The trading behavior of foreign,domestic institutional,and domestic individual investors: Evidence from the Taiwan stock market

In this paper, we apply the threshold cointegration model of Hansen and Seo (2002), incorporating differences in the nonlinear behavior of investors across regimes. An examination of the trading behavior of foreign, domestic institutional, and domestic individual investors in Taiwan revealed no predominance among the three types of investors. When the market was near equilibrium, the purchases of domestic individual investors positively impacted stock prices. This finding, which is consistent with Choe et al. (2005), suggests that domestic individual investors have an edge in investment performance over other types of investors. However, when the market departed substantially from equilibrium, the purchases of foreign and domestic institutional investors predicted a rise in stock prices. On the other hand, domestic individuals traded at worse stock prices; these prices tended to fall (rise) after the purchase (sale).     

Ownership Structure and IPO Valuation—Evidence from Taiwan

We investigate the effect of ownership structure on initial public offering (IPO) valuation in the Taiwanese market, in which many large shareholders exert control through pyramidal structures and cross-shareholdings with voting rights that are in excess of cash flow rights. Our analysis indicates that outside shareholders incorporate the effect of potential expropriation by entrenched large shareholders in valuing an IPO, since a deviating voting-cash structure is negatively associated with the valuation metric at both the offer and initial secondary market prices relative to the corresponding intrinsic value. We also show that a deviating voting-cash structure correlates negatively with IPO underpricing.     

The Agency Problems Embedded in Firm’s Equity Investment

We find that agency problems are embedded in firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments that are mainly dictated by controlling shareholder’s motives and ethical choices manifested in ownership and board structure. The excess equity investment is gauged with respect to industry average. The abnormal equity investment is specifically referred to the number of nominal investment companies that are fully controlled by the controlling owners while subject to little governance. Our empirical evidences of 345 Taiwanese non-financial listed firms show that firm’s excess and abnormal equity investments are negatively correlated with controlling shareholder’s cash flow rights while are positively correlated with the control–cash flow deviation, and board affiliation. The results are supportive of the positive incentive hypothesis and the negative entrenchment hypothesis put forth by La Porta et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 1147–1171) and Claessen et al. (2002, Journal of Finance 57, 2741–2742). The negative relation between equity investment and firm’s value further supports the agency postulation that corporate excess and abnormal equity investments represent a leeway for controlling shareholder to exploit wealth of minority shareholders. This study potentially contributes to the literature of business ethics by portraying an empirically testable linkage from controlling owner’s ethical choices to his actions and therefore firm’s value. Yin-Hua Yeh, Ph.D., is Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of Finance at Fu-Jen Catholic University (FJU) in Taiwan. He is also the Director of the Center for Corporate Governance and Business Ethics at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, corporate finance, and merger and acquisition. Tsun-Siou Lee, Ph.D., is Professor of Finance at National Taiwan University. His main research and teaching areas are corporate governance, futures and options, and financial innovation. Pei-Gi Shu, Ph.D., is Professor of Business Administration at Fu-Jen Catholic University in Taiwan. He is also the Vice Dean of Management College at FJU. His main research and teaching areas are mutual funds and behavioral finance.     

Does Trading Improve Individual Investor Performance?

From 52,649 accounts and 10,615,117 transaction records obtained from a renowned brokerage house in Taiwan we find that individual investors purchase 73.4% and sell 64.5% of their stock portfolios each month. This is more than ten times the statistics for their U.S. counterparts. In general, individual investors have positive abnormal returns from factor-based models. However, they would have earned higher returns from following a buy-and-hold strategy. We find a U-shaped rather than a monotonic turnover and performance relation. The results do not support the overconfidence argument proposed by Barber and Odean (2000, 2001) nor does the rational model of Grossman and Stiglitz (1980). We find that investors with large portfolio values tend to be informed traders whose excess trading does create performance value. We also investigate whether men are more overconfident than women and find that even though men trade more excessively than women, men's performance measures are not dramatically lower than women's. Specifically, the own-benchmark adjusted gross return for men is higher than that for women. The regression results indicate that electronic traders rather than men are overconfident.     

A New Measure of Control-Cash Flow Deviation: Cases in Taiwan

The traditionally defined measure of deviation fails to capture the possibility that controlling owners might pledge their shares for bank loans and with that money from bank loans to amplify their personal leverage in the stock market. In this study we construct a newly defined measure of deviation that includes pledge ratio into the definition. Using a sample of 2777 firm-year observations in the sampling period of 2011–2015, we find that the newly defined measure of deviation is negatively correlated with firm’s performance and are more capable of dictating firm’s performance than the traditionally defined measure. We further find that the newly defined deviation could better contrast the performance measures between normal firms and financially-distressed firms.     

The reputation effect of venture capital

The main purpose of this paper to examine how the reputation effect of venture capital (VC) is associated with the initial return and ex-post performance of its invested IPO firms. In this paper, we use 267 Taiwanese IPO firms in 1994–2007 periods and find that VC-backed firms outperform non-VC-backed firms in terms of ex-post equity market-to-book ratio, ROA and R&D expenditure ratio. For those VC-backed IPOs, reputable VC-backed firms outperform mediocre VC-backed ones. Moreover, among the four proxies of VC reputation, the market share with respect to total IPO proceeds is most promising in explaining IPO firms’ ex-post performance. The overall result confirms the reputation effect associated with VC.     

Related-party transactions and corporate governance: The evidence from the Taiwan stock market

In this study we explore how corporate governance affects the level of related-party transactions (RPTs) and how it moderates the motives of using RPTs in Taiwan, an ownership-concentrated economy. The empirical results show that good corporate governance is effective in constraining RPTs with the negative relation being sustainable across different measures of RPTs (raw, residual and industry-adjusted RPTs) and across different types of RPTs (related sales, lending and guarantee, and related borrowings). The propping-up hypothesis indicates that the level of related sales is positively correlated with the condition that firms plan to issue seasoned equity next period and the condition of a decrease in the reported earnings. The internal capital market hypothesis indicates that the level of related lending and guarantee (related borrowing) is negatively (positively) correlated with the condition of an increase in capital expenditure and an increase in net working capital. The empirical results lend partial support to the two hypotheses. More importantly, we find that corporate governance moderates the relation between the motives and the level of RPTs.