Share Holder Wealth Effects of Corporate Selloffs: Impact of Growth Opportunities, Economic Cycle and Bargaining Power

Most of the existing empirical evidence on corporate selloffs documents significant wealth gains for the seller's shareholders. We investigate the sources of these wealth gains by examining the impact of business and financial strategy, the economic environment during selloff, and the bargaining advantages of the seller including information asymmetry. We find evidence that sellers with growth opportunities and financially strong sellers enjoy higher returns. Selloffs during recessions generate larger wealth gains than those during economic boom. Information asymmetry due to the buyer's location being different from the purchased division's gives the seller a bargaining advantage leading to larger wealth gains. Relatively large divestments are more beneficial to seller shareholders than small ones. The study highlights the importance of both firm specific and environmental factors in explaining the wealth gains associated with corporate selloffs.     

The impact of purchasing power parity on auto foreign trade

In this study, the validity of the assumption saying that the import and export are a function of prices as in the classical, neo-classical approaches is studied within the framework of the import and export of automobile vehicles between 1997 and 2003 in Turkey and the EU countries which are automobile manufacturers. The price here is considered as the purchasing power parity. The effect of the purchasing power parity on the automobile import and export is determined by using classical models with constant coefficients, and fixed and random effects models with constant slope coefficients and a constant term differing according to units and/or time. The models comprise balanced linear panel data models. The likelihood ratio test and F-test are used in the selection of fixed effects and classical models; and the Lagrange multiplier test is used in the selection of random effects and classical models. As for the selection of fixed and random effects models, the Hausman test is used. As a result of these tests, the fixed effects models covering both individual and time effects are selected as the most appropriate import and export models.     

Corporate Restructuring in Response to Performance Decline: Impact of Ownership, Governance and Lenders

Firms in performance decline may choose a variety ofrestructuring strategies for recovery with conflicting welfareimplications for different stakeholders such as shareholders,lenders and managers. Choice of recovery strategies is thereforedetermined by the complex interplay of ownership structure,corporate governance and lender monitoring of such firms. For asample of 297 U.K. firms experiencing relative stock return declineduring 1987–93, we examine the impact of these factors as wellas other control factors on their turnaround strategies. Strategychoices during the decline year and two post-decline years aremodelled with logit regressions. Our results show that turnaroundstrategy choices are significantly influenced by both agency andcontrol variables. While there is agreement among stakeholderson certain strategies there is also evidence of conflict ofinterests among them. There is further evidence of shiftingcoalitions of stakeholders for or against certain strategies.     

Glamour Acquirers, Method of Payment and Post‐acquisition Performance: The UK Evidence

We study the effect of different acquirer types, defined by financial status and their payment methods, on their short and long‐term performance, in terms of abnormal returns using a variety of benchmark models. For a sample of 519 UK acquirers during 1983–95, we examine the abnormal return performance of acquirers based on their pre‐bid financial status as either glamour or value acquirers using both the price to earnings (PE) ratio and market to book value ratio (MTBV). Value acquirers outperform glamour acquirers in the three‐year post‐acquisition period. One interpretation is that glamour firms have overvalued equity and tend to exploit their status and use it more often than cash to finance their acquisitions. As we move from glamour to value acquirers, there is a greater use of cash. Our results are broadly consistent with those for the US reported by Rau and Vermaelen (1998). However, in contrast to their study, we find stronger support for the method of payment hypothesis than for extrapolation hypothesis. Cash acquirers generate higher returns than equity acquirers, irrespective of their glamour/ value status. Our conclusions, based on four benchmark models for abnormal returns, suggest that stock markets in both the US and the UK may share a similar proclivity for over‐extrapolation of past performance, at least in the bid period. They also tend to reassess acquirer performance in the post‐acquisition period and correct this overextrapolation. These results have implications for the behavioural aspects of capital markets in both countries.     

Determinants of earnout as acquisition payment currency and bidder’s value gains

We examine the wealth effects of a comprehensive sample of UK bidders offering contingent payment, or earnout, as consideration for their acquisitions. We show that bidders using earnout generate significantly higher announcement and post-acquisition value gains than bidders using non-earnout currencies (such as cash, stock exchange, or mixed payments). We construct a logistic model to predict when it is optimal for a bidder to offer earnout. We show that bidders offering earnout optimally enjoy significantly higher announcement and post-acquisition gains than bidders offering non-earnout currencies, consistent with our model of the choice of the optimal method of payment. Overall, we provide robust evidence that earnout is an effective payment mechanism to mitigate valuation risk to acquirers, and also enhances acquirer value during the announcement and post-acquisition periods. Our paper contributes to the broader literature on how corporate acquirers use payment currency to manage information asymmetry and the attendant valuation risk.     

Determinants of financial covenants and pricing of debt in private debt contracts: the UK evidence

This paper presents details of financial covenants given by a sample drawn from the largest 200 non-financial quoted firms in the UK in private debt contracts and analyses these data to see whether there are relationships between the nature of the covenants given and firm characteristics. Data were obtained from 72 firms, of which 17 gave no financial covenants. Firm size was found to be the only significant factor influencing whether firms did or did not give covenants as well as the only factor which influenced the margin given on debt. Some types of covenants given were found to be different from those found in previous research. In particular, there is greater use of EBITDA as a base for both interest cover and gearing covenants. This shows the importance of cash flow based lending as opposed to asset based lending for general financing for large firms.     

Management Going‐concern Disclosures: Impact of Corporate Governance and Auditor Reputation

The UK regulatory requirements relating to going‐concern disclosures require directors to report on the going‐concern status of their firms. Such directors have incentives not to report fairly in the case of financially‐distressed firms. We expect effective corporate governance mechanisms will encourage directors to report more truthfully in such situations. This paper tests this proposition explicitly using a large sample of going‐concern cases over the period 1994–2000. We find that whereas auditors' going‐concern opinions predict the subsequent resolution of going‐concern uncertainties directors' going‐concern statements convey arbitrary and unhelpful messages to users. However, robust corporate governance structures and high auditor reputation constrain directors to be more truthful in their going‐concern disclosures, bringing these more into line with the more credible auditor opinions.     

Corporate Restructuring in Response to Performance Decline: Impact of Ownership, Governance and Lenders

Firms in performance decline may choose a variety of restructuringstrategies for recovery with conflicting welfare implicationsfor different stakeholders such as shareholders, lenders andmanagers. Choice of recovery strategies is therefore determinedby the complex interplay of ownership structure, corporate governanceand lender monitoring of such firms. For a sample of 297 U.K.firms experiencing relative stock return decline during 1987–93,we examine the impact of these factors as well as other controlfactors on their turnaround strategies. Strategy choices duringthe decline year and two post-decline years are modelled withlogit regressions. Our results show that turnaround strategychoices are significantly influenced by both agency and controlvariables. While there is agreement among stakeholders on certainstrategies there is also evidence of conflict of interests amongthem. Thereis further evidence of shifting coalitions of stakeholdersfor or against certain strategies.