Managerial ownership and corporate diversification: a longitudinal view

Strategy and finance research suggests that managerial ownership results in increased incentive alignment and therefore is negatively related to corporate diversification. Using a longitudinal approach, we develop arguments to examine whether managerial ownership is associated with subsequent changes in diversification and/or if diversification is associated with subsequent changes in ownership. The results indicate that levels of managerial ownership in one time period are not associated with subsequent changes in corporate diversification, which raises incentive alignment questions. We also find that higher levels of corporate diversification are associated with changes in managerial ownership, which suggests support for the employment risk‐reduction perspective. This study provides important reasons to reassess the longitudinal implications of the managerial ownership‐corporate diversification link from both theoretical and managerial perspectives. Copyright © 2007 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

INTERNATIONAL TFP DYNAMICS AND HUMAN CAPITAL STOCKS: A PANEL DATA ANALYSIS, 1960–2003

This paper adopts fixed‐effect panel methodologies to obtain TFP values for a sample of 76 countries from 1960 through 2003. Our results are robust to the use of different estimators (LSDV, Kiviet‐corrected LSDV, and GMM). They show that TFP dynamics are characterized by a process of conditional convergence where most countries do not catch up with the U.S., and where human capital plays an important role in technology adoption, as suggested by Nelson and Phelps in 1966. Such a role is robust to the inclusion of controls for the quality of institutions in a country. Further, our results imply a plausible link between stages of development and returns to different levels of education. Finally, we calculate the minimum human capital level necessary to generate catch‐up and find that virtually all countries are above that level—a result that again emphasizes the importance of human capital in technology diffusion.     

Drivers of R&D investment: The interaction of behavioral theory and managerial incentives

This research explores the interaction of behavioral theory and agency theory, investigating their joint effects on firm-level R&D investment. Based on the logic of organizational routines driving R&D investment, we rely on the effects of organizational slack, performance relative to aspirations and distance from bankruptcy as the foundation for our research model. We argue that managerial incentives moderate the relationships between these behavioral theory variables and R&D investment, albeit in contrasting directions. Specifically, we hypothesize that stock option pay positively moderates these relationships while managerial stock ownership has a negative moderating effect. Using panel data for 573 publicly-traded manufacturing firms, we find support for several of our hypotheses, highlighting the interdependence of these two perspectives on R&D investment.     

Miller and Modigliani,Predictive Return Regressions and Cointegration*

This paper investigates the use of alternative measures of dividend yields to predict US aggregate stock returns. Following Miller and Modigliani [Journal of Business (1961), Vol. 34, pp. 411–433] we construct a cashflow yield that includes both dividend and non‐dividend cashflows to shareholders. Using a data set covering the course of the 20th century, we show in a cointegrating vector autoregression framework that this measure has strong and stable predictive power for returns. The weak predictive power of standard measures of the dividend yield is explained by the strong rejection of the implied cointegrating and causality restrictions on the impact of non‐dividend cashflows.     

International Development Strategies of Luxury-goods Players in China

The aim of this paper is to study and analyse the intemationalisation strategies chosen by the main luxury-goods players in the Chinese market, demonstrating the business intemationalisation processes. The research questions are： ttow luxury companies have developed distribution strategies in the Chinese markets？ What are the main formats of distribution for the Chinese markets？ Are there any differences in the internationalization process between the main players of the luxury markets and the smaller ones？ The methodology is based on the analysis on multiple-case ~.nalysis on a sample of luxury-goods companies and identifies and compares the different strategies used by the players analysed. The research process starts from identifying and selecting the most well-known companies operating in the luxury branded sector, which have established a presence in the Chinese market with their own brand, collecting secondary data for the selected companies （website, corporate profile, articles on websites and in trade magazines and interviews with the management）, analysing the data collected and interpreting the main results to have emerged from the research. The main findings and conclusions are that the route to development in the Chinese market taken by the players in the luxury-goods sector, historically undertaken by delocalising production operations, has in recent years begun to accelerate with new forms in play, principally linked to distribution. The Chinese market tbr luxury brands is ever more an outlet market rather than a production hub. The ability to create brand awareness will become a key factor for successful consolidation of the competitive position in this market, an operation that can only be performed through distribution. Moreover, Chinese high-end consumers are becoming ever more demanding, seeking out an ever more sophisticated shopping experience. Just as happening in other markets, opening directly operated stores is a strategic choice for reaching and convincing end-consumers, sinc     

Firm heterogeneity in growth option value: The role of managerial incentives

Growth option value varies widely across firms. This research explores managerial incentives as a source of firm heterogeneity in growth option value. We argue that when the payoff structure of managerial incentives corresponds to that of growth options, managers will be motivated to pursue actions that increase firms' growth option value, particularly when greater growth opportunities are available in an industry. Results indicate that stock option holdings and managerial stock ownership have a positive effect on growth option value, while short‐term pay has a negative effect. We also find support for a positive interaction effect between equity‐based managerial incentives and industry growth opportunities on growth option value. These findings highlight the critical role of managerial incentives in affecting firms' realization of growth option value. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Managing risk and uncertainty in complex capital projects

In evaluating capital budgeting decisions, quantitative approaches, such as traditional discounted cash flow modeling and real options valuations, are useful when there is a presumed probability distribution for the future forecasted outcomes or for when there are lower levels of uncertainty. As uncertainty increases and forecasting becomes difficult, the value of financial modeling techniques decreases. Borrowing from the strategic management literature, we argue that it may be useful to employ a qualitative approach to evaluate capital projects when faced with high levels of uncertainty. In order to illustrate our argument, we use a derivative of scenario planning and qualitative real options to evaluate non-quantifiable factors in a project for the National Ignition Facility.     

The effects of managerial ownership on international and business diversification: Balancing incentives and risks

Research has examined the effects of managerial share ownership on business diversification, typically from the incentive alignment perspective. Yet, share ownership also shifts risk to managers (the efficient managerial contracting perspective). Furthermore, the effects of managerial ownership on international diversification are unexplored. We examine how managerial ownership influences both international and business diversification in light of the trade‐off between incentive alignment and risk bearing. Based on the differing risk profiles of the two types of diversification, we argue that incentive contracts with higher levels of managerial ownership will be inefficient, i.e., counter to shareholder interests—reducing international diversification and increasing business diversification. Our findings support our arguments for international diversification. We find no significant effect for business diversification after accounting for endogeneity and serial correlation. Copyright © 2013 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

An economic capital model integrating credit and interest rate risk in the banking book

Banks often measure credit and interest rate risk in the banking book separately and then add the risk measures to determine economic capital. This approach misses complex interactions between the two risk types. We develop a framework where these risks are analysed jointly. Since banking book positions are generally not marked to market, our model is based on book value accounting. Our simulations show that interactions matter, and that ignoring them leads to risk overstatement. The magnitude of the errors depends on the structure of the balance sheet and on the repricing characteristics of assets and liabilities.     

High-order PLS path model for multi-group analysis: the prosumership service quality model

Quality & Quantity - This study deepening the analysis of prosumership service quality model (PROSERV), a new model for assessing the customer satisfaction developed in order to take...