On the short-time behavior of the implied volatility for jump-diffusion models with stochastic volatility

In this paper we use Malliavin calculus techniques to obtain an expression for the short-time behavior of the at-the-money implied volatility skew for a generalization of the Bates model, where the volatility does not need to be a diffusion or a Markov process, as the examples in Sect. 7 show. This expression depends on the derivative of the volatility in the sense of Malliavin calculus. E. Alòs’ research is supported by grants MEC FEDER MTM 2006 06427 and SEJ2006-13537. J.A. León’s research is partially supported by the CONACyT grant 45684-F. J. Vives’ research is supported by grant MEC FEDER MTM 2006 06427.     

Competition in the Changing World of Banking

This paper reviews the role of competition in banking againstthe background of a transforming sector. It uses industrialorganization and modern financial intermediation analysis tostudy the relationships between the level of competition, risk-takingincentives, and the regulatory frame. The consequences for marketstructure of the liberalization process and the need for competitionpolicy in the sector are high-lighted.     

Short-term investment and the informational efficiency of the market

A dynamic finite-horizon market for a risky asset with a continuumof risk-average heterogeneously informed investors and a risk-neutralcompetitive market-making sector is examined. The article analyzesthe effect of investors' horizons on the information contentof prices. It is shown that short horizons enhance or reduceaccumulated price informativeness depending on the temporalpattern of private information arrival. With concentrated arrivalof information, short horizons, reduce final price informativeness;with diffuse arrival of information, short horizons enhanceit. In the process a closed-form solution to the dynamic equilibriumwith long-term investors is derived.     

Social learning and costly information acquisition

Summary. Short-lived agents want to predict a random variable q\theta and have to decide how much effort to devote to collect private information and consequently how much to rely on public information. The latter is just a noisy average of past predictions. It is shown that costly information acquisition prevents an unbounded accumulation of public information if (and only if) the marginal cost to acquire information is positive at zero (C￠(0) > 0)(C^\prime (0) > 0). When C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision at period n, _boxclose_boxclose\tau_n, tends to infinity with n but the rate of convergence of public information to q\theta is slowed down with respect to the exogenous information case. At the market outcome agents acquire too little private information. This happens either with respect to a (decentralized) first best benchmark or, for n large, with respect to a (decentralized) second best benchmark. For high discount factors the limit point of market public precision always falls short of the welfare benchmarks whenever C￠(0) > 0C^\prime (0) > 0. In the extreme, as the discount factor tends to one public precision tends to infinity in the welfare-optimal programs while it remains bounded at the market solution. Otherwise, if C￠(0) = 0C^\prime (0) = 0 public precision accumulates in an unbounded way both at the first and second best solutions. More public information may hurt at either the market or second best solutions.     

Price Dynamics and Consumer Learning

This paper studies the price dynamics induced by strategic firm behavior in the presence of consumer learning about the uncertain quality differential of the products offered by a duopoly. It is found that consumers learn slowly and that prices converge also slowly to full-information levels. A consequence is that the incentives affirms to manipulate consumers' beliefs are persistent. Although pricing tends to be aggressive at the early stages, and average prices eventually increase over time, price wars may occur at intermediate stages of the product life cycle.     

Perceptions of Justice and the Human Rights Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework

Human rights declarations are instruments used to introduce universal standards of ethics. The UN’s Protect, Respect, and Remedy Framework (Ruggie, Protect, respect, and remedy: A Framework for business and human rights. UN Doc A/HRC/8/5, 2008; Guiding principles on business and human rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect, and Remedy” framework. UN Doc A/HRC/17/31, 2011) intends to provide guidance for corporate behavior in regard to human rights. This article applies concepts from the field of organizational justice to the arena of business and human rights for the purpose of operationalizing the UN Framework. This approach facilitates the recognition of gaps between perceptions of justice held by stakeholders versus businesses and/or the State. Such recognition raises the potential for addressing issues that lead to divergent perceptions of justice, thus potentially improving the human rights performance of businesses. The research also shows the potential for complicity of businesses in human rights abuses and exposes a fundamental weakness in the UN Framework, which attempts to draw a sharp distinction between duties of States versus responsibilities of business. We illustrate this approach through analysis of the case of Goldcorp’s Marlin Mine in Guatemala; an extractive industry project that affects indigenous communities.     

Games of strategic complementarities: an application to Bayesian games

This paper provides an introduction to the theory of games of strategic complementarities, considers Bayesian games, and provides an application to global games. This paper is based on the Spanish Economic Review lecture given at the Simposio de Análisis Económico, Alicante, December 2001. Support from the Spanish Ministry of Education and Science (project SEJ2005-08263) is gratefully acknowledged.