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Jose S. Penalva Zuasti 《Review of Economic Dynamics》2001,4(4):790-822
This paper extends existing insurance results on the type of insurance contracts needed for insurance market efficiency to a dynamic setting. It introduces continuously open markets that allow for more efficient asset allocation. It also estimates the role of preferences and endowments in the classification of risks, which is done primarily in terms of the actuarial properties of the underlying risk process. The paper further extends insurability to include correlated and catastrophic events. Under these very general conditions the paper defines a condition that determines whether a small number of standard insurance contracts (together with aggregate assets) suffice to complete markets or one needs to introduce such assets as mutual insurance. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: D81, D99, G11. 相似文献
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Jose S. Penalva Zuasti 《The Journal of risk and insurance》2008,75(2):313-342
The first contribution of this article is to provide a framework, a model together with a corresponding equilibrium notion, suitable for the study of the interaction between insurance and dynamic financial markets. Our central result is that in equilibrium risk‐averse agents purchase full insurance coverage, despite unfair insurance prices. We identify three conditions that explain this result: (1) insurance contracts are priced competitively, (2) financial prices include a risk premium only for undiversifiable risk, and (3) financial markets are effectively complete. An implication is that in this model disasters can be insured by fully assessable stock insurance companies. 相似文献
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We empirically examine how governance structure affects the design of executive compensation contracts and in particular, the implicit weights of firm performance measures in CEO’s compensation. We find that compensation contracts in firms with higher takeover protection and where the CEO has more influence on governance decisions put more weight on accounting-based measures of performance (return on assets) compared to stock-based performance measures (market returns). In additional tests, we further find that CEO compensation in these firms has lower variance and a higher proportion of cash (versus stock-based) compensation. We further find that CEOs’ incentives (measured as changes in CEO annual wealth which includes expected changes in the value of the CEO’s equity holdings in addition to yearly compensation) do not vary across governance structures. These findings are consistent with CEOs in firms with high takeover protection and where they have more influence on governance negotiating different contracts.
相似文献
Fernando PenalvaEmail: Phone: +34-93-2534200 |
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Accounting conservatism and corporate governance 总被引:7,自引:0,他引:7
Juan Manuel García Lara Beatriz García Osma Fernando Penalva 《Review of Accounting Studies》2009,14(1):161-201
We predict that firms with stronger corporate governance will exhibit a higher degree of accounting conservatism. Governance
level is assessed using a composite measure that incorporates several internal and external characteristics. Consistent with
our prediction, strong governance firms show significantly higher levels of conditional accounting conservatism. Our tests
take into account the endogenous nature of corporate governance, and the results are robust to the use of several measures
of conservatism (market-based and nonmarket-based). Our evidence is consistent with the direction of causality flowing from
governance to conservatism, and not vice versa, indicating that governance and conservatism are not substitutes. Finally,
we study the impact of earnings discretion on the sensitivity of earnings to bad news across governance structures. We find
that, on average, strong-governance firms appear to use discretionary accruals to inform investors about bad news in a timelier
manner.
相似文献
Fernando Penalva (Corresponding author)Email: |
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Conditional conservatism and cost of capital 总被引:2,自引:0,他引:2
Juan Manuel García Lara Beatriz García Osma Fernando Penalva 《Review of Accounting Studies》2011,16(2):247-271
We empirically test the association between conditional conservatism and cost of equity capital. Conditional conservatism
imposes stronger verification requirements for the recognition of economic gains than economic losses, resulting in earnings
that reflect losses faster than gains. This asymmetric reporting of gains and losses is predicted to lower firm cost of equity
capital by increasing bad news reporting precision, thereby reducing information uncertainty (Guay and Verrecchia 2007) and the volatility of future stock prices (Suijs 2008). Using standard asset-pricing tests, we find a significant negative relation between conditional conservatism and excess
average stock returns over the period 1975–2003. This evidence is corroborated by further tests on the association between
conditional conservatism and measures of implied cost of capital derived from analysts’ forecasts. 相似文献
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Juan Manuel García Lara Beatriz García Osma Fernando Penalva 《Journal of Business Finance & Accounting》2009,36(3-4):336-372
Abstract: We study the economic determinants of conditional conservatism. Consistent with prior literature, we find that contracting induces only conditional conservatism and litigation induces both conditional and unconditional conservatism. We extend prior evidence by Qiang (2007) by showing that taxation and regulation induce not only unconditional conservatism, but conditional conservatism as well. We show that in certain scenarios taxation and regulation create incentives to shift income from periods with high taxation pressure and high public scrutiny to periods with lower taxation pressure and lower public scrutiny. These income shifting strategies are implemented by recognising current economic losses that, given managerial incentives to report aggressively, would not have been recognized otherwise, or by delaying the recognition of current economic gains that would have been recognized had circumstances been different. 相似文献
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