DIVISION MANAGEMENT BUYOUTS OF UNRELATED DIVISIONS WITHOUT A SALES PRICE REPORTED

Shareholder wealth effects of division management buyouts are examined: (1) for selling divisions with business operations unrelated to the parent, and (2) for announcements that do not report the sales price. Initial evidence suggests that both of these characteristics result in smaller abnormal returns. Further analysis, however, indicates that these individual effects are interdependent and that only their combined effect is accompanied by an abnormal return that is not significant.     

OPEN MARKET REPURCHASES: THE VALUE FROM BUYING SHARES AT A DISCOUNT

This article shows that share repurchase announcements create value for shareholders when the shares of the industrial firm sell at a discount from the value of the underlying assets, even when shareholders and managers share full information about the firm's prospects and the firm's operating performance is not expected to improve. The value created by capturing the discount on the repurchased shares is a function of only two variables: the percentage discount prior to the announcement and the proportion of shares to be repurchased.
For a sample of 100 companies selling below net asset value, the authors report that the excess stock returns surrounding their announcements of open market repurchases are (significantly) positively associated with the authors' estimates of the value captured from buying shares at a discount. Moreover, the stock market's response to repurchase announcements by companies that are selling at a discount is considerably more positive than to announcements by firms selling at a premium.     

The Choice Between Spin-offs and Sell-offs

Spin-offs and sell-offs are alternative methods for divesting assets, but the effects on the parent firm differ substantially. We examine firms' characteristics that may influence the asset divestiture choice between a spin-off and sell-off. Results of the analysis indicate that the primary factors influencing the choice of divestiture type are financial distress, number of directors on the board, whether the CEO is also the Board Chair, and the size of the unit divested.     

DIVESTITURE TO UNIT MANAGERS AND SHAREHOLDER WEALTH

The impact on shareholder wealth from selling units to management is examined. The two-day announcement period average abnormal return for parent firms divesting units to managers of those units is positive (0.80 percent) and significant. On average, the impact on shareholder wealth of parent firms divesting assets to managers of the unit is similar to the shareholder wealth effect for divestiture to third parties.