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Buyer power and supplier incentives 总被引:3,自引:0,他引:3
This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare. 相似文献
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Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search
to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In
equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with
the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes
under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter
values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used
to achieve separation.
Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000 相似文献
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Summary. We discuss a competitive (labor) market where firms face capacity constraints and individuals differ according to their productivity.
Firms offer two-dimensional contracts like wage and task level. Then workers choose firms and contracts. Workers might be
rationed if the number of applicants exceeds the capacity of the firm.
We show that under reasonable assumptions on the distribution of capacity an equilibrium in pure strategies (by the firms)
exists. This result stands in contrast to the case of unlimited capacity. The utility level is uniquely determined in equilibrium.
No rationing occurs in equilibrium, but it does off the equilibrium path.
Received: December 29, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2000 相似文献
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