Rational IPO Waves

We argue that the number of firms going public changes over time in response to time variation in market conditions. We develop a model of optimal initial public offering (IPO) timing in which IPO waves are caused by declines in expected market return, increases in expected aggregate profitability, or increases in prior uncertainty about the average future profitability of IPOs. We test and find support for the model's empirical predictions. For example, we find that IPO waves tend to be preceded by high market returns and followed by low market returns.     

Uncertainty about Government Policy and Stock Prices

We analyze how changes in government policy affect stock prices. Our general equilibrium model features uncertainty about government policy and a government whose decisions have both economic and noneconomic motives. The model makes numerous empirical predictions. Stock prices should fall at the announcement of a policy change, on average. The price decline should be large if uncertainty about government policy is large, and also if the policy change is preceded by a short or shallow economic downturn. Policy changes should increase volatilities and correlations among stocks. The jump risk premium associated with policy decisions should be positive, on average.     

Money Creation: Tax or Public Liquidity?

I revisit the example of non‐neutral anticipated monetary expansions used in Lucas (1995) Nobel Prize Lecture, within a broader definition of monetary policy tools, such as paying a nominal return on money or using open market operations, to show that money expansions increase output by reallocating consumption across heterogenous individuals and time periods. This result survives with noninterest‐bearing cash when the latter does not generate relevant distortions.     

Disclosure Regulation and Corporate Acquisitions

This paper examines the effect of disclosure regulation on the takeover market. We study the implementation of a recent European regulation that imposes tighter disclosure requirements regarding the financial and ownership information on public firms. We find a substantial drop in the number of control acquisitions after the implementation of the regulation, a decrease that is concentrated in countries with more dynamic takeover markets. Consistent with the idea that the disclosure requirements increased acquisition costs, we also observe that, under the new disclosure regime, target (acquirer) stock returns around the acquisition announcement are higher (lower), and toeholds are substantially smaller. Overall, our evidence suggests that tighter disclosure requirements can impose significant acquisition costs on bidders and thus slow down takeover activity.     

The Growth and Welfare Effects of Deficit‐Financed Dividend Tax Cuts

I develop a tractable growth model that allows me to study analytically transition dynamics and welfare in response to a deficit‐financed cut of the tax rate on distributed dividends. I then carry out a quantitative assessment of the Job Growth and Taxpayer Relief Reconciliation Act (JGTRRA) of 2003. I find that the Act produces lower steady‐state growth despite the fact that the economy’s saving and employment ratios rise. Most importantly, it produces a welfare loss of 19.34% of annual consumption per capita—a substantial effect driven by the fact that the steady‐state growth rate falls from 2% to 1.08%.     

Intrinsic Persistence of Wage Inflation in New Keynesian Models of the Business Cycles

We derive and estimate a New Keynesian wage Phillips curve that accounts for intrinsic inertia. In line with microevidence on wage setting, we consider a wage‐setting model featuring an upward‐sloping hazard function, based on the notion that the probability of resetting a wage depends on the time elapsed since the last reset. Our wage Phillips curve embeds also backward terms. We test the hazard function slope using generalized method of moment estimation. Then, placing our equation in a small‐scale New Keynesian model, we investigate its dynamic properties using Bayesian estimation. Model comparison shows that our model outperforms commonly used alternative methods to introduce persistence.     

The Price of Political Uncertainty: Theory and Evidence from the Option Market

We empirically analyze the pricing of political uncertainty, guided by a theoretical model of government policy choice. To isolate political uncertainty, we exploit its variation around national elections and global summits. We find that political uncertainty is priced in the equity option market as predicted by theory. Options whose lives span political events tend to be more expensive. Such options provide valuable protection against the price, variance, and tail risks associated with political events. This protection is more valuable in a weaker economy and amid higher political uncertainty. The effects of political uncertainty spill over across countries.     

Boosting Foreign Investment: The Role of Certification of Corporate Governance

This paper studies the economic consequences of certification of corporate governance practices. For identification, we exploit a recent cross-country initiative by a coalition of key institutions in Southeast Asia; the periodic publication of a “Top List” of companies in the region selected based on an independent assessment of corporate governance practices. Our results suggest that being included in the list induces an increase in foreign investment and changes in corporate governance practices. The announcement of the Top List elicits a positive stock market response among constituents and is followed by higher accounting performance. Overall, the evidence suggests that the certification of governance practices is a meaningful tool to boost foreign investment.