Career Concerns and Resource Allocation in Conglomerates

We investigate resource allocation decisions in conglomerateswhen managers are motivated by career concerns. When divisionalcash flows are differentially informative about managerial ability,we show that it is in the managers' interest to overallocateunobservable intangible resources to the more informative divisions.Anticipating this bias, it is optimal for the firm's ownersto also overallocate observable capital to the more informativedivisions. The model provides rationale for corporate socialismand corporate hedging. It also highlights a cost of segmentreporting and tracking stocks, namely, that they allow managersto distort their perceived ability at the expense of investors.     

Optimal trade policy with quality-differentiated goods

In this article we apply the model of vertically differentiated products to international trade. A foreign firm competes with a domestic firm in the latter's market, producing products of varying quality. We examine the nature of the equilibrium in this case, assuming the firms compete in prices. Contrary to the popular belief, we show that a protectionist policy of imposing a tariff on the foreign firm raises overall welfare in the domestic economy, as well as induces the domestic firm to upgrade the quality of its product, if it produces the lower quality product. Furthermore, if minimum quality standards are imposed on the foreign firm, the domestic firm upgrades quality, and overall welfare in the domestic economy is higher.     

Bargaining and brinkmanship : Capital structure choice by regulated firms

A bargaining model of regulation is developed. It is shown that regulated firms can improve their bargaining positions and induce the regulator to set higher prices for firm output by choosing more debt. Firms, in choosing an optimal level of debt, trade off this bargaining advantage against expected bankruptcy costs. The model predicts that firms would tend to choose higher levels of debt in harsher regulatory environments. This prediction is shown to be consistent with cross-sectional evidence for U.S. electric utilities for the sample period 1972–1983.     

The risky business of hiring stars

With the battle for the best and brightest people heating up again, you're most likely out there looking for first-rate talent in the ranks of your competitors. Chances are, you're sold on the idea of recruiting from outside your organization, since developing people within the firm takes time and money. But the authors, who have tracked the careers of high-flying CEOs, researchers, software developers, and leading professionals, argue that top performers quickly fade after leaving one company for another. To study this phenomenon in greater detail, the authors analyzed the ups and downs of more than 1,000 star stock analysts, a well-defined group for which there are abundant data. The results were striking. After a star moves, not only does her performance plunge, but so does the effectiveness of the group she joins--and the market value of her new company. Moreover, transplanted stars don't stay with their new organizations for long, despite the astronomical salaries firms pay to lure them from rivals. Most companies that hire stars overlook the fact that an executive's performance is not entirely transferable because his personal competencies inevitably include company-specific skills. When the star leaves the old company for the new, he cannot take with him many of the resources that contributed to his achievements. As a result, he is unable to repeat his performance in another company--at least not until he learns to work the new system, which could take years. The authors conclude that companies cannot gain a competitive advantage or successfully grow by hiring stars from outside. Instead, they should focus on cultivating talent from within and do everything possible to retain the stars they create. Firms shouldn't fight the star wars, because winning could be the worst thing that happens to them.     

Sedimentation of reservoirs in India

The sedimentation of Indian reservoirs has become a serious problem due to the synergistic action of population growth, intensity of agricultural operations, poor soil conservation and deforestation. This article examines the reasons for and responses to, sedimentation in three Indian reservoirs — Nizamsagar, Tungabhadra and Sriramsagar. The land management practices adopted in each case are analysed with reference to current and future needs. The article highlights particularly the need to monitor methodically the land use changes in the catchments of reservoirs.     

Negligence,capture, and dependence: safety regulation of the design of India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor

This article contributes a case study of regulation of the design of India’s Prototype Fast Breeder Reactor (PFBR). This reactor is the first of its kind in India, and perceived by the nuclear establishment as critical to its future ambitions. Because fast breeder reactors can experience explosive accidents called core disruptive accidents whose maximum severity is difficult to contain, it is difficult to assure the safety of the reactor’s design. Despite the regulatory agency’s apparent misgivings about the adequacy of the PFBR’s design, it eventually came to approve construction of the reactor. We argue that the approval process should be considered a case of regulatory failure, and examine three potential factors that contributed to this failure: institutional negligence, regulatory capture, and dependence on developers and proponents for esoteric knowledge. This case holds lessons for nuclear safety regulation and more generally in situations where specialized, highly technical, knowledge essential for ensuring safety is narrowly held.     

CEO tenure and the performance-turnover relation

In a broad cross-section of US firms, we document that the likelihood of a CEO’s performance-related dismissal declines in his tenure. This finding is consistent with both firm performance revealing information about a CEO’s uncertain executive ability and CEO tenure reflecting weak firm governance choices that reduce the likelihood of performance-related dismissal. In a sample of CEOs who begin their appointment during our sample period, we find evidence more broadly in favor of the former explanation. Specifically, we find that (1) CEO survival is associated with superior firm performance, (2) this relation is unaffected by firm governance choices, (3) the intensity with which a firm monitors its CEO declines over his tenure, and (4) firms’ monitoring intensity increases following CEO turnover. Collectively, our results suggest that periodic performance reports increasingly resolve uncertainty regarding executive ability, thereby lowering firm owners’ demand for monitoring their CEO over his tenure.     

DO INSTITUTIONS PREFER HIGH‐VALUE ACQUIRERS? AN ANALYSIS OF TRADING IN STOCK‐FINANCED ACQUISITIONS

If owners of target shares in a stock‐for‐stock merger perceive the acquirer as overvalued, they should sell their holdings more aggressively to profit before such overvaluation dissipates. We study institutional owners of targets and find that slightly more than half liquidate their shares in stock mergers, consistent with high institutional‐share turnover rates found in the prior literature. However, share retention is higher when valuation measures suggest greater acquirer overvaluation, regardless of whether institutional owners generally prefer growth or value stock. Institutions that prefer large‐cap, growth stock are most enthusiastic about bids from large, high‐valuation acquirers, and substantially increase their stakes in such deals.     

Tender Offers, Proxy Contests, and Large-Shareholder Activism

The paper analyzes tender offers and proxy contests as alternative means of resolving corporate governance conflicts between dissidents and incumbent management. We show that when a dissident shareholder is sufficiently confident about the potential benefits from changing corporate policy, he will seek majority control by making a tender offer rather than initiating a proxy contest. When the dissident is relatively uninformed, however, he may opt for a proxy contest, thereby utilizing the information of other shareholders to implement the better policy. Consistent with empirical evidence, the model predicts that announcements of tender offers will tend to be associated with larger positive stockprice reactions than announcements of proxy contests. The model is easily extended to allow for promanagement bias in proxy voting by institutional investors. Empirical observations that have been viewed as evidence of such promanagement bias are shown to be quite consistent with the absence of such bias. Policy issues are discussed as well. An interesting result is that even policies targeted at reducing the costs of conducting proxy contests may have ambiguous social consequences, given the possibility of substitution between tender offers and proxy contests.     

Do Laws Influence the Cost of Real Estate Brokerage Services? A State Fixed Effects Approach

A FTC‐DOJ study argues that state laws and regulations may inhibit the unbundling of real estate brokerage services in response to new technology. Our data show that 18 states have changed laws in ways that promote unbundling since 2000. We model brokerage costs as measured by number of agents in a state‐level annual panel vector autoregressive framework, a novel way of analyzing wasteful competition. Our findings support a positive relationship between brokerage costs and lagged house price and transactions. We find that change in full‐service brokers responds negatively (by well over two percentage points per year) to legal changes facilitating unbundling.