ON‐THE‐JOB SEARCH,PRODUCTIVITY SHOCKS,AND THE INDIVIDUAL EARNINGS PROCESS*

Individual labor earnings observed in worker panel data have complex, highly persistent dynamics. We investigate the capacity of a structural job search model with on‐the‐job search, wage renegotiation by mutual consent, and i.i.d. productivity shocks to replicate salient properties of these dynamics, such as the covariance structure of earnings, the evolution of individual earnings mean, and variance with the duration of uninterrupted employment, or the distribution of year‐to‐year earnings changes. Structural estimation of our model on a 12‐year panel of highly educated British workers shows that our simple framework produces a dynamic earnings structure that is remarkably consistent with the data.     

An empirical assessment of the premium associated with meeting or beating both time-series earnings expectations and analysts’ forecasts

Recent research provides evidence of a market premium accruing to firms that meet or beat analysts’ forecasts. We find similar results for our sample of firms. However, we also find a market premium for firms that meet or beat time-series forecasts, and that the highest market premium accrued to firms that meet or beat both analysts’ and time-series forecasts. These findings are supported by assessments of future financial performance over the next two subsequent years. Our findings are consistent with the notion that when time-series benchmark is used in conjunction with analysts’ forecasts, investors obtain a more reliable (i.e., less noisy) signal regarding whether firms have actually met or beaten market expectations.

Competition,strategic delegation and delay in technology adoption

This paper examines how strategic managerial delegation affects firms' timing of adoption of a new technology under different modes of product market competition. It demonstrates that strategic delegation has differential impacts on adoption dates under Cournot and Bertrand competitions. Strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes always leads to early adoption in markets with Bertrand competition compared to that under no-delegation, but not necessarily so in markets with Cournot competition. It also shows that under strategic delegation with ‘own-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption occurs earlier (later) in markets with Cournot competition than in markets with Bertrand competition, if the degree of product differentiation is high (low). In contrast, under strategic delegation with ‘relative-performance’-based incentive schemes, adoption dates do not differ across markets with different modes of competition. It also analyses implications of firms' choice over types of managerial incentive schemes on the speed of diffusion of new technology.     

The Reaction of Closed End Funds to Stock Distribution Announcements

This study examines the impact of stock split and stock dividend announcements made by closed end mutual funds. We argue that the asymmetric information / signaling hypothesis does not apply to mutual funds. Therefore, any announcement effects must be attributed to other factors such as the optimal trading range hypothesis. We find that closed end funds react no differently than other firms to stock distribution announcements; also, trading volume and turnover remain unchanged after closed end funds' ex-stock distribution days, while liquidity declines for other firms that distribute shares.     

The pricing of accruals for profit and loss firms

This paper investigates whether the accrual anomaly reported in prior studies exists across both profit and loss firms. We posit that the extent of accrual mispricing is less severe for loss firms than for profit firms because earnings for loss firms are less value relevant and, therefore, less subject to accrual mispricing. As expected, we find that the accrual overpricing anomaly is restricted to profit-making firms and, thus, is dampened by the inclusion of loss firms in the sample. Furthermore, we report that accrual overpricing for profit firms but not for loss firms is primarily attributable to the overpricing of positive accruals of profit firms compared with those of loss firms. Finally, we find that the phenomenon of accrual overpricing for profit but not for loss firms may persist into the new regulatory environment following the passage of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002.     

AN EQUILIBRIUM SEARCH MODEL OF SYNCHRONIZED SALES*

We demonstrate the existence of periodic nonstationary equilibria with self‐generating cycles in a simple model of random search. Our results provide a theory of synchronized sales based on product market search by heterogeneous consumers. That is, our model explains how it can be optimal for all sellers to follow a repeated pattern of posting a high price for several periods and then posting a low price for one period.     

Dark tourism through the lens of attachment theory and domestic tourists

This study explores the factors that affect domestic tourist attachment to dark tourism destinations by developing a hybrid model using several methods, including structural equation modeling (SEM) and fuzzy analytical hierarchy process (FAHP), predicated on attachment theory. The study collected data from 60 tourism experts and 622 domestic tourists. The study found that tourist motivation, national identity, tourism impacts, and destination attachment are all crucial factors that explain domestic tourist behavior towards dark tourism. The results of the mediation analysis indicate that destination attachment mediates the relationship between tourist motivation, national identity, and negative tourism impact with tourist satisfaction. The FAHP results show that place identity has the highest influence while place dependence has the lowest influence in shaping domestic tourists' selection of dark tourist destinations. The study's findings provide valuable insights for tour operators and destination managers to meet domestic tourists' expectations of dark tourism, adding to the existing knowledge related to the factors that impact dark tourism.     

Price discovery in commodity derivatives: Speculation or hedging?

We investigate whether commodity futures or options markets play a more important role in the price discovery process in the six most actively traded markets: crude oil, natural gas, gold, silver, corn, and soybeans. Using new information leadership techniques, we report new evidence and report that both markets make a meaningful contribution to price discovery in recent times; however, on average, options lead futures in reflecting new information for a majority of these commodities. We find that increased speculation, rather than hedging activity, in commodity derivatives is a key determinant of price discovery in the options markets.     

Will a matchmaker invite her potential rival in?

This paper analyzes optimal strategies of an incumbent intermediary, who matches agents on the two sides of a market, in the presence of entry threat under alternative scenarios. It shows that, when entry is free, strategic entry accommodation is the optimal choice of the incumbent—not entry deterrence, unless the variation in agents' types is small. Entry accommodation remains optimal for the incumbent for a wide range of parametric configurations even when there is a fixed cost of entry. These results are in sharp contrast to the predictions of existing models of entry.     

The timing of changes in CEO compensation from cash bonus to equity-based compensation: Determinants and performance consequences

This study examines the determinants and performance consequences of changes in CEO compensation structure. The study uses the unique setting when Australian companies have changed from cash bonus to equity-based compensation. While most US CEOs receive some form of equity-based compensation, Australian CEOs have not always been paid equity-based compensation. According to efficient contracting theories, we argue that the change to equity-based compensation is driven by changes in firm characteristics and by the occurrence of CEO turnover, the latter of which provides a less costly opportunity for such change. Our results are consistent with the above arguments. We also document a significant negative association between changes in compensation structure and subsequent firm performance in the following year, even after controlling for CEO turnover and poor governance environments. Overall, our results suggest that the initial change to equity-based compensation is part of an error learning process made by firms that leads them towards efficient CEO compensation contracts.