The effect of information releases on the pricing and timing of equity issues

With time-varying adverse selection in the market for new equityissues, firms will prefer to issue equity when the market ismost informed about the quality of the firm. This implies thatequity issues tend to follow credible information releases.In addition, if the asymmetric in information increases overtime between information releases, the price drop at the announcementof an equity issue should increase in the time since the lastinformation release. Using earning releases as a proxy for informativeevents, we find evidence supporting these propositions.     

Uncertainty during tender offers and the measurement of shareholder wealth effects

Uncertainty concerning the ultimate outcome of tender offers may affect the measurement of changes in shareholder wealth. The uncertainty regarding the outcome of tender offers is measured by estimating the probability of acceptance of tender offers during the period when the tender offers are outstanding. The estimated probability of acceptance of tender offers implies that the amount of uncertainty prior to knowledge of the ultimate outcome is substantial and affects the measurement of expected equity gains. The uncertainty-adjusted measure of the change in shareholder wealth indicates that previous studies may have underestimated the gains expected to result from tender offers.