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Asset Quality Misrepresentation by Financial Intermediaries: Evidence from the RMBS Market 下载免费PDF全文
We document that contractual disclosures by intermediaries during the sale of mortgages contained false information about the borrower's housing equity in 7–14% of loans. The rate of misrepresented loan default was 70% higher than for similar loans. These misrepresentations likely occurred late in the intermediation and exist among securities sold by all reputable intermediaries. Investors—including large institutions—holding securities with misrepresented collateral suffered severe losses due to loan defaults, price declines, and ratings downgrades. Pools with misrepresentations were not issued at a discount. Misrepresentation on another easy‐to‐quantify dimension shows that these effects are a conservative lower bound. 相似文献
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We study optimal compensation in a dynamic framework where the CEO consumes in multiple periods, can undo the contract by privately saving, and can temporarily inflate earnings. We obtain a simple closed‐form contract that yields clear predictions for how the level and performance sensitivity of pay vary over time and across firms. The contract can be implemented by escrowing the CEO's pay into a “Dynamic Incentive Account” that comprises cash and the firm's equity. The account features state‐dependent rebalancing to ensure its equity proportion is always sufficient to induce effort, and time‐dependent vesting to deter short‐termism. 相似文献
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We estimate an open‐economy vector autoregressive (VAR) model to study the effect of capital‐inflow shocks on the U.S. housing market. We look at different external shocks that generate capital inflows to the U.S., in particular “saving‐glut” shocks and foreign monetary‐policy expansions. The shocks are identified with theoretically robust sign restrictions derived from an open‐economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Our findings suggest that capital inflows that result from “saving‐glut” shocks have a positive and persistent effect on real house prices and real residential investment. 相似文献
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SHEKHAR AIYAR CHARLES W. CALOMIRIS TOMASZ WIELADEK 《Journal of Money, Credit and Banking》2014,46(Z1):181-214
The regulation of bank capital as a means of smoothing the credit cycle is a central element of forthcoming macro‐prudential regimes internationally. For such regulation to be effective in controlling the aggregate supply of credit it must be the case that: (i) changes in capital requirements affect loan supply by regulated banks, and (ii) unregulated substitute sources of credit are unable to offset changes in credit supply by affected banks. This paper examines micro evidence—lacking to date—on both questions, using a unique data set. In the UK, regulators have imposed time‐varying, bank‐specific minimum capital requirements since Basel I. It is found that regulated banks (UK‐owned banks and resident foreign subsidiaries) reduce lending in response to tighter capital requirements. But unregulated banks (resident foreign branches) increase lending in response to tighter capital requirements on a relevant reference group of regulated banks. This “leakage” is substantial, amounting to about one‐third of the initial impulse from the regulatory change. 相似文献
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We examine large public interventions in the financial sector, such as bank nationalizations and search for “financial protectionism,” a decrease in the quantity and/or an increase in the price of loans that banks from one country make to borrowers resident in another. We use a bank‐level panel data set spanning all U.K.‐resident banks between 1997Q3 and 2010Q1. After nationalization, foreign banks reduced their fraction of British loans by about 11% and increased their effective interest rates by about 70 basis points. In contrast, nationalized British banks did not significantly change either their loan mix or effective interest rates. 相似文献
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By carefully matching the data sets from the Michigan Survey of Consumers with the Survey of Professional Forecasters, we show that there exists substantial heterogeneity in the propensity of U.S. households to learn from experts in forming inflation expectations. Additional results for a group of European economies broadly confirm this observation. We advance an extended version of the sticky-information model to analyze disagreement in consumer inflation expectations. Besides differences in consumers' propensities to learn, disagreement in our model arises from heterogeneity in consumers' fundamental inflation and past expectations and experts' different views about future inflation. 相似文献
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