On the Effects of Deposit Insurance and Observability on Bank Runs: An Experimental Study

We study the effects of deposit insurance and observability of previous actions on the emergence of bank runs by means of a controlled laboratory experiment. We consider three depositors in the line of a bank, who decide between withdrawing or keeping their money deposited. We have three treatments with different levels of deposit insurance which reflect the losses a depositor may incur in the case of a bank run. We find that different levels of deposit insurance and the possibility of observing other depositors’ actions affect the likelihood of bank runs. When decisions are not observable, higher levels of deposit insurance decrease the probability of bank runs. When decisions are observable, this need not to be the case. These results suggest that (i) observability might be considered as a partial substitute of deposit insurance and (ii) the optimal deposit insurance should take into account the degree of observability.     

DOMESTIC MARKETS AND INTERNATIONAL COMPETITIVENESS: GENERIC AND PRODUCT-SPECIFIC COMPETENCIES IN THE ENGINEERING SECTOR

This paper develops a theory of how the size of the domestic market shapes firm competencies. Our theory implies that large markets are beneficial even if factors such as economies of scale or learning effects are absent. We validate our model by an international comparison of the performance of firms that provide engineering services to the oil and petrochemical industry. We conclude that, relative to the United States, the competitiveness of European or Japanese industries is greater in activities whose underlying competencies are not product specific and can be utilized across a variety of products. The benefits of large markets are greatest for activities based on product-specific competencies. © 1997 by John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.