Comovement and investment banking networks

We test the hypothesis that investment banking networks affect stock prices and trading behavior. Consistent with the notion that investment banks serve as information hubs for segmented groups of investors, the stock prices of firms that use the same lead underwriter during their equity offerings tend to move together. We also find that when firms switch underwriters between their initial public offering (IPO) and a seasoned equity offering (SEO), they comove less with the stocks associated with the old bank and more with the stocks associated with the new bank. This change in comovement is greater for stocks completing their first SEO and for those experiencing large changes in institutional ownership.     

Interpreting budget deficits in Latin America: the methods with application to Argentina

Fiscal policy in Latin American countries is too often evaluatedon the basis of raw deficit figures. This study demonstrateshow the effects of inflation on the deficit must be removedin order to derive the discretionary component of fiscal policy.Once this correction is made, fiscal policy can be evaluatedby testing the movement of the deficit with respect to alternativepolicy targets. As an illustration I employ Argentine data inorder to decompose the deficit and determine the degree to whichit is a reflection of budget endogeneity versus populism/socialconflict.     

Information,sell-side research,and market making

The interaction between an investment bank's research and market making arms may have important implications for the trading of a firm's stock. We investigate the impact that research has on the liquidity provided by the bank's market maker. Utilizing a large sample of Nasdaq firms, we show that market makers whose banks also provide research coverage provide more liquidity and contribute more to price discovery than do market makers without such research coverage. Finally, we show that such “affiliated” market makers are less affected by uncertainty following earnings announcements. Our results provide new evidence on the sources of liquidity improvements for Nasdaq firms, and suggest that the information produced by banks in the sell-side research process is beneficial to their market makers.     

The Only Fund in Town? Geographic Segmentation in the US Mutual Fund Industry

We find that mutual funds located in regions with more competing funds charge lower management fees, but higher fees related to sales and distribution (12b‐1 fees), sales loads, and other nonmanagement fee expenses. There is some evidence that funds in more competitive regions have higher total expense ratios than similar funds in less competitive regions. Our results indicate that while increased competition drives down fund profits, it creates a negative externality by way of increased sales expenses. Overall, our results suggest the mutual fund industry is characterized by monopolistic competition determined at the local level.     

Consumers' Willingness to Pay for Locally Produced Ground Beef: A Case Study of the Rural Northern Great Plains

This study examined consumers’ preferences and willingness to pay (WTP) for locally produced ground beef with an emphasis on the impacts of product attributes and the heterogeneity caused by rural consumers’ characteristics. We applied the choice-based conjoint technique to analyze data collected from a typical rural town in the Northern Great Plains. The results indicate that location associated product brand differences and leanness were dominant components affecting consumers’ WTP. The premium of locally produced ground beef for consumers with a close tie to local production is $0.48/lb. Cut difference, grass-fed, and organic were trivial factors in determining consumers’ WTP.     

Impact of AIDS/HIV on medical directors

The decade of AIDS/HIV has changed the way insurance medicine is practiced by medical directors. One director details some of these changes.     

Leadership and the aggregation of international collective action

Political entrepreneurs, or leaders, play an important rolein overcoming under-provision and coordination problems inherentin international public goods. Recent examples include the MontrealProtocol on ozone depletion and NATO peacekeeping. We demonstratethat the Prisoner's Dilemma need not be a fait accompli of internationalcollective action, owing to the various means for aggregatingcontributions (summation, best shot, better shot, weakest linkand weaker link). Using evolutionary game theory, we examine'leading by example', whereby a leader unilaterally providesan intermediate contribution, and matching behavior there beyond.It is shown to be a noncooperative means for achieving cooperativeprovision.