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Health care reform in the United States is on a collision course with economic reality. Most proposals focus on measures that will produce one-time cost savings by eliminating waste and inefficiency. But the right question to ask is how to achieve dramatic and sustained cost reductions over time. What will it take to foster entirely new approaches to disease prevention and treatment, whole new ways to deliver services, and more cost-effective facilities? The answer lies in the powerful lessons business has learned over the past two decades about the imperatives of competition. In industry after industry, the underlying dynamic is the same: competition compels companies to deliver constantly increasing value to customers. The fundamental driver of this continuous quality improvement and cost reduction is innovation. Without incentives to sustain innovation in health care, short-term cost savings will soon be overwhelmed by the desire to widen access, the growing health needs of an aging population, and the unwillingness of Americans to settle for anything less than the best treatments available. The misguided assumption underlying much of the debate about health care is that technology is the enemy. By assuming that technology drives up costs, reformers neglect the central importance of innovation or, worse yet, attempt to slow its pace. In fact, innovation, driven by rigorous competition, is the key to successful reform. 相似文献
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How and under what circumstances can adjusting the inflation target serve as a stabilization-policy tool and contribute to welfare improvement? We answer these questions quantitatively with a standard New Keynesian model that includes cost-push-type shocks. Our proposed inflation target rule calls for the target to be adjusted in a persistent manner and in the opposite direction to the realization of a cost-push shock, which is essentially a makeup strategy. The inflation target rule, combined with a Taylor-type rule, significantly reduces inflation fluctuations originating from cost-push shocks and mitigates the stabilization trade-off, resulting in a similar level of welfare to that associated with the Ramsey optimal policy. 相似文献
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The U.S. health care system is in bad shape. Medical services are restricted or rationed, many patients receive poor care, and high rates of preventable medical error persist. There are wide and inexplicable differences in costs and quality among providers and across geographic areas. In well-functioning competitive markets--think computers, mobile communications, and banking--these outcomes would be inconceivable. In health care, these results are intolerable, with life and quality of life at stake. Competition in health care needs to change, say the authors. It currently operates at the wrong level. Payers, health plans, providers, physicians, and others in the system wrangle over the wrong things, in the wrong locations, and at the wrong times. System participants divide value instead of creating it. (And in some instances, they destroy it.) They shift costs onto one another, restrict access to care, stifle innovation, and hoard information--all without truly benefiting patients. This form of zero-sum competition must end, the authors argue, and must be replaced by competition at the level of preventing, diagnosing, and treating individual conditions and diseases. Among the authors' well-researched recommendations for reform: Standardized information about individual diseases and treatments should be collected and disseminated widely so patients can make informed choices about their care. Payers, providers, and health plans should establish transparent billing and pricing mechanisms to reduce cost shifting, confusion, pricing discrimination, and other inefficiencies in the system. And health care providers should be experts in certain conditions and treatments rather than try to be all things to all people. U.S. employers can also play a big role in reform by changing how they manage their health benefits. 相似文献
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