Arbitrage risk and the turnover anomaly

A strong turnover premium exists such that stocks with lower turnover have higher future returns in the 5 years following their formation than those with higher turnover. This turnover premium cannot be explained by existing asset-pricing models, a risk-based liquidity factor, or anomalies such as size, book-to-market ratio, or momentum. Further analysis indicates that the turnover premium is greater for stocks with higher idiosyncratic volatility, higher transaction costs, lower institutional ownership, and lower investor sophistication, which implies it is consistent with the mispricing explanation based on arbitrage risk.     

Do relative leverage and relative distress really explain size and book-to-market anomalies?

In a capital asset pricing model (CAPM) framework, Ferguson and Shockley [2003. Equilibrium “anomalies”. Journal of Finance 58, 2549–2580] propose two factors constructed on relative leverage and relative distress, and show that the two factors subsume Fama and French's [1993. Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial Economics 33, 3–56] factors constructed on size and book-to-market (BM) in explaining the cross-sectional average returns of the 25 size-BM portfolios. Based on tests on individual securities, we find that all factors fail to fully explain the common asset-pricing anomalies. In the spirit of Merton's [1973. An intertemporal capital asset pricing model. Econometrica 41, 867–887] intertemporal CAPM, we propose an augmented five-factor model, which incorporates Ferguson and Shockley's [2003. Equilibrium “anomalies”. Journal of Finance 58, 2549–2580] factors into the Fama–French three-factor model. The empirical results show that a simple conditional version of the augmented model is able to explain most well-known asset-pricing anomalies.     

Risk aversion and price limits in futures markets

Assuming that a representative trader is risk-neutral, Brennan [1986. Journal of Financial Economics 16, 213–233] shows that price limits, in conjunction with margins, may help reduce the default risk, lower the margin requirement, and decrease the total contract cost. We show that Brennan's result is true only when the trader's degree of risk aversion is low and the precision of additional information about the equilibrium futures price is also low. When the trader either is more risk-averse or can receive precise information, price limits become ineffective in either reducing the default probability, cutting down the margin requirement, or lowering the contract cost.     

Do industries matter in explaining stock returns and asset-pricing anomalies?

Industry returns cannot be explained fully by well-known asset pricing models. This study reveals that common factors extracted from industry returns carry significant risk premiums that go beyond the explanatory power of size, book-to-market (BM) ratios, and momentum. In particular, this study shows that (1) the small-firm effect is significant only for firms whose market capitalization is below their industry average; (2) the BM effect is an intra-industry phenomenon; (3) a one-year momentum effect is significant only for firms whose BM ratio is smaller than the industry average and limited to non-January months; and (4) there is seasonality in all effects that cannot be explained by risk-based asset-pricing models. Neither rational nor behavioral theories alone can explain industry returns, and it is perhaps too hasty to attribute asset pricing anomalies to a single driving force.     

Prospect theory and the effectiveness of price limits

Assuming that traders are risk-neutral, Brennan (1986) shows that price limits are effective in improving the efficiency of futures contracts with limited accessibility to information because they obscure the exact loss when they are triggered. However, Brennan's (1986) model fails to explain why price limits also exist in contracts with abundant information like those of financial futures. We show that when traders are loss-averse, the effectiveness of price limits is strengthened even in the presence of precise information. Thus, our analysis provides a theoretical foundation explaining why price limits can be useful when market participants are not fully rational.     

Bootstrap Tests for Multivariate Event Studies

Statistical tests for multivariate event studies—exact or asymptotic—are derived based on multivariate normality. As it has been previously documented that the performances of these tests are not satisfactory, because stock returns are far from normally distributed (especially for daily returns), this paper proposes the use of bootstrap methods, which are free from any specific distributional assumption, to provide better approximations to the sampling distributions of test statistics in multivariate event studies. The Monte Carlo experiments based on real daily returns data show that the bootstrap tests outperform the traditional tests by having close rejection rates to the nominal significance levels. The traditional tests, in contrast, tend to reject the null hypotheses too often.     

Prospect theory and the risk-return paradox: some recent evidence

There is extensive evidence indicating a negative risk–return relation when a firm’s performance is measured based on accounting measures such as return on asset (ROA) and return on equity (ROE). Previous studies show that the risk-return paradox can be explained by the prospect theory, which predicts that managers’ risk attitudes are different for firms of different performances. However, those studies mostly use earlier data from the COMPUSTAT database, which suffers from a survivorship bias. Failure to account for delisting firms may understate the risk–return relation. We reexamine the mixture of risk-seeking and risk-averse behaviors based on an updated 20-year sample period that is free from the survivorship problem. Interestingly, our results show stronger and robust evidence supporting the prospect theory during the period from 1984 to 2003.     

Being good or being known: corporate governance,media coverage,and earnings announcements

Based on a sample of banking firms listed on the Taiwan Stock Exchange, we examine the impact of corporate governance and media coverage on the market reaction to unexpected earnings announcements. This study finds that positive media reports prior to bad earnings announcements have a positive short-term impact on the market's response to unexpected negative earnings, but the impact is reversed in the long term. In contrast, a better corporate governance quality has a persistent positive impact on market's reaction to unexpected negative earnings, especially when the quality of corporate governance is measured by pledge ratios. The study finding provides one central implication for managements: Yes, being good would pay off.     

Firm characteristics,alternative factors,and asset-pricing anomalies: evidence from Japan

Based on the errors-in-variables-free approach proposed by Brennan et al. [J. Financial Econ., 1998, 49, 345–373], we investigate the competing explanatory capabilities of alternative multi-factor models when examining various asset-pricing anomalies using Japanese data for the period 1978–2006. We find that turnover and book-to-market (BM) ratio are the two major characteristics that significantly explain the average stock returns. A further sub-period analysis reveals that the turnover effect is significant only before 1990, but cannot be explained by any multifactor models. In contrast, the BM premium is significant only after 1990, and can be explained by the Fama–French three-factor model. Thus, the results suggest that asset-pricing anomalies documented in the literature are not universal, and may be different across different markets.