Pricing in Segmented Markets, Arbitrage Barriers, and the Law of One Price: Evidence from the European Car Market

The paper uses micro‐level price data from the European car market to examine why there are deviations from the law of one price. The absolute law of one price is strongly rejected, but there is convergence to its relative version. Two sets of explanations are considered: (i) price‐setting in segmented markets, and (ii) arbitrage barriers. Overall, the determinants of arbitrage costs have more explanatory power. The single most important factor is the distance between markets. Evidence for Belgium and Luxembourg suggests that a single currency lowers price differences significantly.     

Social economics and economics imperialism

Address delivered at a session on April 2, 1993 at the Midwest regional meetings of the Association for Social Economics, Indianapolis, IN.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Introduction: What Role Can Experiments Play in Research on Regulation?

Journal of Regulatory Economics -     

Competitive search markets for durable goods

Summary. This paper considers a dynamic version of Akerlof's (1970) lemons problem where buyers and sellers must engage in search to find a trading partner. We show that if goods are durable, the market itself may provide a natural sorting mechanism. In equilibrium, high-quality goods sell at a higher price than low-quality goods but also circulate longer. This accords with the common wisdom that sellers who want to sell fast may have to accept a lower price. We then compare the equilibrium outcomes under private information with those under complete information. Surprisingly, we find that for a large range of parameter values the quilibrium outcomes under the two information regimes coincide, despite the fact that circulation time is used to achieve separation. Received: August 24, 2000; revised version: October 24, 2000