Entry, exit, market makers, and the bid-ask spread

The probability of entry and exit of dealers on the NASDAQ NationalMarket (NNM) is significantly affected by trading intensity,volatility and the quoted bid-ask spread. Entry and exit ofmarket makers is a pervasive phenomenon. Large-scale entry (exit)is associated with substantial declines (increases) in quotedend-of-day inside spreads, even after controlling for the effectsof changes in volume and volatility. The spread changes arelarger in magnitude for issues with few market makers; however,even for issues with a large number of market makers, substantialchanges in quoted spreads take place. The results are consistentwith the competitive model of dealer pricing.     

Momentum Trading by Institutions

We document the equity trading practices of approximately 1,200 institutions from the third quarter of 1987 through the third quarter of 1995. We decompose trading by institutions into the initiation of new positions (entry), the termination of previous positions (exit), and adjustments to ongoing holdings. Institutions act as momentum traders when they enter stocks but as contrarian traders when they exit or make adjustments to ongoing holdings. We find significant differences in trading practices among different types of institutions.     

Style investing,comovement and return predictability

Barberis and Shleifer (2003) argue that style investing generates momentum and reversals in style and individual asset returns, as well as comovement between individual assets and their styles. Consistent with these predictions, in some specifications, past style returns help explain future stock returns after controlling for size, book-to-market and past stock returns. We also use comovement to identify style investing and assess its impact on momentum. High comovement momentum portfolios have significantly higher future returns than low comovement momentum portfolios. Overall, our results suggest that style investing plays a role in the predictability of asset returns.     

Competition among mutual funds

We examine the impact of the entry of new mutual funds on incumbents using the overlap in their portfolio holdings as a measure of competitive intensity. This simple metric delivers powerful economic results. Incumbents that have a high overlap with entrants subsequently engage in price competition by reducing management fees. Distribution fees, however, rise so that investors do not benefit as much from price competition. Funds with high overlap also experience quantity competition through lower investor flows, have lower alphas, and higher attrition rates. These effects only appear after the late 1990s, at which point there appears to be an endogenous structural shift in the competitive environment. We conclude that the mutual fund market has evolved into one that displays the hallmark features of a competitive market.     

The profitability and investment premium: Pre-1963 evidence

I investigate the profitability and investment premium in stock returns using hand-collected data from Moody's Manuals for 1940–1963. Controlling for value, the profitability premium emerges as important in this period. In contrast, there is no reliable relation between investment and returns, regardless of whether investment is measured using growth in total assets or book equity and even after extending the data back to 1926. In spanning regressions, factors constructed from profitability and book-to-market ratios (RMW and HML, respectively) improve the mean-variance efficient tangency portfolio but the investment factor (CMA) does not.     

Institutional Trading and Soft Dollars

Proprietary data allow us to distinguish between institutional investors' orders directed to soft-dollar brokers and those directed to other types of brokers. We find that soft-dollar brokers execute smaller orders in larger market value stocks. Allowing for differences in order characteristics, we estimate the incremental implicit cost of soft-dollar execution at 29 (24) basis points for buyer- (seller-) initiated orders. For large orders, incremental implicit costs are 41 (30) basis points for buys (sells). However, we document substantial variability in these estimates, and research services provided by soft-dollar brokers may at least partially offset these costs.