Returns on initial public offerings of closed-end funds

Examination of 41 closed-end fund initial public offerings (IPOs)during the period from January 1986 to June 1987 reveals thatthe mean initial day's return is not significantly differentfrom zero in contrast to previous findings for nonfund IPOs.New funds also show significant negative after-market returnsunlike other new issues. Despite the disparity between our findingsand previous results, our results are consistent with existingmodels.     

Estimating the performance effects of business groups in emerging markets

Business groups—confederations of legally independent firms—are ubiquitous in emerging economies, yet very little is known about their effects on the performance of affiliated firms. We conceive of business groups as responses to market failures and high transaction costs. In doing so, we develop hypotheses about the effects of group affiliation on firm profitability: affiliation could either boost or depress firm profitability, and members of a group are likely to earn rates of return similar to other members of the same group. Using a unique data set compiled largely from local sources, we test for these effects in 14 emerging markets: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, India, Indonesia, Israel, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Turkey. We find evidence that business groups indeed affect the broad patterns of economic performance in 12 of the markets we examine. Group affiliation appears to have as profound an effect on profitability as does industry membership, yet strategy scholars have a much clearer grasp of industries than of groups. Moreover, membership in a group raises the profitability of the average group member in several of the markets we examine. This runs contrary to the wisdom, conventional in advanced economies, that unrelated diversification depresses profitability. Overall, our findings suggest that the roots of sustained differences in profitability may vary across institutional contexts; conclusions drawn in one context may well not apply to another. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Bringing science to the art of strategy

Many managers feel doomed to trade off the futile rigor of ordinary strategic planning for the hit-or-miss creativity of the alternatives. In fact, the two can be reconciled to produce novel but realistic strategies. The key is to recognize that conventional strategic planning, for all its analysis, is not actually scientific-it lacks the careful generation and testing of hypotheses that are at the heart of the scientific method. The authors outline a strategy-making process that combines rigor and creativity. A team begins by formulating options, or possibilities, and asks what must be true for each to succeed. Once it has listed all the conditions, it assesses their likelihood and thereby identifies the barriers to each choice. The team then tests the key barrier conditions to see which hold true. From here, choosing a strategy is simple: The group need only review the test results and choose the possibility with the fewest serious barriers. This is the path P&G took in the late 1990s, when it was looking to become a major global player in skin care. After testing the barrier conditions for several possibilities, it opted for a bold strategy that might never have surfaced in the traditional process: reinventing Olay as a prestigelike product also sold to mass consumers. The new Olay succeeded beyond expectations-showing what can happen when teams shift from asking "What is the right answer" and focus instead on figuring out "What are the right questions?".     

Strategy making in novel and complex worlds: the power of analogy

We examine how firms discover effective competitive positions in worlds that are both novel and complex. In such settings, neither rational deduction nor local search is likely to lead a firm to a successful array of choices. Analogical reasoning, however, may be helpful, allowing managers to transfer useful wisdom from similar settings they have experienced in the past. From a long list of observable industry characteristics, analogizing managers choose a subset they believe distinguishes similar industries from different ones. Faced with a novel industry, they seek a familiar industry which matches the novel one along that subset of characteristics. They transfer from the matching industry high‐level policies that guide search in the novel industry. We embody this conceptualization of analogy in an agent‐based simulation model. The model allows us to examine the impact of managerial and structural characteristics on the effectiveness of analogical reasoning. With respect to managerial characteristics, we find, not surprisingly, that analogical reasoning is especially powerful when managers pay attention to characteristics that truly distinguish similar industries from different ones. More surprisingly, we find that the marginal returns to depth of experience diminish rapidly while greater breadth of experience steadily improves performance. Both depth and breadth of experience are useful only when one accurately understands what distinguishes similar industries from different ones. We also discover that following an analogy in too orthodox a manner—strictly constraining search efforts to what the analogy suggests—can be dysfunctional. With regard to structural characteristics, we find that a well‐informed analogy is particularly powerful when interactions among decisions cross policy boundaries so that the underlying decision problem is not easily decomposed. Overall, the results shed light on a form of managerial reasoning that we believe is prevalent among practicing strategists yet is largely absent from scholarly analysis of strategy. Copyright © 2005 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

How strategists really think. Tapping the power of analogy

Leaders tend to be so immersed in the specifics of strategy that they rarely stop to think how much of their reasoning is done by analogy. As a result, they miss useful insights that psychologists and other scientists have generated about analogies' pitfalls. Managers who pay attention to their own analogical thinking will make better strategic decisions and fewer mistakes. Charles Lazarus was inspired by the supermarket when he founded Toys R Us; Intel promoted its low-end chips to avoid becoming like U.S. Steel; and Circuit City created CarMax because it saw the used-car market as analogous to the consumer-electronics market. Each example displays the core elements of analogical reasoning: a novel problem or a new opportunity, a specific prior context that managers deem to be similar in its essentials, and a solution that managers can transfer from its original setting to the new one. Analogical reasoning is a powerful tool for sparking breakthrough ideas. But dangers arise when analogies are built on surface similarities (headlong diversification based on loose analogies played a role in Enron's collapse, for instance). Psychologists have discovered that it's all too easy to overlook the superficiality of analogies. The situation is further complicated by people's tendency to hang on to beliefs even after contrary evidence comes along (a phenomenon known as anchoring) and their tendency to seek only the data that confirm their beliefs (an effect known as the confirmation bias). Four straightforward steps can improve a management team's odds of using an analogy well: Recognize the analogy and identify its purpose; thoroughly understand its source; determine whether the resemblance is more than superficial; and decide whether the original strategy, properly translated, will work in the target industry.     

Response to Farjoun's ‘Strategy making,novelty, and analogical reasoning — commentary on Gavetti,Levinthal, and Rivkin (2005)’

In his thoughtful commentary on our 2005 paper (Gavetti, Levinthal, and Rivkin, 2005), Farjoun offers three critiques and extensions. First, he suggests our approach should have explicitly considered a constructionist logic. Second, Farjoun argues that we have neglected the full array of modes of cognition between rational choice and feedback‐based adaptive learning and have therefore overstated the role of our focal mode, reasoning by analogy. Third, he highlights some of the contingencies under which the various modes of cognition he identifies are effective. In response, we address each point. We first argue that a constructionist perspective is not alien either to the role of analogical reasoning or to the particular modeling apparatus we have developed. We then suggest that despite the richness of modes of cognition that lie between rational choice and adaptive learning, theorizing about them requires simplification and the identification of underlying categories that classify such modes, which is the approach our paper employs. Finally, we clarify how our paper adopts the contingent logic advocated by Farjoun. Copyright © 2008 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.