A Re-Examination of Financial Analysts' Differential Earnings Forecast Accuracy*

Abstract. This research re-examines whether there are differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts through a comparison of their annual earnings per share forecasts. The comparison of analyst forecast accuracy is made on both an ex post (within sample) and an ex ante (out of sample) basis. Early examinations of this issue by Richards (1976), Brown and Rozeff (1980), O'Brien (1987), Coggin and Hunter (1989), O'Brien (1990), and Butler and Lang (1991) were ex post and suggest the absence of analysts who can provide relatively more accurate forecasts over multiple years. Contrary to the results of prior research and consistent with the belief in the popular press, we document that differences do exist in financial analysts' ex post forecast accuracy. We show that the previous studies failed to find differences in forecast accuracy due to inadequate (or no) control for differences in the recency of forecasts issued by the analysts. It has been well documented in the literature that forecast recency is positively related to forecast accuracy (Crichfield, Dyckman, and Lakonishok 1978; O'Brien 1988; Brown 1991). Thus, failure to control for forecast recency may reduce the power of tests, making it difficult to reject the null hypothesis of no differences in forecast accuracy even if they do exist. In our analysis, we control for the differences in recency of analysts' forecasts using two different approaches. First, we use an estimated generalized least squares estimation procedure that captures the recency-induced effects in the residuals of the model. Second, we use a matched-pair design whereby we measure the relative forecast accuracy of an analyst by comparing his/her forecast error to the forecast error of another randomly selected analyst making forecasts for the same firm in the same year on or around the same date. Using both approaches, we find that differential forecast accuracy does exist amongst analysts, especially in samples with minimum forecast horizons of five and 60 trading days. We show that these differences are not attributable to differences in the forecast issuance frequency of the financial analysts. In sum, after controlling for firm, year, forecast recency, and forecast issuance frequency of individual analysts, the analyst effect persists. To validate our findings, we examine whether the differences in the forecast accuracy of financial analysts persist in holdout periods. Analysts were assigned a “superior” (“inferior”) status for a firm-year in the estimation sample using percentile rankings on the distribution of absolute forecast errors for that firm-year. We use estimation samples of one- to four-year duration, and consider two different definitions of analyst forecast superiority. Analysts were classified as firm-specific “superior” if they maintained a “superior” status in every year of the estimation sample. Furthermore, they were classified as industry-specific “superior” if they were deemed firm-specific “superior” with respect to at least two firms and firm-specific “inferior” with respect to no firm in that industry. Using either definition, we find that analysts classified as “superior” in estimation samples generally remain superior in holdout periods. In contrast, we find that analysts identified as “inferior” in estimation samples do not remain inferior in holdout periods. Our results suggest that some analysts' earnings forecasts should be weighted higher than others when formulating composite earnings expectations. This suggestion is predicated on the assumption that capital markets distinguish between analysts who are ex ante superior, and that they utilize this information when formulating stock prices. Our study provides an ex ante framework for identifying those analysts who appear to be superior. When constructing weighted forecasts, a one-year estimation period should be used because we obtain the strongest results of persistence in this case.     

THE PERFORMANCE CONSEQUENCES OF SUBFIELD ENTRY

The emergence of technical subfields is a common phenomenon in dynamic as well as relatively stable industries. The proper strategic response to the emergence of a subfield, that is, the decision on whether to enter or not to enter, is a key determinant of future firm performance. We propose that this entry decision is not a simple one. The effects of subfield entry may be influenced by strategic factors related to the subfield as well as to the greater industry environment. In this study, we apply a population ecology framework to the study of subfield birth and evolution and use this perspective to develop and test several propositions related to the effects of subfield entry on performance. The data pertain to the evolution of the automatic teller machine subfield over the first 9 years of its existence for a population of over 3500 banks. Our results support the population ecology framework, generally emphasizing the positive performance consequences of early subfield entry. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Learning and the Yield Curve

Two central implications of Expectations Hypothesis under rational expectations are inconsistent with yield curve data: (i) future expected long yields fall, instead of rising, when yield spread rises; (ii) long yields are excessively volatile relative to short yields. I propose an optimization framework in which boundedly rational agents use adaptive learning to form expectations. The belief structure rationalizes pattern of yields observed in the data so that the first puzzle does not arise with subjective expectations: intertemporal income and substitution effects are amplified relative to rational expectations. The second puzzle is partly accounted for by extra volatility due to parameter uncertainty.     

Voluntary Disclosures,Corporate Control,and Investment

We examine the valuation and capital allocation roles of voluntary disclosure when managers have private information regarding the firm’s investment opportunities, but an efficient market for corporate control influences their investment decisions. For managers with long‐term stakes in the firm, the equilibrium disclosure region is two‐tailed: only extreme good news and extreme bad news is disclosed in equilibrium. Moreover, the market’s stock price and investment responses to bad news disclosures are stronger than the responses to good news disclosures, which is consistent with the empirical evidence. We also find that myopic managers are more likely to withhold bad news in good economic times when markets can independently assess expected investment returns.     

Continuity and Change: Some Observations on the Landscape of Agricultural Labourers in North Bihar, India

This paper is an attempt to catalogue and analyse the changes over two decades in the world of agricultural labourers in a backward region in India. It is primarily based on a series of field visits to two villages in Purnia district, located in the north-eastern part of Bihar. Changes in the living conditions of labourers are obviously connected to developments in the rural economy of the region and there are important linkages with developments elsewhere, including changes in the overall macro-economic policy regime. An attempt is made to trace these. Agricultural wage workers in the surveyed region are extremely poor by any reckoning, although a few of them have made some progress through state-sponsored programmes and migration. These developments have also contributed significantly to altering the relations of dominance and subordination, thus creating greater elbow-room for labourers. However, it is important not to overstate these small gains and there are serious doubts as to whether they can be sustained. It appears that some of the material correlates of labourers' well-being in the surveyed region are being affected adversely by the currently ascendant neoliberal policy regime. There are no signs of the emergence of mechanisms that might imply sustained significant improvements in the very fragile life and work conditions of these labourers.     

Capital Investment,Innovative Capacity,and Stock Returns

We study the dynamic implications of capital investment in innovative capacity (IC) on future stock returns, investment, and profitability by modeling the unique effects of IC investment on uncertain option generation/exercise and postexercise revenue. The model highlights the diverse effects of IC investment on expected returns in different postinvestment regimes and yields the novel prediction that, under the neoclassical assumption of nonincreasing revenue returns, IC investment is positively related to subsequent cumulative stock returns with a lag. The model also predicts a positive effect of IC investment on future investment and profitability. We find strong empirical support for these predictions.     

Leverage and the Cross‐Section of Equity Returns

Building on theoretical asset pricing literature, we examine the role of market risk and the size, book‐to‐market (BTM), and volatility anomalies in the cross‐section of unlevered equity returns. Compared with levered (stock) returns, unlevered market beta plays a more important role in explaining the cross‐section of unlevered equity returns, even after controlling for size and BTM. The size effect is weakened, while the value premium and the volatility puzzle virtually disappear for unlevered returns. We show that leverage induces heteroskedasticity in returns. Unlevering returns removes this pattern, which is otherwise difficult to address by controlling for leverage in regressions.     

Boom and Gloom

We study the performance of investments made at different points of an investment cycle. We use a large data set covering hotels in the United States, with rich details on their location, characteristics, and performance. We find that hotels built during hotel construction booms underperform their peers. For hotels built during local hotel construction booms, this underperformance persists for several decades. We examine possible explanations for this long‐lasting underperformance. The evidence is consistent with information‐based herding explanations.