Cardinality-based equality of opportunities

We study possible rankings of opportunity profiles. An opportunity profile is a list of opportunity sets, one for each agent in the society. We compare profiles on the basis of the notion of “equality of opportunities”. Our main results show the necessary and sufficient conditions for this comparison to be made using exclusively the information provided by two cardinal measures: the number of common alternatives in all sets of a given profile and the difference between the number of alternatives in the individual sets. We also show that, under additional axioms, we can combine these criteria only in a weighted procedure or in some lexicographic refinements of a weighted procedure.      

Regional innovation and small high technology firms in peripheral regions

This paper highlights the difficulty of developing HT firms in a peripheral region of Spain. Although the endogenous development of HT firms in these regions is possible, their evolution depends on more central regions. The firm's geographical location and the type of HT production are the most important endogenous factors governing the firm's success.     

中石化上游领域竞争力和抗风险能力的定量分析

在分析石油公司上游领域竞争力影响因素的基础上，提出了定量评价上游 领域竞争力和抗油价风险能力的定量评价方法，按上游综合竞争力指标将世界石油公司分为三类，第一类公司的指标值均在90以上，第二类公司在55－70，第三类公司在25－35。分析表明中石化集团上游领域竞争力较低，承受体油价的时间很短，但是，中石化集团公司上游竞争力和抗风险能力有很大的改善余地，并提出提高竞争力和抗风险能力的措施和建议。     

应该将扩大消费需求提升到国家战略的高度

消费问题经过几十年的讨论,至今仍没有得到一些人的高度重视。重投资,重GDP的增长,不重视消费拉动的老毛病,一直制约着我国经济的可持续发展。事实上,如果我国消费水平再不上一个新台阶,还将制约我国经济的持续发展。应该将扩大消费需求提升到我国发展的战略高度来认识。一、应     

采取网络型的政府市场供给模式应对房价问题

面对不断飙升的房价,从理论界到政策层面对其原因都有不同的解读,但从实践结果来看对房价的治理并不理想。本文在综合分析理论研究与国家调控政策的基础上,认为创新措施采取网络型的政府市场供给模式是解决房价过快上涨的有效途径。文章着重对这一模式进行了分析,并认为此举对缓解供需矛盾、解决市场的信息不对称、市场操控、改变预期、稳定房价等都有非常重要的作用。     

The endless need for regulation in telecommunication: An explanation

Telecommunication services have existed as a legal monopoly nearly throughout its entire history. In 1998, telecom market liberalisation was achieved across the European Union (EU) through the introduction of competition among telephone services. Asymmetrical obligations were deemed necessary in order to compensate the market power of the former monopolist.As the evolution of asymmetrical regulation in Spain illustrates, obligations and the telecommunications operators subject to them increased with the regulatory framework established in 2002 in the EU. This new regulatory framework may continue to expand through the inclusion of functional separation as another possible asymmetrical obligation. In short, it seems that the regulatory pressure on the telecommunications industry is increasing, despite the lapse in time since the liberalisation of the industry.In this paper, a methodology developed by the Austrian School of Economics is applied in order to explain why the telecommunication market is subject to increasing regulation in Europe, rather than deregulation, after more than 10 years of liberalisation. In particular, Mises's theory of price control is used to explain the evolution of the regulation of local loop unbundling.