为什么德国“不折腾”

二战结束后,特别是到20世纪50、60年代,依靠艾哈德"社会市场经济"政策的调节,联邦德国经济发展迅速,创造了经济增长的奇迹。1963年阿登纳因专权引起党内反对而辞职,当时的经济部长艾哈德接任总理职务。     

THE IMPACT OF ACADEMIC PATENTING ON THE RATE,QUALITY AND DIRECTION OF (PUBLIC) RESEARCH OUTPUT*

We examine the influence of faculty patenting on the rate, quality, and content of public research outputs in a panel dataset of 3,862 academic life scientists. Using inverse probability of treatment weights (IPTW) to account for self‐selection into patenting, we find that patenting has a positive effect on the rate of publications and a weak positive effect on the quality of these publications. We also find that patenters may be shifting their research focus to questions of commercial interest. We conclude that the often voiced concern that patenting in academe has a nefarious effect on public research output is misplaced.     

Is Fairly Priced Deposit Insurance Possible?

We analyze risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance in the presence of private information and moral hazard. Without deposit-linked subsidies it is impossible to implement risk-sensitive, incentive-compatible deposit insurance pricing in a competitive, deregulated environment, except when the deposit insurer is the least risk averse agent in the economy. We establish this formally in the context of an insurance scheme in which privately informed depository institutions are offered deposit insurance premia contingent on reported capital; the result holds for alternative sorting instruments as well. This suggests a contradiction between deregulation and fairly priced, risk-sensitive deposit insurance.     

Interest Rate Uncertainty and the Financial Intermediary's Choice of Exposure

The financial intermediary's choice of operating as a broker with minimal risk exposure or as an asset-transformer with interest rate risk is modeled as a funds inventory decision made prior to the resolution of uncertainty regarding the borrowing or lending interest rates. It is shown that an increase in the interest rate uncertainty leads the intermediary to reduce its exposure, thereby offering decreased asset-transformation and more brokerage services. However, a stochastic increase in the interest rates leads to greater asset-transformation and less brokerage services.     

On Enhancing Shareholder Control: A (Dodd‐) Frank Assessment of Proxy Access

We use events related to a proxy access rule passed by the Securities and Exchange Commission in 2010 as natural experiments to study the valuation effects of changes in shareholder control. We find that valuations increase (decrease) following increases (decreases) in perceived control, especially for firms that are poorly performing, have shareholders likely to exercise control, and where acquiring a stake is relatively inexpensive. These results suggest that an increase in shareholder control from its current level would generally benefit shareholders. However, we find that the benefits of increased control are muted for firms with shareholders whose interests may deviate from value maximization.