Fixed Asset Revaluations and Managerial Incentives

The study attempts to explain why Australian companies revalue their fixed assets, when a revaluation, by itself , has no discernible direct effect on cash flows and is costly to carry out. A revaluation is hypothesised to affect contracting and political costs. It may also help resolve problems associated with information asymmetries, or be used to signal information to investors. The results support the proposition that economic forces help explain the decision to revalue assets.     

Is There a Bank-Lending Channel of Monetary Policy in New Zealand?

The results reported in the paper cast serious doubt on the existence of a potent bank-lending channel of monetary policy in New Zealand either before or after the reforms of the mid-1980s. We find no sound evidence of a link between a number of different finance mix variables and economic activity in New Zealand. Similar, unfavourable results are reported by the investigation of the connection between movements in an interest rate spread and real economic performance. Moreover, neither the finance mix variables nor the spread respond consistently to changes in various indicators of monetary policy.     

Effects of Increasing Enforcement on Financial Reporting Quality and Audit Quality

A widely held assumption in policy making and empirical research is that increasing the strength of public enforcement improves financial reporting quality and audit quality. This paper provides a more nuanced view. In a model with a manager who can manage earnings, a strategic auditor, and an enforcement institution, we show that enforcement and auditing are complements in a weak enforcement regime but can be substitutes in a strong regime. Although stronger enforcement always mitigates earnings management, the effects of different instruments of strengthening enforcement are ambiguous. We show that they can improve or impair financial reporting quality and audit quality, depending on production risk, accounting system characteristics, and the scope of auditing relative to enforcement.     

HOW CONSERVATIVE DOES THE CENTRAL BANKER HAVE TO BE? ON THE TREATMENT OF EXPECTATIONS UNDER DISCRETIONARY POLICYMAKING

This paper explores an issue that arises in the delegation process. The paper shows that a myopic central banker, one who treats expectations as constant in setting discretionary policy, can replicate the behaviour of output and inflation under policy from a timeless perspective. For that to happen, society must delegate a price level target or a speed limit policy to a central banker who is more weight-conservative than society.