Pricing European Options by Numerical Replication: Quadratic Programming with Constraints

The paper considers a regression approach to pricing European options in an incomplete market. The algorithm replicates an option by a portfolio consisting of the underlying security and a risk-free bond. We apply linear regression framework and quadratic programming with linear constraints (input = sample paths of underlying security; output = table of option prices as a function of time and price of the underlying security). We populate the model with historical prices of the underlying security (possibly massaged to the present volatility) or with Monte Carlo simulated prices. Risk neutral processes or probabilities are not needed in this framework.     

Does shareholder approval requirement of equity compensation plans matter?

This paper studies the impact of the 2003 SEC Regulation requiring shareholder approval of all equity-based executive compensation plans on executive compensation policies and practices at S&P 500 firms. Following the 2003 Regulation, firms with shareholder approved equity plans in place or those with strong performance, while not those with non-approved plans or weak performance, increase their equity compensation proposal submission activity. The quality of equity compensation proposals improves in the after-regulation period, and shareholders exhibit greater scrutiny and monitoring of executive compensation through increased voting rights. We find a decline in the equity pay component while an increase in the cash component of total executive compensation after the 2003 Regulation and also provide evidence that the 2003 Regulation contributes to this change in compensation structure.     

SECULAR MEAN REVERSION AND LONG‐RUN PREDICTABILITY OF THE STOCK MARKET

The empirical financial literature reports evidence of mean reversion in stock prices and the absence of out‐of‐sample return predictability over horizons shorter than 10 years. Anecdotal evidence suggests the presence of mean reversion in stock prices and return predictability over horizons longer than 10 years, but thus far, there is no empirical evidence confirming such anecdotal evidence. The goal of this paper is to fill this gap in the literature. Specifically, using 141 years of data, this paper begins by performing formal tests of the random walk hypothesis in the prices of the real S&P Composite Index over increasing time horizons of up to 40 years. Although our results cannot support the conventional wisdom that the stock market is safer for long‐term investors, our findings speak in favor of the mean reversion hypothesis. In particular, we find statistically significant in‐sample evidence that past 15‐17 year returns are able to predict the future 15‐17 year returns. This finding is robust to the choice of data source, deflator, and test statistic. The paper continues by investigating the out‐of‐sample performance of long‐horizon return forecasting based on the mean‐reverting model. These latter tests demonstrate that the forecast accuracy provided by the mean‐reverting model is statistically significantly better than the forecast accuracy provided by the naive historical‐mean model. Moreover, we show that the predictive ability of the mean‐reverting model is economically significant and translates into substantial performance gains.     

Do Firms Use M&A Business to Pay for Analyst Coverage?

We find that acquirers in merger and acquisition (M&A) transactions are more likely to hire as advisors investment banks that provided analyst coverage for the acquirer prior to the transaction. We also find that compared to a matched control group of banks, the advisor banks are less likely to terminate and more likely to initiate analyst coverage of the acquirer after the transaction. Finally, the advisor banks that initiate coverage after the transaction collect higher fees. These findings suggest that firms value analyst coverage and use M&A advisor appointments and advisor fees to compensate for it.     

Regulation of State-Owned and Privatized Utilities: Ukraine Electricity Distribution Company Performance*

Both ownership and regulation affect the behavior of utility managers. Private ownership rewards managerial decisions that enhance shareholder value. Regulatory incentives reward behavior that affects profits and costs. An empirical analysis of 24 Ukraine electricity distribution companies from 1998 to 2002 indicates that privately owned firms do respond to incentives that add to net cash flows (associated with reducing commercial and non-commercial network losses). However, they also respond more aggressively than do state-owned distribution utilities to mark-up (cost-plus) regulatory incentives that increase shareholder value but decrease cost efficiency. This study was initiated while Val Tsaplin was a PURC Visiting Scholar with funding from the FSA Contemporary Issues Fellowship Program. Michael Pollitt, David Sappington, Fernando Damonte, and an unknown reviewer provided very helpful comments on earlier drafts. We thank Patricia Mason for copy-editing the paper. The conclusions do not necessarily represent the views of organizations with which the researchers are affiliated.     

Do Investment Banks Have Incentives to Help Clients Make Value‐Creating Acquisitions?

Many have long suspected that investment banks, when advising corporate clients on potential acquisitions, have strong incentives just to “get the deal done” with little if any motive for urging clients to walk away from “bad” deals. The incentive to complete deals comes from compensation arrangements in which the bulk of the bankers' fees depend upon completion of the deals. Several earlier studies have provided support for this suspicion by reporting findings that show banks' market shares of advisory services depending mainly on two variables—their previous market shares and their deal completion rate—with little if any connection to the value created (or destroyed) for their clients' shareholders. In their recently published study, the authors revisit that relationship and reach a number of different conclusions: (1) advisors in acquisitions that create more value for clients are more likely to be chosen for future deals; (2) the changes in bankers' advisory market shares are strongly related to the value created for prior clients; and (3) the changes in banks' market values are positively correlated with the value created for their acquirer clients. In sum, the findings suggest that banks have significant market‐related incentives to advise their clients to pursue value‐creating acquisitions and to avoid deals likely to reduce their market values.     

Forecasting the size premium over different time horizons

In this paper, we provide evidence that the small stock premium is predictable both in-sample and out-of-sample through the use of a set of lagged macroeconomic variables. We find that it is possible to forecast the size premium over time horizons that range from one month to one year. We demonstrate that the predictability of the size premium allows a portfolio manager to generate an economically and statistically significant active alpha.     

Trend following with momentum versus moving averages: a tale of differences

Despite the ever-growing interest in trend following and a series of publications in academic journals, there is a dearth of theoretical results on the properties of trend-following rules. Our paper fills this gap by comparing and contrasting the two most popular trend-following rules, the momentum (MOM) and moving average (MA) rules, from a theoretical perspective. We provide theoretical results on the similarity between different trend-following rules and the forecast accuracy of trading rules. Our results show that the similarity between the MOM and MA rules is high and increases with the strength of the trend. However, compared to the MOM rule, the MA rules exhibit more robust forecast accuracy for the future direction of price trends. In this paper, we also develop a hypothesis about uncertain market dynamics. We show that this hypothesis, coupled with our analytical results, has far-reaching practical implications and can explain a number of empirical observations. Among other things, our hypothesis explains why the empirical performance of the MA rules is better than that of the MOM rule. We broaden the appeal and practical importance of our theoretical results by offering various illustrations and real-world examples.     

The value implications of restrictions on asset sales

This paper examines the effect of restrictions over asset disposition, measured by the ratio of secured debt to fixed assets, on firm value. We find evidence consistent with two non-mutually exclusive hypotheses. (1) Restrictions on the disposition of assets reduce firm value by limiting a firm's ability to restructure assets or to raise funds to finance higher NPV projects. (2) Restrictions on asset disposition increase firm value by limiting agency costs of managerial discretion over uncommitted assets. The net effect of restrictions over asset disposition on firm value is determined by potential agency problems and the need for operating flexibility.