Cost Analysis of Calcium in Store Brand versus National Brand Grocery Products

Objective: This study was to determine if calcium fortification yields a higher price per serving in grocery store products. Researchers compared store brand to national brand grocery products in relation to cost in order to examine if calcium values were similar between store brand and national brand products. Methods: A total of 112 store brand and 211 national brand grocery products were collected from three low (national chain store), middle and high priced (Virginia and North Carolina regional store) grocery venues. Products were compared using price and calcium percentage per serving. ANOVA was used to determine between store brand and national brand for price per serving and calcium content, and between grocery venues. Results: National brand fortified products had a significantly lower mean price per serving when compared to national brand non-fortified products (p = 0.0002). There was no statistical difference between store brand fortified and non-fortified products (p = 0.9256). Low priced store brand products had the lowest mean price per serving ($0.34 ±0.24). Conclusions: This study found store brand products have similar calcium content as national brand products. Product cost was lower at low priced store compared to middle and high priced stores.     

Identifying “best” applicants in recruiting using data envelopment analysis

Selecting the most promising candidates to fill an open position can be a difficult task when there are many applicants. Each applicant achieves certain performance levels in various categories and the resulting information can be overwhelming. We demonstrate how data envelopment analysis (DEA) can be used as a fair screening and sorting tool to support the candidate selection and decision-making process. Each applicant is viewed as an entity with multiple achievements. Without any a priori preference or information on the multiple achievements, DEA identifies the non-dominated solutions, which, in our case, represent the “best” candidates. A DEA-aided recruiting process was developed that (1) determines the performance levels of the “best” candidates relative to other applicants; (2) evaluates the degree of excellence of “best” candidates’ performance; (3) forms consistent tradeoff information on multiple recruiting criteria among search committee members, and, then, (4) clusters the applicants.     

The Effects of Participation and Job-Relevant Information on the Relationship Between Evaluative Style and Job Satisfaction

This study investigates the intervening effects of budgetary participation and job-relevant information on the relationship between budget emphasis and job satisfaction. It proposes that budgetary participation and job-relevant information are endogenous to budget emphasis. Using the path analytical technique and based on a sample of 152 senior managers, the study found that budget emphasis has an insignificant direct effect on job satisfaction, but a strong indirect effect through job-relevant information and budgetary participation. The results also indicate that job-relevant information has an intervening effect on the relationship between participation and job satisfaction.     

Heterogeneous ability,career choice and firm size

Entrepreneurial ability is the ability to innovate new products. Managerial ability is the ability to maintain the profitability of current operations. By assuming heterogeneous abilities of acquiring and maintaining an endogenous number of production processes, the model of this paper predicts a distribution of firm sizes, a diversity in the composition of R&D and chosen career. Firms conduct product improvement if and only if managerial ability is high relative to entrepreneurial ability. Individuals choose careers as either innovative entrepreneurs, managerial entrepreneurs or salaried employees depending on their abilities. An individual's entrepreneurial ability may not be high enough to choose a career as an innovative entrepreneur, but if managerial ability is sufficiently high, then a career as a managerial entrepreneur is optimal. Managerial ability has an effect on expected firm size if and only if the individual is a managerial entrepreneur.This material is based upon work supported by the Research Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management. I wish to thank two anonymous referees for helpful suggestions.     

An empirical investigation of firm public and private knowledge

Many studies examine firm private knowledge, but purport to be generalizable to the totality of firm knowledge, both public and private. This study demonstrates that public and private firm knowledge are empirically separable constructs that have significant and yet different influences on innovative outcomes. The example of product development effectiveness within this study shows that both public and private knowledge are significantly related to product development quality; however, public knowledge is negatively related to quality lapses while private knowledge is positively related to quality lapses. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Non-commitment in performance evaluation and the problem of information distortions

Auditing is modeled in a sequential game without commitment. The manager must decide whether and where to audit a worker's output, taking into account all interim information he has obtained. The worker will work just hard enough (and show it) to divert the manager from making an audit or cover up, withholding information about his work to make an audit more difficult. This usually raises the costs of setting work incentives, so incentives are softened, sometimes drastically. Moreover, when a worker's on-the-job information is valuable for entrepreneurial decisions, work incentives must be softened to improve the internal flow of information.     

A model of project evaluation with limited attention

Summary This paper characterizes the optimal policy for a model in which manager may adopt an endogenous number of projects but has only limited resources to devote to their evaluation and maintenance. In any period, the manager may discard any subset of existing projects but may evaluate only one existing or one new project which is then either discarded or restored. Both its current return and the probability with which a project may be restored depends only on the number of periods since its last evaluated. For a manager whose objective is to maximize the sum of discounted returns, the optimal policy takes one of two forms. A discard policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project in each period and discard current projects at some critical age. An age inspection policy specifies that the manager evaluate a new project only if all current projects are sufficiently young.Support from the C. V. Starr Center for Applied Economics and the Research Resource Committee of the Rutgers Graduate School of Management is gratefully acknowledged. We thank Roy Radner for valuable assistance in the early stages of the work.     

Competition with Congestible Networks

We analyse competition between two network providers when the quality of each network depends negatively on the number of customers connected to that network. With respect to price competition we provide a sufficient condition for the existence of a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Comparative statics show that as the congestion effect gets stronger quantities will decrease and prices increase, under both Bertrand and Cournot competition. In an example with endogenous capacities it turns out that equilibrium capacities are at first increasing and then decreasing in the strength of congestion. Furthermore, capacities are higher under Cournot competition. Welfare comparisons between Bertrand and Cournot competition are unambiguous for fixed capacities, but may turn around for endogenous capacities.     

Experimental evidence of gender effects in arbitration decisions

The study investigates arbitrator gender and arbitrator-grievant gender effects on the decisions of 146 arbitrators rendered on a hypothetical sexual harassment case. Gender was not found to have a statistically significant effect on the decisions examined. However, other characteristics of the arbitrator—level of experience and level of education—were found to influence the arbitral decision.     

Government wage differentials

This paper shows that public sector wages usually exceed private but the size and composition of the differentials depend on sex and level of government. Using a technique derived from the literature on sex discrimination, these differentials are decomposed into a portion attributable to differences in productivity between the two types of workers and a portion ascribed to economic rent. This rent results from public workers' relatively greater political influence in the government wage-setting process and a systematic upward bias in public wages imparted by present government pay policy.