-run impact of changes in the exchange rate on the net agricultural trade balance, we find that the depreciation of the domestic currency leads to a deterioration of the net external position of Tunisia's agricultural sector in the long-run.     

LOBBYING COMPETITION OVER TRADE POLICY*

Competition between opposing lobbies is an important factor in the endogenous determination of trade policy. This article investigates the consequences of lobbying competition between upstream and downstream producers. The theoretical structure underlying the empirical analysis is the well‐known Grossman–Helpman model of trade policy determination, modified to account for the cross‐sectoral use of inputs (itself a quantitatively significant phenomenon, with around 50% of manufacturing output being used by other sectors rather than in final consumption). Our empirical results validate the theoretical predictions. Importantly, accounting for lobbying competition also alters substantially estimates of the “welfare‐mindedness” of governments in setting trade policy.     

Pricing Policy Under Double Market Power: Madagascar and the International Vanilla Market

This paper uses a price-leadership model of the international vanilla market to study the welfare consequences of alternative pricing policies for Madagascar, the leader, that also controls domestic production through a single-channel marketing system. Econometric estimates of the model are used for simulations of welfare and revenue changes and internal redistribution of income. Results indicate that Madagascar could have gained between 0.9% and 2.6% of GDP per year on average over the period 1981–91 by following optimal pricing policies, and that producers were overtaxed suggesting that political economy considerations played a role in the pricing decisions.     

A Political‐Economic Account of Global Tariffs

The objective of this paper is to evaluate the relative importance of three distinct factors that motivate redistributive government policy: tariff revenues, consumer welfare, and producer profits. We generalize Grossman and Helpman's (1994, American Economic Review 84: 833–850). protection‐for‐sale model by positing that government places different weights on these components of the welfare of its polity when it decides which industries to protect and to what extent. Employing tariff data from 40 countries, the predictions from this model are used to estimate these weights. The results are surprising in their range and variety. Developing countries with weak tax systems often weigh tariff revenue heavily, while more developed countries weigh producer interests the most. Very few hold consumer welfare dear.     

Regionalism as Industrial Policy: Evidence from MERCOSUR

This paper empirically explores whether trade preferences can be used as a substitute for industrial policy and help countries achieve their industrialization objectives at the expense of other regional members. Results show that Mercado Común del Sur (MERCOSUR) preferences obtained by Brazilian exporters have led to an increase in exports of relatively sophisticated products in which Brazil does not enjoy a global comparative advantage. On the contrary, smaller members of MERCOSUR export to the region products in which they have strong comparative advantages and with relatively low levels of sophistication. This suggests that MERCOSUR has helped Brazil achieve its industrialization objectives, but has not contributed to the industrialization of its smaller members.     

On `indirect' trade-related R&D spillovers

An influential literature argues that trade promotes knowledge flows and technology transmission between trading partners. This literature focuses on `direct' research and development (R&D) spillovers which are related to the levels of R&D produced by the trading partners. In this paper, we argue that `indirect' trade-related R&D spillovers also take place between countries, even if they do not trade with each other. These `indirect' spillovers are associated with available rather than with produced levels of R&D. Our empirical results suggest that these `indirect' trade-related spillovers are at least as important as the `direct' ones, and strengthen the view that trade does matter for the international transmission of R&D. They also suggest that, due to the existence of these `indirect' effects, bilateral trade patterns are relatively less important determinants of the level of foreign R&D spillovers acquired through trade.