Law and finance: why does legal origin matter?

This paper assesses empirically two theories of why legal origin influences financial development. The political channel stresses that legal traditions differ in the priority they give to the rights of individual investors vis-à-vis the state and this has repercussions for financial development. The adaptability channel holds that legal traditions differ in their ability to adjust to changing commercial circumstances and legal systems that adapt quickly will foster financial development more effectively. We use historical comparisons and cross-country regressions to assess the validity of these two channels. We find that legal origin matters for financial development because legal traditions differ in their ability to adapt efficiently to evolving economic conditions. Journal of Comparative Economics 31 (4) (2003) 653–675.     

Tax competition,uniform assessment,and the benefit principle

In previous discussions it has been argued that tax competition between local governments results in a tax burden on business that is less than the cost of public services for business and in suboptimal levels of public expenditures for residents. However, this conclusion has never been substantiated by a full theoretical treatment. Here a theoretical model of tax competition is developed between metropolitan areas, with labor perfectly immobile and two local public goods, one for residents and one for business. For “plausible” parameter values, numerical solutions of the optimality conditions are computed by means of a nonlinear programming algorithm.     

Simon's and Siegel's responses to the 'mixed strategy anomaly': a missed case in the sensitivity of economics to empirical evidence

In some of their papers published in the 1950s, Herbert Simonand Sidney Siegel responded to the so-called mixed strategyanomaly in ways which deserve more attention. They producednot only (i) immediate defences of the economic theory of theirown time, but also (ii) ideas and solutions that have laterturned out to be significant contributions to the developmentof the economic theory of choice and decision-making and theseparation of experimental economics from experimental psychology.These observations suggest that economics can be more responsiveto empirical anomalies than has been assumed. Furthermore, knowledgeof the desirable responsiveness to anomalies can provide meansof avoiding the non-desirable immunity to anomalies.     

The influence of trust perceptions on German tourists’ intention to book a sustainable hotel: a new approach to analysing marketing information

ABSTRACT

This study examined the relationship between German tourists’ trust perceptions and their intention to book a sustainable hotel, pioneering a new quantitative approach to sustainable tourism marketing. Data came from 300 respondents who participated in an online survey. Respondents were given a digital brochure to read containing information about a “fictitious” three-star beach hotel in Portugal, before completing a questionnaire that measured inter alia their intention to book this sustainable hotel. Both individual “general trust” (perception of others’ trustworthiness) and “specific trust” towards the fictitious hotel in the brochure were measured. The survey also evaluated respondents’ perceptions about the usefulness of the information in the brochure. Multiple regression analysis of the data indicated that general trust, trusting the hotel and perceived usefulness of the brochure were positively and significantly related to booking intentions. An interaction between general trust and perceived usefulness was also observed. This means that the higher the perception rate about the brochure's usefulness, the higher general trust was for booking intentions and vice versa. The practical implications of the results suggest that tourists could be motivated to book a hotel if its sustainability attributes and amenities were communicated in a trust inspiring way in marketing material.     

Does truth win when teams reason strategically?

We study behavior in the race game with the aim of assessing whether teams can create synergies. The race game has the advantage that the optimal strategy depends neither on beliefs about other players nor on distributional or efficiency concerns. Our results reveal that teams not only outperform individuals but that they can also beat the “truth-wins” benchmark. In particular, varying the length of the race game we find that the team advantage increases with the complexity of the game.     

Innovation speed under uncertainty and competition

Innovation speed is widely considered to be a key factor for a firm's ability to maintain competitive advantage. Primarily, empirical evidence has found contradictory interdependencies regarding the role of innovation speed. The prevailing proposition of “the faster the better” has been challenged by results of empirical studies heavily depending on the methodological setup used. In contrast, we propose a model of the complete innovation process to study innovation speed under uncertainty and competition. We find that higher market uncertainty speeds up innovation and encourages firms to innovate incrementally. Strong competition tends to reduce innovation speed and encourages rather radical innovation.     

Supply Disruptions and Regional Price Effects in a Spatial Oligopoly—An Application to the Global Gas Market

Supply shocks in the global gas market may affect countries differently, as the market is regionally interlinked but not perfectly integrated. Additionally, high supply‐side concentration may expose countries to market power in different ways. To evaluate the strategic position of importing countries with regard to gas supplies, we disentangle the import price into different components and characterize each component as price increasing or price decreasing. Because of the complexity of the interrelations in the global gas market, we use an equilibrium model programmed as a mixed complementarity problem (MCP) and simulate the blockage of liquefied natural gas (LNG) flows through the Strait of Hormuz. This enables us to account for the oligopolistic nature and the asymmetry of the gas supply. We find that Japan faces the most severe price increases, as the Japanese gas demand completely relies on LNG supply. In contrast, European countries such as the UK benefit from good interconnection to the continental pipeline system and domestic price taking production, both of which help to mitigate an increase in physical costs of supply as well as in the exercise of market power.     

Willingness to Pay for Voluntary Climate Action and Its Determinants: Field-Experimental Evidence

The determinants of individual, voluntary climate action (VCA) in combating climate change and its potential scale are frequently debated in public but largely underresearched. We provide estimates of the willingness to individually reduce EU greenhouse gas emissions by one ton, using the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. Estimates are derived from an online field experiment with a large, highly heterogenous, and Internet-representative sample of voting-aged Germans. Jointly estimating willingness to pay (WTP), non-indifference to VCA, and prior knowledge, we uncover important determinants of preferences for VCA, such as education, the information structure among the population, and exogenous environmental conditions.     

The Biodiversity Bargaining Problem

We employ cooperative bargaining theory and Nash’s ‘rational threats’ idea to cast light on the biodiversity bargaining problem. The problem of global environmental negotiations is argued to be of the nature of a bargaining problem, in which bargainers must agree on the distribution of cooperative surplus in order to move to the bargaining frontier. We discuss the importance of both efficiency (bargaining frontier) and fairness (recognition of characteristics of bargainers) in the choice of the appropriate contract. We show that the incremental cost contract, used to resolve the biodiversity bargaining problem, is of the form of an extreme point contract that fails to recognise the contributions of the South to the production of cooperative surplus. A rational response to such a contract is the use of threats of biodiversity destruction. Contracts must evince both efficiency and fairness in order to represent lasting solutions.