When Less (Potential Demand) Is More (Revenue): Asymmetric Bidding Capacities in Divisible Good Auctions

We show that asymmetry in bidders’ capacity constraints plays an important role in inhibiting collusion and promoting competitive outcomes in multi-unit auctions in which the final value of the good is common knowledge. This effect appears to be related to the increased difficulty of coordination when there are significant differences between bidders. Due to its impact on collusive outcomes, asymmetry in bidding capacities has a more powerful impact on the seller’s revenue than does the auction type. Consistent with the finding in Sade et al. (2006) that the discriminatory auction is more susceptible to collusion than the uniform-price auction, asymmetry in capacity constraints has a greater impact in discriminatory auctions.We thank Emmanuel Morales-Camargo, Ira Luria and Yelena Larkin for their excellent research assistance. We have benefited from comments by Yishay Yafeh, Eugene Kandel, Dan Levin, David Genesove, Eric Hughson, Steve Rock, Peter Bossaerts, David McAdams two anonymous referees, participants at the 2005 International Meeting of the Economic Science Association in Montreal, the 2006 winter meeting of the Econometric Society in Boston, and seminar participants at the University of Cincinnati, Hebrew University, Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta, Tel-Aviv University, the University of Notre Dame, and Ben-Gurion University. Sade thanks the Israel Science Foundation (ISF 480/05) and the Krueger Center for Finance at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem for partial financial support.     

Competition and Cooperation in Divisible Good Auctions: An Experimental Examination

An experimental approach is used to examine the performanceof three different multiunit auction designs: discriminatory,uniform-price with fixed supply, and uniform-price with endogenoussupply. We find the actual strategies to be inconsistent withtheoretically identified equilibrium strategies. The discriminatoryauction is found to be more susceptible to collusion than eitheruniform-price auction and so, contrary to theoretical predictionsand previous experimental results, it generates the lowest averagerevenue. Consistent with theoretical predictions, the actualbid schedules are more elastic with reducible supply or discriminatorypricing than in the uniform-price auction with fixed supply.     

The influence of Flexible Manufacturing Technology adoption on productivity of Malaysian manufacturing industry

This paper investigates the influence of the adoption of Flexible Manufacturing Technology (FMT) on the Total factor Productivity Growth (TFPG) of Malaysia Manufacturing Industry. The Principal Component Analysis has been adopted to extract the most appropriate underlying dimensions of FMT to use in place of the eight FMT variables owing to the potential multicollinearity. The study has been conducted within FMT intensively adopted 16 three-digit industries that encompass 50 five-digit industries covering the years 2000–2005. The results obtained from the two situations, one, including the industry fixed effects dummy variables and the other without these, are contrasted. It is established that the model that included the industry fixed effect dummy variables has a greater explanatory power. The two principal components that account for the greater variation in FMT show positive and moderately significant relationship with TFPG. The study provides sufficient evidence to conclude that FMT has a direct and moderately significant relationship with TFPG.