Contract compliance and equal opportunities

In 1983, the Greater London Council adopted a policy of 'Contract Compliance' designed to ensure that firms selling goods and services to the Council complied with its equal opportunity requirements. The initiative aroused wide interest and many other local authorities - 40 are known of to date - have been considering introducing such a policy. Although simple in essence, its execution can be complex and difficult. In April 1986, the Inner London Education Authority, a partner in the GLC policy, took over the Contract Compliance Unit following the GLCs abolition. Linda Smith explains the background to contract compliance, how the GLC, now ILEA, operates the policy; assesses its achievements and its significance and explores some of the lessons learnt in its three years of operation.     

Recurrent unemployment in young black and white males

In this article the author, using data drawn from the experience of West Indians and white school leavers, examines the problem of recurrent unemployment and its relationship to the structure of local labour markets.     

Empirical Effects of Performance Contracts: Evidence From China

Performance contracts (PCs)—contracts signed between thegovernment and state enterprise managers—have been usedwidely in developing countries. China's experience with suchcontracts was one of the largest experiments with contractingin the public sector, affecting hundreds of thousands of statefirms, and offered a rare opportunity to explore how PCs work.On average, PCs did not improve performance and may have madeit worse. But China's PCs were not uniformly bad; in fact, PCsimproved productivity in slightly more than half of the participants.PC effects were on average negative because of the large lossesassociated with poorly designed PCs. Successful PCs were thosethat featured sensible targets, stronger incentives, longerterms, managerial bonds, and were in more competitive industries.Selecting managers through bidding was not associated with performanceimprovement. Good PC features were more often observed in state-ownedenterprises (SOEs) under the oversight of local governments,that faced more competition, that were smaller in size, andthat had better previous performance.     

Managerial Altruism and Governance in Charitable Donations

We describe a double agency problem in firms' charitable donations. When managers have better knowledge about the effectiveness of donations and their altruistic preferences, it is difficult for shareholders to tell whether charitable donations are made for a strategic purpose or due to managerial altruism. We characterize the equilibrium donations in a heterogeneous competition model. We show that managerial altruism is a substitute for the effectiveness of donations, and excess donations cannot be prevented by a compensation scheme that reduces the interest conflicts between ownership and management. Under board authorization, the board will tolerate donations with high effectiveness and low altruism as well as donations corresponding to low effectiveness and high altruism. Under a penalty scheme, the altruistic manager will increase donations, in order to increase donation's strategic benefit to compensate for the loss from the penalty. Copyright © 2017 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

The stop-loss start-gain paradox and option valuation: a new decomposition into intrinsic and time value

The downside risk in a leveraged stock position can be eliminatedby using stop-loss orders. The upside potential of such a positioncan be captured using contingent buy orders. The terminal payoffto this stop-loss start-gain strategy is identical to that ofa call option, but the strategy costs less initially. This articleresolves this paradox by showing that the strategy is not self-financingfor continuous stock-price processes of unbounded variation.The resolution of the paradox leads to a new decomposition ofan option's price into its intrinsic and time value. When thestock price follows geometric Brownian motion, this decompositionis proven to be mathematically equivalent to the Black-Scholes(1973) formula.